A Dream Foreclosed: the Uneven Geography of the Foreclosure Crisis in the Twin Cities by Avre, Zack
Macalester College
DigitalCommons@Macalester College
Geography Honors Projects Geography Department
5-6-2014
A Dream Foreclosed: the Uneven Geography of
the Foreclosure Crisis in the Twin Cities
Zack Avre
Macalester College, zavre@macalester.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/geography_honors
Part of the Geography Commons
This Honors Project - Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the Geography Department at DigitalCommons@Macalester College.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Geography Honors Projects by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Macalester College. For more
information, please contact scholarpub@macalester.edu.
Recommended Citation
Avre, Zack, "A Dream Foreclosed: the Uneven Geography of the Foreclosure Crisis in the Twin Cities" (2014). Geography Honors
Projects. Paper 41.
http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/geography_honors/41
  
A Dream Foreclosed: 
The Uneven Geography of the Foreclosure Crisis 
in the Twin Cities 
 
 
 
Zack Avre 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Honors Project  
Advisor: Laura Smith  
Department of Geography  
Macalester College 
Saint Paul, Minnesota 
 
May 6, 2014
 INTRODUCTION TO THE PUBLICATION 
This publication originated out of research conducted through a grant from the Anderson-
Grosshuesch Interdisciplinary Summer Research Fund for 2013 and draws inspiration from two 
distinct sources. First, this research picks up where existing Twin Cities housing research 
produced by John Adams and my own advisor, Laura Smith, left off before the subprime 
mortgage crisis of the mid-2000s. Secondly, this publication aims to put numbers to anecdotes 
surrounding the foreclosure crisis in the Twin Cities. With several colleagues and friends 
engaged in anti-foreclosure work in the metro region, I have been humbled and inspired by 
stories of those fighting to stay in their homes and keep the “American Dream” alive. This 
publication serves to validate the experiences of individuals and communities stricken by 
foreclosure, particularly low-income, communities of color, with quantitative evidence.   
Though the document is over two hundred pages in length, analysis breaks down into five 
case study chapters covering distinct portions of the Twin Cities metro region. For those 
interested in place-specific analysis, the chapters break down as follows: 
 Chapter IV: South Minneapolis, Richfield, Bloomington, Burnsville, and Lakeville 
 Chapter V: North Minneapolis, Golden Valley, Robbinsdale, New Hope, Crystal, 
Brooklyn Park, and Maple Grove 
 Chapter VI: North Minneapolis, Brooklyn Center, and Brooklyn Park 
 Chapter VII: Saint Paul, Roseville, and Shoreview 
 Chapter VIII: Saint Paul, Maplewood, Oakdale, and Woodbury 
As noted in the Table of Contents, at the end of each of the five case study chapters there are 
one- to two-page discussion sections that summarize and distill both the pre- and post-housing 
crash trends and the effects of the foreclosure crisis examined in the body of each case study 
chapter. The final chapter offers metro wide conclusions and next steps for further research. 
The online version of this document also includes an appendix for each case study 
chapter. Included in these appendices are maps highlighting 1) the reference area, 2) housing 
appreciation and depreciation trends between 2002 and 2013, 3) median home values from select 
years, and 4) annual overall, homeowner, and renter foreclosure rates from 2007 to 2012. These 
maps are meant to not only supplement this publication but also serve as resources for those 
involved in anti-foreclosure and equitable housing work. These maps, most of which appear in 
the body of the document, can be accessed via Digital Commons @ Macalester or by request.  
While the following publication is academic in nature, it is meant to be accessible to a 
wider audience, serve as a resource, and ideally, have a greater impact on communities across the 
Twin Cities. It is my hope that this publication informs and empowers communities, 
organizations, and individuals involved in anti-foreclosure work and those fighting for more 
equitable and just housing policy moving forward. 
 
 
Zack Avre 
Macalester College 
Department of Geography 
May 2014 
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ABSTRACT 
Grounded in research on urban housing submarkets, this project assesses the spatial dynamics 
of the Twin Cities housing market leading up to the subprime mortgage crisis and analyzes the 
neighborhood impact of the resulting rise in foreclosures, particularly on historically 
marginalized communities. Constructing housing price histories from central core to outermost 
suburbs for five submarkets in the Twin Cities, this research reveals the uneven geography of 
housing bubbles and foreclosures across the metro region. Communities with high 
concentrations of people of color and low-income residents witnessed the greatest levels of 
housing value appreciation leading up to the housing crash. However, low-income communities 
of color and renters across the metro region experienced disproportionately higher rates of 
foreclosure and housing value depreciation than more affluent, white homeowners in the 
aftermath of the crash. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 Following the Great Depression and World War II, homeownership embodied the 
American Dream: a vehicle for upward mobility and the ticket to the middle-class. The subprime 
mortgage crash of 2007 and subsequent foreclosure crisis, however, jeopardized this dream for 
millions of Americans. As housing prices began to plummet from historic heights, millions of 
homeowners fell underwater on their mortgages and faced foreclosure, wreaking havoc on 
communities across the country. Though suburban homeowners who bought beyond their means 
experienced foreclosure, the impacts of the crisis were disproportionately concentrated in urban 
communities of color (Massey and Rugh 2010), and by the fall of 2011, activists in these 
communities took to the streets. In Minneapolis, Occupy Homes MN, a grassroots organization 
focused on housing justice for “low income people and communities of color” (Occupy Homes 
MN 2014), has partnered with numerous community members experiencing foreclosure, 
occupying homes and demanding mediation and loan modification for underwater homeowners. 
These campaigns, replete with barricaded homes and police confrontation, tell harrowing 
anecdotes of foreclosure and viscerally underscore how much is at stake, particularly for low-
income residents and people of color. However, how has the foreclosure crisis impacted 
communities across the Twin Cities? 
In this thesis, I aim to put numbers to anecdotes by examining the uneven geography of 
the housing dynamics leading up to and following the housing crash and the impact of the 
foreclosure crisis within the Twin Cities metro region. I explore how the Twin Cities housing 
market evolved in the years immediately preceding and following the subprime mortgage crash 
and determine the location of the biggest housing bubbles in the region and where they burst. To 
do so, I conduct five case studies within the Twin Cities using urban housing submarket theory. 
11 
Housing submarkets in the Twin Cities radiate outward from downtown Minneapolis and Saint 
Paul, and submarket theory follows the assumption that home values in these submarkets will 
appreciate most rapidly at the edges of suburban development and least rapidly in the city core. 
For my study, I predominantly examine middle-class, “American Dream” submarkets, in which 
geographic mobility, or the ability to move outward away from the central city, reflects 
socioeconomic mobility. Throughout my thesis, I make an explicit connection between changes 
in home values and foreclosure rates. Homeowners, and in turn communities, who saw dramatic 
pre-crash appreciation and post-crash depreciation in home values were more likely to hold 
underwater mortgages and experience foreclosure. 
Furthermore, I pay particular attention to the social inequity of the evolving housing 
market leading up to and following the housing crash. According to urban housing submarket 
theory, suburban communities at the periphery of the metro region should see greater levels of 
housing appreciation than their counterparts in inner-city neighborhoods. At its core, this 
process, which largely benefits white, suburban homeowners, is inequitable. In analyzing the 
uneven housing dynamics in the Twin Cities, this research recognizes this inequity and seeks to 
understand the way it manifests across the metro region through the submarket model. To that 
end, I attempt to discover which communities have been hit hardest by the foreclosure crisis, and 
what are the social equity implications of the housing crash for historically marginalized 
communities in the Twin Cities. 
 Ultimately, I argue that the housing dynamics leading up to and following the subprime 
mortgage collapse conditioned an uneven geography to the foreclosure crisis within the Twin 
Cities, in which neighborhoods with high concentrations of low-income residents, people of 
color, and renters were disproportionately affected. In the years preceding the housing crash, 
12 
home values rose most rapidly in the central cities, with substantial housing bubbles forming in 
mostly African-American, Latino, and Asian neighborhoods. Following the crash, these bubbles 
burst, and inner-city neighborhoods with large concentrations of low-income residents, people of 
color, and renters witnessed the highest levels of housing depreciation and largest concentrations 
of foreclosures in the metro region. Though validating anecdotes of the foreclosure crisis, this 
uneven pattern, particularly leading up to the crash, contradicts the assumptions of traditional 
housing submarket theory. 
 To support this argument, I first cover the two key conversations that inform this 
research: urban housing submarkets and the community impact of foreclosures. Next, in Chapter 
III, I detail my methodology for analyzing the housing dynamics and uneven impact of the 
foreclosure crisis across the Twin Cities. Then, in Chapters IV through VIII, I examine the pre- 
and post-crash housing dynamics and geography of the foreclosure crisis within five case studies 
across the metro region. Lastly, in Chapter IX, I offer conclusions of how my results contribute 
to existing research on housing submarkets and the foreclosure crisis and reflect on next steps for 
farther research.  
 
 
 
 
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 
 
URBAN HOUSING SUBMARKETS 
AND THE 
COMMUNITY IMPACT OF FORECLOSURES: 
 
Source: Adams (1991, Fig. 7.2) 
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INTRODUCTION 
 My analysis of the uneven geography of the foreclosure crisis in the Twin Cities is 
informed by two distinct but related discussions: urban housing submarket theory and the 
community impacts of foreclosures. First, I wield urban housing submarket theory as a model to 
understand how housing dynamics within the metro region have evolved since the early 2000s 
and compare these housing trends across space and time. Up to 2000, submarket theory did well 
to explain housing trends within the Twin Cities, in particular (Adams et al. 2002). Secondly, 
because my research analyzes the impact of the foreclosure crisis at a neighborhood level, I use 
existing research on the community impacts of foreclosures to emphasize the implications of 
foreclosure for Twin Cities communities hit hardest by the crisis. Moreover, changing housing 
dynamics have direct and indirect influences on foreclosures, e.g., plummeting property values 
can lead to increased foreclosures, and vice versa. Recognizing the interconnectedness of 
housing dynamics, such as appreciation and depreciation, and foreclosure rates serves to 
underscore how the impacts of the foreclosure crisis reverberated through communities, 
particularly those with high concentrations of low-income residents and people of color. 
URBAN HOUSING SUBMARKETS IN A TWIN CITIES CONTEXT 
I. HOUSING SUBMARKETS AND VACANCY CHAINS  
To examine the housing dynamics in the Twin Cities leading up to and following the 
housing crash, I apply urban housing submarket theory, as developed by John Adams. Stemming 
from the Hoyt Sector Model which concludes that urban development follows residential, 
commercial, and industrial sectors that emanate from the city center (Hoyt 1939), submarket 
theory posits that “many Midwestern metropolitan housing markets have become partitioned into 
well-defined submarkets that originated near downtowns” (Adams 1991, pg. 110). These housing 
15 
submarkets, classified by socioeconomic status, radiate out like spokes from the origins of 
single-family housing near the downtown out to the farthest reaches of suburban development. 
Each of these submarkets has “its own unique history, character, demography, housing market 
conditions and retailing tastes” (Adams 1991, pg. 112). Within the Twin Cities, there have 
traditionally been fourteen housing submarkets (Map 2a). The existence of these submarkets has 
been “confirmed by studies of residential mobility, and by planners, developers, builders, 
financiers, and transportation and marketing specialists who know the region” (Adams et al. 
2002, pg. 21).  
A central component to housing submarket theory is the existence of residential vacancy 
chains. Adams et al. (2002, pg. 19) explain vacancy chains as the movement of households in 
one direction, i.e., into a new house, and vacancies in the other direction, i.e., to household’s 
previous address. As new, more desirable housing is built at the periphery of suburban 
development, it sets into motion a series of vacancies throughout an entire submarket as 
households simultaneously move into vacant homes and leave their former homes vacant. In 
other words, residential vacancy chains operate like ladders: as a new rung is created at the top of 
the ladder, individuals fill the gap left above them until the vacancy chain ends at the innermost 
part of the ladder, or submarket. Because of the long-term tendency of middle-class households 
to move up and out, residential mobility patterns have a “long-term directional bias outward” 
(Adams et al. 2002, pg. 20). As such, residential vacancy chains, and housing submarket theory 
broadly, privilege new, more affluent communities at the periphery of the metro region at the 
expense of older, less prosperous communities in the central city. 
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Map 2a. Twin Cities Housing Submarkets, by Socioeconomic Classification 
 
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, Adams (1991) 
II. Socioeconomic Classification 
Upper-Class Submarkets 
 Historically home to “the out-of-sight rich and captains of local industry” (Adams 1991, 
pg. 114), upper-class submarkets are generally the most stable sectors in a metropolitan housing 
market. Housing in these upper-tier locales is “often physically isolated from other sectors” 
(Adams 1991, pg. 111), and the affluent homeowners in these sectors tend to buy their desired 
home the first time and rarely relocate. As such, upper-class submarkets are relatively slow to 
17 
expand. Instead, they primarily influence housing markets by “setting styles and tastes” (Adams 
1991, pg. 112). Within the Twin Cities metro region, there are two upper-class submarkets: 
 Submarket C: Southwest Lake District – Edina – Minnetonka 
 Submarket M: Summit Avenue – Macalester-Groveland – Highland Park – Mendota 
Heights 
Middle- and Upper-Middle Class Submarkets 
 Unlike their upper-class and working-class counterparts, middle- and upper-middle class 
housing submarkets are spatially and socioeconomically dynamic and expand outward the most 
rapidly of the three submarket groups. In middle-class submarkets, housing is seen as an 
appreciating asset, a vehicle to build equity, and a means to the “American Dream.” That is, for 
middle-class homeowners geographic mobility reflects socioeconomic mobility. Consequently, 
middle- and upper-middle class households in these submarkets often move up and out to “better 
housing as soon as they can afford it” (Adams 1991, pg. 111). These households follow long 
vacancy chains that “extend from the zone of new construction at the suburban edge to old 
neighborhoods in the inner city” (Adams 1991, pg. 111); as a new housing unit is built at the 
edge of the submarket, households jump up the geographic and socioeconomic ladder to fill the 
resulting vacancies. Moving socioeconomically up and geographically out, households in 
middle-class submarkets push their tastes and lifestyles outward. Five middle and upper-middle 
class submarkets exist in the Twin Cities, including: 
 Submarket B: South Minneapolis – Richfield – East Bloomington – Burnsville - 
Lakeville 
 Submarket D: Near North Minneapolis – Golden Valley – Crystal – New Hope – 
Plymouth – Maple Grove 
 Submarket G: Southeast – New Brighton – Mounds View – Blaine 
 Submarket H: Como Park – Saint Anthony Park – Roseville – Shoreview 
 Submarket K: East Side – Maplewood – Oakdale – Woodbury 
18 
Working and Lower-Middle Class Submarkets 
 Working-class submarkets, like their upper-class counterparts, are relatively stable. 
Traditionally concentrated near employment areas historically bypassed by the middle and upper 
classes, working-class submarkets generally expand only to accommodate population expansion 
(Adams 1991, pg. 112). Whereas upper-class and middle-class households view housing as a 
symbol of status and as an appreciating asset, respectively, housing in working-class submarkets 
primarily serves as a source of shelter. Instead of using housing to build equity or push tastes, 
working-class households tend to focus on current consumption, though “ownership has been a 
major goal” (Adams 1991, pg. 112) within these submarkets. There are eight distinct working 
submarkets across the Twin Cities: 
 Submarket A: Cedar/Riverside – Hiawatha – Lake Nokomis – Minnehaha Park 
 Submarket E: North Minneapolis – Brooklyn Center – Brooklyn Park 
 Submarket F: Northeast – Columbia Heights – Fridley – Coon Rapids 
 Submarket I: North End 
 Submarket J:  Lake Phalen – Maplewood – White Bear Lake 
 Submarket L: West Side – West Saint Paul – South Saint Paul – Inver Grove Heights 
 Submarket N: West Seventh Street 
III. Existing Research on Twin Cities Housing Submarkets, 1970 to 1995 
Analyzing the patterns and trends in house price changes from 1970 to 1995 within the 
Twin Cities, John Adams et al. (2002) hypothesize and conclude that newer, more desirable 
homes located at the edges of housing submarkets appreciate more rapidly than older housing 
units situated near the city core. The group study housing prices in three of the fourteen 
submarkets to “see how they vary from the downtown core to the suburban edge, and to see how 
price trends have persisted over time” (Adams et al. 2002, pg. 5). Adams et al. (2002) examine 
two middle-class submarkets, Submarket B from South Minneapolis to Burnsville and 
19 
Submarket H from Saint Paul to Shoreview, and one working-class submarket, Submarket E 
from North Minneapolis to Brooklyn Park.  
 The group ground their hypothesis in two primary assumptions related to housing 
submarket housing theory: 1) that households usually prefer “newer, larger, and lower-density 
housing over older, smaller high-density housing,” and 2) that newer housing can often “be a 
better financial bargain than old housing” (Adams et al. 2002, pg. 72). First, as cities develop 
center to edge, the newest, most desirable housing units are usually located at the outer edges of 
suburban development, whereas older, less desirable housing options are concentrated in 
communities near the downtown. Over time, households “tend to press outward […] as their 
circumstances permit” (Adams et al. 2002, pg. 72), i.e., increasing family sizes, real increases in 
wealth, etc., placing strong demand on the supply of newer houses. Secondly, various tax 
advantages, including “generous income tax treatment of mortgage interest, real estate taxes; and 
capital gains on residential real estate” (Adams et al. 2002, pg. 93), and underpriced 
infrastructure and utilities contribute to relatively large capital gains for new houses. As such, 
newer housing makes more financial sense for households than occupying older housing that will 
likely experience marginal capital gains. Overall, despite some deviations from “localized, tract-
level changes in housing demand and housing supply” (Adams et al. 2002, pg. 94), the findings 
generally follow these assumptions and support Adams et al.’s (2002) hypothesis that rates of 
housing appreciation rise with distance from the central city. 
COMMUNITY IMPACT OF FORECLOSURES 
Additionally, I situate my analysis within existing research on the impact of foreclosures 
on communities, people of color, and renters to underscore the neighborhood-wide and 
socioeconomic implications of the uneven spatial distribution of foreclosures in the Twin Cities. 
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Though foreclosures occur on an individual basis, their impact is not isolated to an individual 
homeowner or property. Instead, every foreclosure negatively impacts the surrounding homes, 
neighborhood, and city. Though single foreclosures in relatively stable neighborhoods 
marginally impact nearby homes, high-density concentrations of foreclosures correspond to 
plummeting home values, increased vacancy rates, rising crime, and mounting public sector 
costs, threatening neighborhood stability and survival. Furthermore, existing research points to 
an uneven impact of foreclosures on people of color and renters alike. 
I. Community Impact of Foreclosures 
Property Values and Vacancies 
 Concentrations of foreclosures in neighborhoods lead to declining property values and 
increasing residential vacancies. Because property values are not based simply on the land 
located directly below a structure but on the surrounding area as well, foreclosures affect not 
only the value of the foreclosed property but property values surrounding the home, as well. In 
fact, foreclosures have a “statistically and economically significant effect on property values” 
within an eighth of a mile radius (Immergluck and Smith 2006, p. 75). Previous research has 
found each additional foreclosure within an eighth of a mile of a property reduces the value of 
the property between 1.4 and 1.8 percent (Immergluck and Smith 2006, p. 72). For low- and 
moderate-income neighborhoods, this equates to losses of $1,600 to $2,000 for the average 
property per additional nearby foreclosure. Additionally, as homeowners are forced out of their 
homes, foreclosures can inflict harm in neighborhoods by “triggering extended vacancies or, 
worse, abandoned and blighted buildings” (Immergluck and Smith 2006, p. 854). Residential 
vacancies not only lead to physical disorder within a neighborhood but can lower the value of 
surrounding properties by more than $7,000 (Shlay and Whitman 2006). With high-density 
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concentrations of foreclosures, neighborhoods experience a domino effect in which foreclosures 
lead to vacancies that in turn damage surrounding property values.  
 Social Disorder, Crime, and Violence 
 Moreover, increased foreclosures in a community lead to greater social disorder and 
higher rates of violent crime. Traditionally, vacant and abandoned buildings, particularly high-
density concentrations, have signaled poor neighborhood health. Researchers of social (dis)order, 
such as broken windows theorists (Kelling and Coles 1996; Wilson and Kelling 1982), argue that 
neighborhood disinvestment in the form of abandoned and boarded-up buildings suggests 
negligence, decay, and lack of social order, harboring vandalism and more serious crime. Given 
the strong association between foreclosures and residential vacancies, Immergluck and Smith 
(2006, p. 862) find that foreclosure rate “remains a statistically significant determinant of violent 
crime” in a neighborhood. In fact, for every one percentage increase in foreclosure rate the 
number of violent crimes rises by roughly 2.3 percent (Immergluck and Smith 2006, p. 862). The 
neighborhood instability created by high-density concentrations of foreclosures and rising 
residential vacancies begets broader instability through rising social disorder and violent crime in 
communities dealing with high foreclosure rates. 
 Public Sector Costs and Fiscal Health 
Foreclosures also inflict considerable damage to the fiscal health and governing capacity 
of local municipalities. In researching foreclosures in Chicago, Apgar and Duda (2005) 
discovered that the average vacant foreclosure costs municipalities over $19,000 in legal fees, 
management expenses, inspections, lost or delayed taxes among other costs. Beyond the direct 
costs of foreclosure to municipalities, foreclosures and the resulting rise in vacancies, decline in 
property values, and increase in displaced households contribute to a shrinking tax base and 
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strains on the ability of the municipality to deliver services. Within the Twin Cities, the public 
sector costs of the foreclosure crisis are palpable. In 2011, Neighborhoods Organizing for 
Change (NOC), a Minneapolis-based grassroots organizing nonprofit, found that the more than 
13,000 foreclosures in Minneapolis since 2006 had forced nearly 4,000 students out of the 
Minneapolis Public Schools (MPS) district (2011, p. 5). Moreover, this dramatic displacement 
cost MPS around $150 million in state funding over the time period (NOC 2011, p. 5). While 
direct costs of foreclosures are easy to trace, indirect costs stemming from displacement of 
residents and declining property values are just as devastating for local municipalities. 
II. Race and Foreclosures 
 Existing research on the subprime mortgage crisis suggests not only a disproportionate 
impact of foreclosure on people of color but also a causal link between segregation and the 
foreclosure crisis. In Minneapolis and across the United States, the foreclosure crisis was a 
highly racialized process, with households of color “significantly more likely than white 
households to experience a foreclosure for both home purchase and refinance loans, even after 
controlling for a variety of other potentially confounding characteristics” (Allen 2011, pg. 136). 
Rugh and Massey (2010, pg. 645) find strong empirical evidence that segregation, in particular, 
“racialized and intensified the consequences of the American housing bubble.” Racial 
discrimination and residential segregation “create a natural market for subprime lending and 
cause riskier mortgages, and thus foreclosures” (Rugh and Massey 2010, pg. 630), which 
disproportionately focuses the negative effects on borrowers and homeowners of color 
(Immergluck 2008; Wyly 2009). More so than other causal factors such overbuilding and 
excessive subprime lending, residential segregation explains the uneven impact of the 
foreclosure crisis on communities of color. 
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III. Impact of Foreclosures on Renters 
 Renters in properties going through foreclosure do not hold the foreclosed mortgage loan, 
yet they are nonetheless affected by foreclosure. After foreclosure of their landlords’ properties, 
most renters experience forced eviction and involuntary displacement through no fault of their 
own. Additionally, tenants’ rights organizations have cataloged a host of “hidden impacts” for 
renters living in foreclosed properties, including but not limited to losing security deposits, living 
without basic utilities, unaddressed home repairs, rent skimming, fraudulent and deceptive 
practices, and even forced homelessness (Tenants Together 2009, pgs. 8-18). Moreover, upon 
eviction, displaced renters often “struggle to find new housing,” and many seek out temporary 
housing before securing new, stable housing (LCBH 2012, pg. 5). While renters do not feel the 
direct impact of defaulting on a mortgage, they still face the lived reality of foreclosure, from 
eviction and displacement to residing in neglected properties.
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INTRODUCTION 
Building on the research produced by John S. Adams et al. in the Minnesota Department 
of Transportation report, “House Price Changes and Capital Shifts in Real Estate Values in Twin 
Cities-Area Housing Submarkets,” the methodology of this project incorporates and expands 
upon that used for the 2002 report. To address the research questions broached in Chapter I, I 
utilize descriptive spatial analysis to chart the evolution of the Twin Cities housing market 
between 2002 and 2013 and assess the uneven geography of the foreclosure crisis. I pay 
particular attention to the housing dynamics leading up to and following the housing crash, rates 
of foreclosure, and the socioeconomic context of each census tract, i.e., race, income, and 
neighborhood health. 
SPATIAL ANALYSIS OF TWIN CITIES HOUSING SUBMARKETS 
I. Study Overview 
 To update and expand the previous research conducted by Adams et al. (2002), I adopt 
their original methodology. Through fieldwork, I have collected a sample of existing single-
family housing units along traverses from downtown Minneapolis and Saint Paul into the 
suburbs in five of the fourteen traditional housing submarkets in the Twin Cities metro region. I 
then build price histories for each property in 2012 dollars and aggregate the findings to the 
census tract level. I supplement this original research methodology by incorporating spatial 
analysis of foreclosure rates, neighborhood health indicators such as vacancy and owner-
occupancy rates, and demographic data on population change and socioeconomic status. By 
overlaying foreclosure data with changes in estimated market values (EMV) for each census 
tract, I analyze the correlation between declining home values and concentrations of 
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foreclosures. Furthermore, I add demographic data to this equation to determine which 
communities have been hit hardest by these housing trends. 
II. Data Definitions 
Estimated Market Value 
 For this project, I use total estimated market value by property, as assessed by city and 
county governments, as my unit of analysis. This approach reflects the methodology employed 
by Adams et al. (2002) in their previous research on Twin Cities housing submarkets. Housing 
researchers tend to employ three basic types of data to analyze prices: assessed value, actual 
sales prices, and repeat sales prices. For the purposes of their research, Adams et al. (2002) select 
assessed value as their unit of analysis for several reasons. The authors explain that actual sales 
prices and repeat sales values “cover only a selected subset of the houses within a city or region 
rather than all houses” (2002, p. 30). Instead, they argue that using assessed values “ensures that 
all houses within a particular geographic area are included, not just those that have changed 
hands during the study period” (2002, p. 30). In Minnesota, all properties are reassessed “at least 
once every four years” (Adams et al. 2002, p. 31), with the assessed values intended to reflect 
“the price that could be obtained at a private sale or an auction sale” (Office of the Legislative 
Auditor 1996). Adams et al. (2002) admit that assessed values tend to be slightly lower than 
actual sales prices, yet they conclude that assessed values are more reliable than other units of 
analysis because of ubiquitous collection and the real implications on property taxes and state aid 
to local schools which encourage accurate assessment.  
 As was the case in Adams et al.’s 2002 report, it is worth noting the evolution of 
assessment between 1990 and 2013. Over time assessed values have been “calculated in different 
ways with the effect of shifting tax burdens to or from residential property owners” (Adams et al. 
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2002, p. 31). From 1979 to 1993, properties in Minnesota were assessed according to estimated 
market value, or “full market value” (Adams et al. 2002, p. 31). However, beginning in 1993, 
assessment of residential properties shifted to limited market values, or “taxable market values,” 
under the Limited Market Value (LMV) Minnesota Statute, which “was designed to protect 
property owners from large jumps in property taxes from year to year” by limiting the percentage 
increase allowed in a given year (Minneapolis City Assessor’s Office 2013). Specifically, a 
property’s taxable market value “could increase by no more than either 10 percent of the 
previous year’s value, or 25 percent of the difference between the previous and present year’s, 
whichever was higher” (Adams et al. 2002, p. 31).  This practice continued until 2008. For the 
purposes of this research, assessed values from 1990 and those recorded after 2008, calculated 
under the limitations of LMV, may be higher than the remaining data, assessed between 1995 
and 2008 using LMV restrictions. Efforts were made to use full market values when possible but 
complete accuracy cannot be guaranteed. 
Foreclosures 
Foundational to addressing my research questions, I also examine foreclosure data within 
each submarket to assess the uneven geography of the foreclosure crisis in the Twin Cities. The 
impact of foreclosures can be represented in several ways, including rates, density, and raw 
numbers. As mentioned in Chapter III, single foreclosures in relatively stable neighborhoods 
marginally affect nearby homes. However, concentrations of foreclosures can reverberate 
throughout communities and correspond with plummeting home values and increased vacancy 
rates. Therefore, I make use of foreclosure rates per census tract to highlight the community 
impact of foreclosures in the Twin Cities. Specifically, using sheriff’s mortgage foreclosure sales 
provided by county sheriff’s offices, I calculate rates of foreclosure by dividing the number of 
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foreclosures reported in each census tract by the total number of residential parcels in that tract 
and then multiplying by 100. For instance, if a census tract has 1000 residential parcels and 
experiences 50 foreclosures in a given year, the tract would have a foreclosure rate of 5 percent 
for that year. Foreclosure data for the years 2007 to 2012 was provided by the Sheriff’s Offices 
of Dakota, Hennepin, Ramsey, and Washington Counties, respectively.   
Additionally, I also estimate the annual foreclosure rates for homeowners and renters in 
each study tract. To calculate estimates for homeowner foreclosure rates, I first select 
homesteaded properties from the total residential parcels. In the State of Minnesota, homestead 
status is used for tax purposes to classify property that is “occupied by an owner or relative of the 
owner, and is used as a primary place of residence” (Hennepin County 2014).  Individual 
homeowners must apply for homestead distinction, and each property included in my dataset has 
been distinguished as either homesteaded or non-homesteaded by the respective County 
Assessor’s Office. Because of its strong association with owner-occupancy, I use homesteaded 
status as a proxy for homeownership, and non-homesteaded status as a proxy for renter-
occupancy. After separating residential parcels into homesteaded and non-homesteaded 
properties, I then classify foreclosure as either “homesteaded foreclosures” or “non-
homesteaded” foreclosures by spatially selecting all foreclosures on homesteaded and non-
homestead parcels. Lastly, I divide the number of homesteaded foreclosures in a census tract by 
the number of homesteaded parcels in that tract and multiply by 100, repeating the process for 
non-homesteaded foreclosures. For example, if a census tract has 800 residential parcels 
classified as homesteaded and there were foreclosures on 24 of these parcels in a given year, the 
tract would have a homesteaded foreclosure rate of 3 percent for that year. 
Neighborhood Health 
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In addition to estimated market value and foreclosure rate, I incorporate a few other 
indicators of neighborhood health in my analysis of the uneven geography of the foreclosure 
crisis in the Twin Cities. First, I examine residential vacancy rates by census tract. Vacancy rates 
measure the percentage of vacant residential units as a proportion of total residential units. I 
include this indicator to provide a more holistic picture of neighborhood-level trends, particularly 
investment, because high vacancy rates suggest instability. For instance, if vacancy rates rise 
during the study period, it might suggest neighborhood-level disinvestment and impact from the 
housing crash and subsequent foreclosure crisis. Vacancy rates were obtained from the 2000 and 
2010 decennial censuses. 
 On the opposite side of the spectrum, I also examine owner-occupancy rates by census 
tract. Owner-occupancy rates represent the percentage of homes in which the occupant owns the 
housing unit. Historically, a high owner-occupancy rate has been viewed as an indicator of a 
healthy neighborhood because of the significant capital investment in and long-term commitment 
to a place implied by homeownership. Like vacancy rates, I include owner-occupancy rates 
obtained from the 2000 and 2010 decennial censuses to give context to the ways the Twin Cities 
housing market has evolved over time. Naturally, the definitions of both residential vacancy rates 
owner-occupancy rates reflect traditional and potentially outdated understandings of 
neighborhood health. Nonetheless, I offer both variables to explain the ways in which 
neighborhoods in each case study have evolved since 2000. 
Demographics 
 To supplement the aforementioned housing data, I also analyze demographic data to 
assess the impact of the foreclosure crisis on different demographic groups. Specifically, I 
include data on population change and socioeconomic status, i.e., race and income. First, I look 
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at change in population, as reported by the 2000 and 2010 decennial censuses, to determine 
which areas have grown or seen population loss over the past 23 years. However, to gauge the 
impact of the foreclosure crisis on communities of color and low-income neighborhoods, I also 
examine the racial and class makeup of the neighborhoods in each case study. Using the 2000 
and 2010 decennial censuses, I calculate incorporate the proportion of black, Asian, and Hispanic 
residents by census tract as well as the change in percentage non-white residents by census tract 
from 2000 to 2010. Furthermore, employing the ESRI 2011 Demographics database, I compare 
median household income levels by census tract to paint a picture of social class within each 
submarket. The combination of data on people of color and income levels by census tract will 
suggest the impact of the foreclosure crisis on historically marginalized communities in the Twin 
Cities.  
III. Data Collection and Procedures 
 I examined a total of 1,403 properties along five different traverses within the Twin 
Cities metro region. Utilizing the map of Twin Cities housing submarkets developed by John 
Adams (Map 3a), I selected the three submarkets originally studied by Adams: South 
Minneapolis to Lakeville (Submarket B), North Minneapolis to Brooklyn Park (Submarket E), 
and Frogtown to Shoreview (Submarket H). In addition to these three sample traverses, I 
examined two additional submarkets: Near North Minneapolis to Maple Grove (Submarket D) 
and Dayton’s Bluff to Woodbury (Submarket K). Adams et al. (2002) selected their original case 
studies for various reasons; Submarkets B and H were chosen for their status as “especially 
vigorous middle-class sectors” compared to surrounding submarkets and Submarket E as a 
lower-middle-class comparison. Adams et al. (2002) offer Submarket I or J, covering the North 
End of St. Paul, as recommendations for additional research. For the purposes of this research, 
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however, I have chosen to examine Submarkets D and K because of their middle-class 
submarket classification and the rapid housing boom that occurred near the edges of these 
submarkets leading up to the housing crash. Much like their counterparts, Submarkets B and H, 
these submarkets embody “American Dream” submarkets within the Twin Cities metro region, 
in which geographic mobility reflects social mobility. 
Map 3a. Twin Cities Housing Submarkets 
 
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, Adams (1991) 
I first mapped each traverse out in as straight of a line as possible, starting from the 
emergence of predominant single-family housing in the core to the farthest reaches of suburban 
development. As the black lines in Map 3b illustrate, I was not always able to stay on a straight 
or connected traverse because of uneven development patterns and both natural and man-made 
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obstacles such as parks, lakes, commercial districts, and transportation infrastructure. 
Additionally, to prevent the traverse from traveling through pockets of atypically high or low 
housing values, I used an initial map of 2010 parcel-level estimated market values (EMV) to 
ensure that the sample traverses reflected the general trends in home values within each 
particular segment of the respective submarkets. The sample size of houses selected from each 
traverse varied between each submarket (Figure 3a). The three western submarkets originating in 
Minneapolis yielded the largest sample sizes and accounted for nearly three-fourths of all sample 
houses, with just under one-third of all samples coming from Submarket B. 
Map 3b. Traverses through Five Twin Cities Housing Submarkets 
 
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, Adams (1991) 
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Figure 3a. 
Number of Sample Properties, Study Tracts, and Study Communities by Submarket 
 
 Replicating the methodology outlined by Adams et al. (2002), I conducted fieldwork to 
obtain my data. To avoid “the risk of selecting houses not typical of their surroundings” (Adams 
et al. 2002, p. 32) presented by random sampling, I trekked through each traverse by car and 
chose a non-random sample of three typical houses per block along the route. Adopting Adams 
et al.’s metric, I define a typical house as a single-family residential structure “of average size 
and condition for the block on which they are located” (2002, p. 32). That is, if a potential 
homeowner was looking for a home to buy on a given block, what would they view as a 
standard, indicative property for that area? While this method is inherently subjective, it 
considers the lived experience of the built environment, reflects the on-the-ground perceptions of 
the housing market over space, and sheds light on patterns between housing stock and property 
values that cannot be discerned simply from data on a computer screen. The specifics of each 
traverse will be developed in further detail in Chapters IV through XIII.  
 To build the price histories for each submarket across space and time, I first obtained 
EMVs for each property between 2002 and 2013. During fieldwork, I recorded the street 
addresses of the sample houses and then collected the assessed values for the sample properties 
Submarket Route Direction
No. of  Sample 
Properties
No. of Study 
Tracts
No. of Study 
Communities
B
Minneapolis to 
Lakeville
S 439 23 5
D
Minneapolis to 
Maple Grove
NW 281 16 7
E
Minneapolis to 
Brooklyn Park
N 266 12 3
H
Saint Paul to 
Shoreview
N 201 12 3
K
Saint Paul to 
Woodbury
E 216 12 4
34 
from the Dakota, Hennepin, Ramsey, and Washington County assessor’s offices between 2002 
and 2013.
1
 In order to illuminate broader trends across space, I then aggregated the EMVs to the 
census tract level. Though some census tract boundary definitions changed between 2000 and 
2010, I selected 2010 tract definitions for the sake of consistency and assigned sample properties 
and data to tracts based on the latest tract boundaries. As was the case in the 2002 report 
produced by Adams et al. (2002), the sample sizes for this project varied greatly between the 75 
census tracts; while the number of sample properties per census tract ranged from 3 to 58, the 
median size of sample properties per census tract was 18 houses. Due to this variance, the 
calculated median values for census tracts with smaller sample sizes may not be representative of 
the median value for the entire tract (Adams et al. 2002, p. 33). This aspect of my research 
design will be included in a discussion on the limitations of my findings in Chapter IX. 
                                                          
1
 It should be noted that EMVs for each property were collected from 1990, 1995, and 2000, as well. Though these 
figures were mapped, they have been left out of analysis because of inconsistencies in data, particularly in 
Washington and Dakota Counties, and their distance from the housing collapse in 2006 and 2007.  
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BACKGROUND 
I. Geographic Definition 
Originating in South Central Minneapolis, Submarket B represents an exemplar middle-
class housing submarket in the Twin Cities metro region. My geographic definition of Submarket 
B, like the four other submarket case studies explored in this project, reflects the original 
definitions described by John Adams using 1990 census tract boundaries (1991). Though tract 
boundaries have shifted slightly since 1990, particularly in Minneapolis and outer-ring suburbs, I 
base my geographic definition on Adams original work for clarity and comparison purposes. 
 Submarket B begins just south of downtown Minneapolis and stretches along Interstate 
35 southward toward Burnsville and Lakeville (Map 4a). For the purposes of this case study, I 
have selected a traverse running from the intersection of Franklin and Portland Avenues in 
Minneapolis south through the eastern halves of Richfield and Bloomington and across the 
Minnesota River into the Dakota County suburbs of Burnsville and Lakeville. Traverse B (Map 
4a) originates as commercial development and multi-unit housing give way to predominantly 
single-unit housing and flows through solidly residential development. The built environment in 
Submarket B varies across space, with older, less valuable housing units concentrated in 
Minneapolis and its inner-ring suburbs and newer, more valuable houses on larger lots located in 
outer-ring suburbs (Figures 4a-f).  
Along its route, Traverse B intersects 23 census tracts: six in the South Minneapolis 
communities of Phillips, Powderhorn, and Nokomis, three in Richfield, three in Bloomington, 
seven in Burnsville, and three in Lakeville. These 23 census tracts and the sample of 439 houses 
collected across Hennepin and Dakota Counties serve as the foundation of the analysis for 
Submarket B.   
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Map 4a. Submarket B Study Area 
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Figure 4a. Sample Houses along Traverse B: 24
th
 through 45
th
 Street
2
  
 
                                                          
2
 Sample houses pictured represent “typical” single-family units in each tract. Peak and low housing values are 
shaded. Data Source: Hennepin County Assessor’s Office. 
Current $ Constant $ Current $ Constant $
1995 47,000 69,400 1995 46,500 68,662
2000 68,500 85,930 2000 117,000 140,475
2005 234,500 254,566 2005 260,500 282,790
2010 252,000 257,422 2006 260,500 283,261
2013 211,500 206,809 2010 202,000 206,346
2013 165,000 161,340
Current $ Constant $ Current $ Constant $
1995 41,000 60,541 1995 59,000 87,119
2000 61,500 77,149 2000 82,500 103,492
2005 144,200 156,539 2005 183,500 199,202
2006 163,000 177,242 2006 186,000 202,252
2010 142,000 145,055 2010 165,500 169,061
2012 127,500 127,500 2012 147,500 147,500
2013 132,000 129,072 2013 152,500 149,117
Year Built: 1900 Year Built: 2000
Year Built: 1912 Year Built: 1952
Assessed Value Assessed Value
Assessed Value Assessed Value
Tract 1260 Tract 84
Tract 95 Tract 1109
24xx Portland Ave 31xx 5th Ave
37xx Oakland Ave 44xx 5th Ave
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Figure 4b. Sample Houses along Traverse B: 51
st
 through 71
st
 Street
3
   
 
                                                          
3
 Sample houses pictured represent “typical” single-family units in each tract. Peak and low housing values are 
shaded. Data Source: Hennepin County Assessor’s Office.  
Current $ Constant $ Current $ Constant $
1995 100,500 148,398 1995 96,500 142,492
2000 144,500 181,268 2000 147,000 184,404
2005 278,500 302,331 2005 264,000 286,590
2006 278,500 302,834 2006 264,000 287,067
2010 283,000 289,089 2010 223,500 228,309
2012 251,500 251,500 2012 213,500 213,500
2013 263,000 257,166 2013 228,500 223,431
Current $ Constant $ Current $ Constant $
1995 93,000 137,324 1995 111,000 163,903
2000 116,000 145,516 2000 135,600 170,103
2005 245,000 265,964 2005 247,000 268,135
2007 268,000 285,936 2007 262,000 279,534
2010 200,000 204,303 2010 216,000 220,647
2013 186,000 181,874 2013 187,000 182,852
Year Built: 1952 Year Built: 1955
Year Built: 1941
Assessed Value
Assessed Value Assessed Value
Assessed Value
Tract 1116 Tract 120.03
Tract 247 Tract 248.01
59xx Oakland Ave
65xx 3rd Ave 70xx Oakland Ave
51xx Park Ave
Year Built: 1948
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Figure 4c. Sample Houses along Traverse B: 76
th
 through 106
th
 Street
4
 
 
                                                          
4
 Sample houses pictured represent “typical” single-family units in each tract. Peak and low housing values are 
shaded. Data Source: Hennepin County Assessor’s Office. 
Current $ Constant $ Current $ Constant $
1995 88,000 129,941 1995 74,200 109,564
2000 109,000 136,735 2000 90,800 113,904
2005 198,000 214,942 2005 174,600 189,540
2007 229,000 244,326 2006 184,500 200,621
2010 185,000 188,980 2010 156,000 159,356
2012 156,000 156,000 2013 126,100 123,303
2013 161,000 157,429
Current $ Constant $ Current $ Constant $
1995 100,600 148,546 1995 133,000 196,388
2000 130,100 163,204 2000 157,700 197,827
2005 237,800 258,148 2005 266,100 288,870
2006 251,100 273,040 2007 287,700 306,954
2010 210,400 214,927 2010 254,100 259,567
2013 180,100 176,105 2013 220,700 215,804
Year Built: 1959 Year Built: 1968
Assessed Value Assessed Value
Assessed Value Assessed Value
Tract 248.02 Tract 252.01
Tract 252.05 Tract 253.01
76xx Oakland Ave 83xx 11th Ave
89xx 11th Ave 4xx Mission Rd
Year Built: 1955 Year Built: 1952
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Figure 4d. Sample Houses along Traverse B: 102
nd
 through 125
th
 Street
5
 
 
                                                          
5
 Sample houses pictured represent “typical” single-family units in each tract. Peak and low housing values are 
shaded. Data Source: Hennepin County Assessor’s Office and Dakota County Assessor’s Office. 
Current $ Constant $ Current $ Constant $
1995 105,500 155,781 1995 110,900 163,755
2000 131,200 164,584 2000 176,900 206,571
2005 222,900 241,973 2005 229,000 248,595
2007 240,800 256,915 2006 238,800 259,665
2010 198,600 202,873 2010 199,900 204,201
2013 173,600 169,749 2012 182,300 182,300
2013 192,100 187,839
Current $ Constant $ Current $ Constant $
1995 107,100 158,144 1995 113,200 167,151
2002 203,418 189,800 2002 181,900 212,410
2005 233,100 253,046 2005 235,300 255,434
2006 244,800 266,189 2006 245,400 266,842
2010 202,100 206,448 2010 208,200 212,679
2012 184,390 184,390 2012 188,800 188,800
2013 194,300 189,990 2013 202,800 198,302
Year Built: 1961 Year Built: 1964
Year Built: 1977 Year Built: 1968
Assessed Value Assessed Value
Assessed Value Assessed Value
Tract 253.02 Tract 607.48
Tract 607. 47 Tract 607.14
102xx 5th Ave 109xx Radisson
26xx 115th 21xx Skyline
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Figure 4e. Sample Houses along Traverse B: 130
th
 through 152
nd
 Street
6
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 Sample houses pictured represent “typical” single-family units in each tract. Peak and low housing values are 
shaded. Data Source: Dakota County Assessor’s Office. 
Current $ Constant $ Current $ Constant $
1995 124,800 184,280 1995 114,200 168,628
2002 194,700 227,357 2002 181,700 212,176
2005 257,800 279,859 2005 236,200 256,411
2006 269,100 292,613 2006 246,600 268,147
2010 226,400 231,271 2010 210,900 215,438
2012 208,400 208,400 2013 195,500 191,163
2013 211,600 206,906
Current $ Constant $ Current $ Constant $
1995 103,700 153,124 1995 121,400 179,259
2002 166,300 194,193 2002 185,800 216,964
2005 216,000 234,483 2005 253,400 275,083
2006 229,100 249,118 2006 262,100 285,001
2010 189,100 193,169 2010 218,800 223,508
2012 178,100 178,100 2012 196,400 196,400
2013 190,100 185,883 2013 203,300 198,790
Year Built: 1972 Year Built: 1973
Year Built: 1979 Year Built: 1985
Assessed Value Assessed Value
Assessed Value Assessed Value
Tract 607.37 Tract 607.13
Tract 607.41 Tract 607.42
6xx Thoreau 135xx Oakland Ave
143xx Park Ave 8xx Rushmore
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Figure 4f. Sample Houses along Traverse B: 167
th
 through 178
th
 Street
7
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 Sample houses pictured represent “typical” single-family units in each tract. Peak and low housing values are 
shaded. Data Source: Dakota County Assessor’s Office. 
Current $ Constant $ Current $ Constant $
1995 169,900 250,875 1995 106,700 157,553
2002 264,100 308,397 2002 184,500 215,446
2005 339,600 368,659 2005 234,900 255,000
2006 358,700 390.041 2006 254300 276,519
2010 292,700 298,997 2010 213,500 218,093
2012 271,000 271,000 2012 197,700 197,700
2013 279,300 273,105 2013 203,900 199,377
Current $ Constant $
1995 No data No data
2002 272,300 317,973
2005 344,900 374,412
2006 411,500 447,455
2010 336,100 343,331
2012 310,100 310,000
2013 321,700 314,564
Year Built: 1992 Year Built: 1978
Year Built: 2000
Assessed Value Assessed Value
Assessed Value
Tract 608.14 Tract 608.15
Tract 608.16
167xx Jaguar 176xx Italy
93xx 178th
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II. Socioeconomic Context 
MEDIAN HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
Within Submarket B, median household income tends to increase along Traverse B from 
Minneapolis through its inner-ring suburbs to its outer-ring suburbs in Dakota County. The 
lowest median household incomes are concentrated in the innermost part of Submarket B; the 
innermost tract, Tract 1260, had a 2011 median household income of $25,683, nearly $90,000 
lower than the income in the outermost tract, Tract 608.16 in Lakeville (Figure 4g). Tract 1116, 
however, represents an outlier within South Minneapolis; the tract, which contains the amenity-
rich Minnehaha Creek, had a 2011 median household income of $76,970, over $20,000 higher 
than the adjacent study tracts. This outlier aside, not much separates South Minneapolis from its 
inner-ring suburbs, Richfield and Bloomington. In fact, Tracts 1109 and 120.03 had 2011 median 
household incomes of $51,187 and $55,128, respectively. Only one of the three Richfield study 
tracts had a higher income level than both of the Minneapolis tracts, and although income levels 
in three of the four Bloomington study tracts were higher than in Tract 1109, just Tract 253.01 
had a median household income that eclipsed Tract 120.03. Therefore, while low income 
residents are disproportionately concentrated in the core of Submarket B, income levels in South 
Minneapolis are generally on par with those throughout Richfield and Bloomington.  
Income levels in Dakota County, however, are considerably higher than their Hennepin 
County counterparts. While median household income levels in Burnsville are sporadic and vary 
greatly between study tracts (Figure 4g), income in the outer-ring suburb remains noticeably 
higher than in Richfield and Bloomington. Despite a few study tracts with 2011 median 
household incomes below $60,000, Burnsville also contains study tracts with median household 
incomes of over $80,000, such as Tracts 607.13 and 607.42 in the southern half of the suburb. 
Lakeville, on the other hand, had relatively steady income levels in 2011. Each of the three 
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Lakeville study tracts had median household incomes of at least $86,000, and Tract 608.16 at the 
outer edges of Submarket B had the highest income across the submarket with a median 
household income of $113,208. With the exception of a few outliers in Burnsville, the outer-ring 
suburbs in Submarket B hold most of the wealth in the middle-class submarket.  
Figure 4g. Submarket B Median Household Income by Census Tract, 2011 
 
Source: Esri Demographic Database, 2011 
DEMOGRAPHIC MAKEUP 
 Between 2000 and 2010, South Minneapolis became increasingly white and Hispanic, 
while the inner- and outer-ring suburbs have seen growth in their communities of color. Over the 
course of the decade, the proportion of white residents declined in 19 of the 23 study tracts in 
Submarket B. The four tracts that saw their populations become whiter were all located in South 
Minneapolis. Although Tracts 1260 and 120.03 each lost eight percent of their white populations, 
the proportion of white residents in Tracts 84, 95, and 1109 each grew by at least 7.8 percent, 
Minneapolis Burnsville Bloomington Lakeville Richfield 
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with Tract 95 seeing its white population grow by 12 percent. At the same time, the proportion of 
black residents in these three tracts has declined by over 13 percent. That being said, the 
Hispanic community has made significant inroads in South Minneapolis since 2000. In Tract 84, 
for example, the proportion of Hispanic residents increased by nearly 23 percent over the decade, 
and as of 2010, Hispanic residents made up roughly 45 percent of the tract population. Overall, 
as of 2010, four of the six Minneapolis study tracts consisted of white majorities or pluralities, 
while Tract 1260 and Tract 84 were black and Hispanic pluralities, respectively. 
 Outside of Minneapolis, the study tracts in Submarket B remained majority white from 
2000 to 2010 but became increasingly diverse. Each of the 19 suburban tracts in the submarket 
saw drops in their proportion of white residents, with eight of these tracts witnessing double-digit 
declines in the percentage of white residents. Simultaneously, the proportion of black, Asian, and 
Hispanic residents in these tracts steadily grew from 2000 to 2010. Tract 252.01 in Bloomington 
and Tract 607.48 in Burnsville each saw the proportion of black residents in their tracts increase 
by 11.1 percent. The most dramatic demographic shift in Submarket B, however, occurred in 
Tract 248.02 in Richfield. Between 2000 and 2010, the proportion of residents who identified as 
Hispanic grew by 32 percent from 8.7 percent in 2000 to 40.7 percent in 2010. Unlike 
Minneapolis, though, the dramatic growth of the Hispanic community in Richfield and other 
suburban tracts across Submarket B did not correlate with a rise in the white population. While 
Submarket B as a whole became more diverse over the 2000s, Minneapolis and its southern 
suburbs experienced dramatically different demographic trends since 2000. 
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Figure 4h. Demographic Makeup
8
 of Submarket B by Census Tract, 2000
9
 and 2010 
 
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 and 2010 Decennial Census 
NEIGHBORHOOD HEALTH 
In addition to income and race, nieghborhood health indicators, like owner-occupancy 
and vacancy rates, also signal socioeconomic disconnect between Minneapolis and its southern 
suburbs. As Figure 4i suggests, there are great variation in levels of owner-occupancy across the 
submarket. Within Minneapolis, for example, there is a 70 percent range in owner-occupancy 
levels. The 14.9 percent rate in Tract 1260 was not only the lowest owner-occupancy rate in 
Submarket B but also the lowest rate across the 75 study tracts. Just a few miles south of Tract 
1260, however, Tracts 1109 and 1116 had owner-occupancy rates of 82.7 and 87.5 percent, 
respectively, in 2010. This intra-city bipolarity in owner-occupancy suggests varying degrees of 
neighborhood stability within Minneapolis. While less dramatic than Minneapolis, cities across 
Submarket B experience this intra-city bipolarity (Figure 4i). 
Nevertheless, rates tend to increase along Traverse B with the lowest owner-occupancy 
rates in concentrated in South Minneapolis and its inner-ring suburbs of Richfield and 
Bloomington and the highest rates found in Burnsville and Maple Grove. In fact, the four study 
tracts in Submarket B with owner-occupancy rates below 50 percent in 2010 were located 
                                                          
8
 Note: Because the Census Bureau considers “Hispanic” as “Ethnicity” and not “Race,” these charts may include 
individuals who identify as both Hispanic and one of the three racial classifications. As such, the demographic 
makeup of each tract may exceed 100 percent of the total tract population. 
9
 Note: Census tract boundaries within Submarket B changed between 2000 and 2010. Tract 1260 in Minneapolis 
formally consisted of Tracts 78.02 and 1071. Tracts 607.47 and 607.48 in Burnsville were formally one tract, Tract 
607.02. 
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exclusively in South Minneapolis and along the Richfield-Bloomington border adjacent to I-494. 
Conversely, the only tracts to see owner-occupancy levels above 90 percent were found in the 
outermost edges of Burnsville and Lakeville. Despite the oscelations between low and high 
levels of owner-occupancy along Traverse B, owner-occupancy in Submarket B tends to increase 
farther from the heart of Minneapolis. 
Figure 4i. Submarket B Owner-Occupancy Rate by Census Tract, 2000
10
 and 2010 
 
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 and 2010 Decennial Census 
Vacancy rates across Submarket B, on the other hand, tend to decline along Traverse B, 
with notable exceptions in Richfield and Burnsville. The highest residential vacancy rates in the 
submarket are concentrated in the innermost tracts of South Minneapolis (Figure 4j). As of 2010, 
the three innermost tracts in Minneapolis had vacancy rates of at least 9.5 percent, with Tracts 
1260 and 84 each seeing rates above 11 percent. Conversely, the outermost tracts in the 
                                                          
10
 Note: Census tract boundaries within Submarket B changed between 2000 and 2010. Tract 1260 in Minneapolis 
formally consisted of Tracts 78.02 and 1071. Tracts 607.47 and 607.48 in Burnsville were formally one tract, Tract 
607.02. 
Minneapolis Burnsville Bloomington Lakeville Richfield 
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submarket enjoyed the lowest vacancy rates; in Lakeville, for instance, each of the three study 
tracts had a vacancy rate at or below 3.5 percent, with just 1.7 percent of residential properities in 
Tract 608.16 laying vacant in 2010. However, Tract 248.02 in Richfield and Tract 607.37 in 
Burnsville represent clear departures from the prevailing trend in vacancies within Submarket B 
(Figure 4j). As of 2010, each tract had a vacancy rate of at least 8 percent. Moreover, each tract 
had a rates considerably higher than study tracts within their respective suburbs; the vacancy rate 
in Tract 607.37, for example, was 6 percent higher than neighboring Tract 607.13. Yet, despite 
these outliers, vacancy rates in Submarket B are negatively correlated with distance along 
Traverse B.  
Figure 4j. Submarket B Vacancy Rate by Census Tract, 2000
11
 and 2010 
 
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 and 2010 Decennial Census 
 
                                                          
11
 Note: Census tract boundaries within Submarket B changed between 2000 and 2010. Tract 1260 in Minneapolis 
formally consisted of Tracts 78.02 and 1071. Tracts 607.47 and 607.48 in Burnsville were formally one tract, Tract 
607.02. 
Minneapolis Burnsville Bloomington Lakeville Richfield 
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HOUSING DYNAMICS, 2002 TO 2013 
Though pre-crash housing appreciation was disproportionately concentrated in South 
Minneapolis, the impact of the housing crash was spread throughout Submarket B. Housing 
appreciation levels between 2002 and 2006 challenge the assumptions of the traditional 
submarket model (Figure 4k). Instead of home values appreciating more rapidly farther along 
Traverse B, the highest pre-crash appreciation rates in the submarket were concentrated in the 
Phillips and Powderhorn communities of South Minneapolis. Conversely, study tracts in the 
outer-ring suburbs of Burnsville and Lakeville saw some of the lowest appreciation rates in the 
entire submarket (Map 4b). Whereas South Minneapolis tracts experienced 79.5 and 60.3 percent 
appreciation rates, suburban tracts did not see home values appreciate more than 35.7 percent 
before the housing crash. In the wake of the housing crash, however, post-crash depreciation 
levels were fairly consistent across Traverse B (Figure 4k). Though the highest post-crash 
deprecation rate was situated in the innermost part of Submarket B, the overwhelming majority 
of tracts in the submarket saw their sample median EMVs depreciate between 25 and 35 percent 
(Figure 4k). Further analysis of the housing trends within each city and across Submarket B will 
compare pre-crash appreciation and post-crash depreciation patterns to expose the uneven 
housing dynamics in Submarket B. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
51 
Figure 4k. 
Traverse B: 
Pre-Crash Appreciation vs. Post-Crash Depreciation for Sample Houses, 2002 to 2013 
 
Sources: Hennepin County Assessor’s Office, Dakota County Assessor’s Office 
Maps 4b and c. 
Submarket B Housing Appreciation by Census Tract, 2002 to 2006; and 
Submarket B Housing Depreciation by Census Tract, 2006 to 2013 
 
Sources: Hennepin County Assessor’s Office, Dakota County Assessor’s Office 
Minneapolis Richfield Burnsville Bloomington Lakeville 
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MINNEAPOLIS 
2002 to 2006 
 Leading up to the housing collapse, South Minneapolis, particularly the Phillips and 
Powderhorn communities, represents a substantial housing bubble within the Twin Cities metro 
region. Study tracts in the innermost part of Submarket B experienced exceptional growth in 
sample median EMV between 2002 and 2006 (Figure 4k and Map 4b). Though home values in 
all six South Minneapolis study tracts appreciated by at least 31 percent, the innermost tracts saw 
the highest spikes in sample median EMVs before 2006. Tracts 1260 and 84 at the core of 
Submarket B witnessed pre-crash appreciation rates of 79.5 percent and 60.3 percent, 
respectively. Situated in the heart of the Phillips community, Tract 1260 saw its sample median 
EMV climb from $129,618 in 2002 to a 2006 peak of $232,698. While Tract 1260 stands as an 
extreme case within Submarket B, dramatic pre-crash gains were enjoyed across South 
Minneapolis. In fact, home values in Tract 120.03 at the southern edge of Minneapolis 
appreciated by only 39.1 percent yet added nearly $100,000 to the tract median EMV. The 
concentration of high pre-crash appreciation levels in the heart of South Minneapolis serves as a 
striking departure from the traditional submarket model (Figure 4k). Given the uncharacteristic 
appreciation pattern in these areas and the significant proportion of low-income people of color 
in the innermost segment of Submarket B, this pattern not only exposes a sizable housing bubble 
in the Phillips and Powderhorn communities but also suggests the potential presence of predatory 
lending practices within these respective neighborhoods.  
2007 to 2013 
 Though South Minneapolis saw the highest pre-crash appreciation rates in Submarket B, 
the housing crash had an uneven impact on home values between 2006 and 2013. South 
Minneapolis was home to both the highest and lowest post-crash depreciation rates along 
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Traverse B (Figure 4k). In the innermost part of Submarket B, home values in Tract 1260 took 
the biggest hit following the housing crash; the sample median EMV in Tract 1260 depreciated 
by 45.6 percent from a 2006 peak of $232,698 to a 2013 low of $126,627. Farther along Traverse 
B, Tracts 84, 95, and 1109 each experienced post-crash depreciation rates between 23.5 percent 
and 29.5 percent, on par with much of Submarket B. However, at the southern edge of 
Minneapolis, Tracts 1116 and 120.03 saw the lowest depreciation rates among the 23 study tracts 
in the submarket. In Tract 1116, which includes Minnehaha Creek, the sample median EMV 
dropped from a 2006 peak of $304,465 to a 2012 low of $253,750 before experiencing 2.3 
percent appreciation between 2012 and 2013. In fact, despite the housing crash in 2006, both of 
these tracts felt net appreciation rates of 12.4 percent and 13.3 percent between 2002 and 2013, 
respectively. The impact of the housing crash was spread unevenly across South Minneapolis, 
with the communities situated in the innermost part of Submarket B experiencing the worst 
levels of housing deprecation. 
Figure 4l. 
 
Source: Hennepin County Assessor’s Office 
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RICHFIELD 
2002 to 2006 
 Compared to South Minneapolis, Richfield experienced more modest pre-crash housing 
appreciation. Nevertheless, appreciation rates in Richfield were greater than or equal to levels 
across Traverse B (Figure 4k). Moreover, sample median EMVs across Richfield grew between 
26 percent and 36 percent, or $49,000 to $64,000. Tract 247, for example, enjoyed a 35.7 percent 
pre-crash appreciation rate, seeing its sample median EMV increase from $178,663 in 2002 to 
$242,485 in 2006. Though it had a lower appreciation rate than five of the six Minneapolis study 
tracts, Tract 247 had the highest pre-crash appreciation in Submarket B outside of Minneapolis. 
Overall, while its pre-crash gains were dwarfed by those seen in the Phillips and Powderhorn 
communities, Richfield fared relatively better than its counterparts farther along Traverse B. 
Figure 4m. 
 
Source: Hennepin County Assessor’s Office 
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2006 to 2013 
 Following the housing crash, however, housing values in Richfield experienced relatively 
high rates of depreciation. Despite respectable gains prior to 2006, the sample median EMVs 
across the three Richfield study tracts declined steadily between 2006 and 2013 (Figure 4m). 
From 2006 to 2013, home values in each Richfield study tract dropped by 32.7 to 34.6 percent. 
Within Richfield, Tract 248.01 felt the greatest impact; after witnessing the lowest pre-crash 
appreciation rate in Richfield, Tract 248.01 had the highest post-crash appreciation rate in the 
inner-ring suburb. The sample median EMV in the tract hit a 2006 peak of $237,591 and then 
decline by 24.6 percent to $155,473 in 2013. Moreover, between 2002 and 2013, home values in 
Tract 248.01 experienced a net depreciation of 17.6 percent. In fact, as of 2013, the sample 
median EMVs in all three Richfield tracts were at least 8.6 percent lower than their 2002 levels. 
Consequently, the pre-crash gains in home values throughout the inner-ring suburb were erased 
in the years following the housing crash. 
BLOOMINGTON 
2002 to 2006 
 Though pre-crash appreciation rates in Bloomington were on par with much of 
Submarket B, the inner-ring suburb also saw the lowest appreciation rates in the submarket. 
Levels of appreciation in Bloomington were split between the northern and southern portion of 
the suburb (Figure 4k and Map 4b). Home values in the northernmost Bloomington tracts along 
Traverse B, Tracts 252.01 and 252.05, felt rates of appreciation that rivaled those in Richfield 
and parts of Minneapolis. In fact, the sample median EMV in Tract 252.05 increased by over 33 
percent from $179,363 in 2002 to a 2006 peak of $239,440. Conversely, the two southern 
Bloomington tracts had the lowest appreciation rates of the 23 study tracts in Submarket B. Both 
Tracts 253.01 and 253.02 had pre-crash appreciation rates below 25 percent. Tract 253.02, for 
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instance, saw its home values grow by just 22.4 percent between 2002 and 2006. However, 
housing values in each of these tracts were $30,000 to $50,000 higher than the other 
Bloomington tracts; that is, Tracts 253.01 and 253.02 had comparable pre-crash net gains in 
housing values yet had higher values to begin with. Therefore, despite the submarket-low 
appreciation rates, Bloomington fared relatively well leading up to the housing crash. 
Figure 4n. 
 
Source: Hennepin County Assessor’s Office 
2006 to 2013 
 From 2006 to 2013, Bloomington experienced some of the highest depreciation rates 
along Traverse B. Bloomington tracts witnessed depreciation rates that rivaled and surpassed that 
seen in South Minneapolis and stand out as epicenters of the housing crash within Submarket B 
(Map 4b). Each study tract in the inner-ring suburb saw post-crash housing depreciation rates 
above 30 percent. Tracts 252.01 and 252.05, in particular, saw rates higher than 36 percent 
between 2006 and 2013. The sample median EMV in Tract 252.01, which had the second-
highest depreciation rate among the 23 study tracts in the submarket, dropped by 37.8 percent 
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from a 2006 peak of $239,440 to a 2013 low of $148,824. Moreover, home values in each of the 
four Bloomington study tracts had yet to return to their 2002 levels; in fact, housing values 
across the four tracts saw a net depreciation of at least 14 percent each. While pre-crash 
appreciation was unevenly distributed across Bloomington, each of the four tracts in the inner-
ring suburb was hit hard by post-crash housing deprecation.  
BURNSVILLE 
2002 to 2006 
 Leading up to the housing crash, study tracts in Burnsville experienced modest housing 
appreciation. Pre-crash appreciation rates were fairly steady across the seven Burnsville study 
tracts (Map 4b). In fact, home values in each of the seven tracts appreciated between 26.4 
percent and 29.6 percent between 2002 and 2006. Moreover, the net gain in each of the sample 
median EMVs across Burnsville ranged from $55,000 to $64,000. In fact, the sample median 
EMVs across Burnsville remained close up through 2006, and no single tract stood out as for an 
exceptionally high or low EMV or level of depreciation rate (Figure 4o). Home values in Tract 
607.37, for instance, sat comfortably higher than their counterparts across the suburb yet 
appreciation rates in the tract were the lowest in Burnsville. Overall, the pre-crash housing 
dynamics in Burnsville suggest steady and stable growth in the outer-ring suburb.  
2006 to 2013 
 After the housing crash in 2006, Burnsville experienced comparatively modest levels of 
depreciation between 2006 and 2013. Despite spatial disparity among depreciation rates within 
Burnsville, the outer-ring suburb nonetheless fared relatively well with Submarket B (Map 4b). 
From 2006 to 2013, sample median EMVs in Burnsville depreciation between 24.6 percent and 
31.5 percent, and all but one of the seven sample EMVs declined by less than 30 percent. In fact, 
Burnsville had the lowest depreciation rates in Submarket B outside of South Minneapolis. 
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Furthermore, while the sample median EMVs in all seven Burnsville tracts had yet to return 
2002 levels as of 2013, most tracts witnessed net depreciation rates below 8 percent between 
2002 and 2013. For instance, as of 2013, home values in Tract 607.14 sat roughly $10,000 short 
of their 2002 value. While post-crash depreciation rates in Burnsville were less stable than pre-
crash appreciation rates, the outer-ring suburb weathered the housing crash relatively better than 
its counterparts in Submarket B. 
Figure 4o. 
 
Source: Dakota County Assessor’s Office 
LAKEVILLE 
2002 to 2006 
 Like their counterparts in Burnsville, study tracts in Lakeville saw relatively modest 
appreciation leading up to the housing crash. Between 2002 and 2006, most of the sample 
median EMVs with Lakeville appreciated at or below 26 percent. However, home values at the 
outermost reaches of Traverse B in Tract 608.16 enjoyed over 33 percent pre-crash appreciation 
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(Figure 4k). In Tract 608.16, the sample median EMV grew by over $100,000 from $318,440 in 
2002 to a 2006 peak of $423,804. During the same period, home values in the other Lakeville 
tracts increased by just $79,000 and $62,000, respectively. While home values rose considerably 
in Tract 608.16 and the outer-ring suburb still fared relatively well between 2002 and 2006, the 
pre-crash housing dynamics in Lakeville challenge the traditional submarket theory. Instead of 
housing values growing much faster than those in Minneapolis and the inner-ring suburbs 
situated along Traverse B, appreciation rates in Lakeville were on par with much of Submarket B 
and well below the levels seen in the innermost portions of Submarket B.  
2006 to 2013 
 From 2006 to 2013, the three Lakeville tracts saw moderate levels of housing 
depreciation comparable to much of Submarket B. Though it followed the trend of housing 
depreciation seen across Submarket B, Lakeville fared better than most communities in 
Minneapolis and the inner-ring suburbs (Map 4b and Figure 4k). In fact, between 2006 and 2013, 
each of the three Lakeville tracts saw their sample median EMVs drop between 27.6 percent and 
30.8 percent. Though post-crash depreciation rates in the suburb were relatively low, two of the 
three tracts in Lakeville experienced net losses in their sample median EMV of over $95,000. 
The sample median EMV in Tract 608.16, for instance, depreciated by 30.8 percent, declining 
from a 2006 high of $423,804 to $293,199 in 2013. For reference, the roughly $118,000 loss in 
the sample median EMV in Tract 608.16 between 2006 and 2013 was around $8,000 shy of the 
2013 sample median EMV of $126,627 in the innermost tract along Traverse B, Tract 1260. 
While the post-crash depreciation rates in Lakeville compare to those throughout Submarket B, 
they hold significant implications for the outer-ring suburb, particularly concerning housing 
equity. Ultimately, Lakeville experienced post-crash depreciation rates that rivaled those seen 
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throughout Submarket B, yet the substantial decline in home values between 2006 and 2013 
suggests the community has nonetheless felt the impact of the housing crisis. 
Figure 4p. 
 
Source: Dakota County Assessor’s Office 
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Map 4d. 
Submarket B Sample Median EMVs by Census Tract, Selected Years, in 2012 Dollars
 
Sources: Hennepin County Assessor’s Office, Dakota County Assessor’s Office 
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IMPACT OF THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS, 2007 TO 2012 
Between 2007 and 2012, foreclosures were spread across Submarket B, yet the 
foreclosure crisis disproportionately affected South Minneapolis residents and renters throughout 
the submarket. Like the other four case studies, foreclosure rates in Submarket B tend to 
decrease with increasing distance along Traverse B moves from inner Minneapolis south toward 
Lakeville. That being said, tracts in suburban communities, particularly inner-ring suburbs, 
shared some of the brunt of the foreclosure crisis with the central city; in fact, foreclosure rates in 
Richfield and Bloomington rivaled and at times surpassed levels seen in the heart of South 
Minneapolis. Moreover, renters across Submarket B were hit hard by the foreclosure crisis. From 
the Phillips community to Burnsville, renters consistently saw double digit foreclosure rates 
throughout the crisis, and in some parts of Submarket B, renter foreclosure rates were 10 to 17 
percent higher than their homeowner counterparts. Though Submarket B did not witness 
foreclosure rates as extreme as those in other submarkets, the impacts of the foreclosure crisis in 
the submarket were nonetheless unevenly distributed, afflicting South Minneapolis residents and 
renters throughout the submarket disproportionately more than suburban residents and 
homeowners.  
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Map 4e.  
Submarket B Foreclosure Rates by Census Tract, 2007 to 2012 
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Sources: Hennepin County Sheriff’s Office, Dakota County Sheriff’s Office 
MINNEAPOLIS 
 In the six years following the housing collapse, foreclosures in Submarket B were 
disproportionately concentrated in South Minneapolis. Overall and homesteaded foreclosure 
rates in the four innermost tracts in Minneapolis ranked above the submarket-wide rate for all of 
the six-year study period (Table 4a). More importantly, the highest rates of foreclosure across 
Submarket B were concentrated in these census tracts. Whereas suburban tracts saw rates around 
one and two percent throughout the foreclosure crisis, foreclosure rates in South Central 
Minneapolis hit highs between five and seven percent, more than doubling and tripling suburban 
rates. This pattern extends to non-homesteaded properties, as well; though less consistent than 
overall foreclosure rates, non-homesteaded rates in South Minneapolis reached double digits 
several times, particularly in the first few years of the foreclosure crisis. Given the persistent 
high foreclosure rates across census tracts, South Minneapolis clearly emerges as the epicenter of 
foreclosure within Submarket B.  
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Yet, while tracts in Minneapolis saw the highest rates of foreclosure, the outermost tracts 
in the city, Tracts 1116 and 120.03 along Minnehaha Creek, saw minimal impact from the crisis. 
For much of the study period, these tracts ranked below the submarket-wide levels and saw 
overall and homesteaded rates of foreclosure below 1.5 percent. This pattern transfers to non-
homesteaded properties as well, with renter foreclosure rates surpassing four percent only twice 
during the foreclosure crisis. The uneven distribution of foreclosures within Minneapolis 
suggests starkly divergent realities for Minneapolis residents and communities. Within the six 
Minneapolis tracts in Submarket B, the city contains both the epicenter of foreclosures within the 
submarket and one of the most stable parts of the submarket. Though Minneapolis stands out 
among Submarket B communities for its relatively high foreclosure rates, the impact of the 
foreclosure crisis has not been felt evenly by all Minneapolitans.  
Additionally, despite their relative significance within Submarket B, the innermost 
Minneapolis tracts in this study have not been the most impacted across the metro region. While 
Tracts 1260 and 84 have made appearances in the top ten foreclosed tracts between 2007 and 
2012, only Tract 95 has remained in the top third of all study tracts for the entirety of the study 
period. In fact, Tract 1109 spent most of the foreclosure crisis in the middle third of all tracts, 
and even Tract 1260 ranked in the middle-of-the-pack multiple times since 2007. Even though 
foreclosures in Submarket B are disproportionately concentrated in South Central Minneapolis, 
the particular tracts included in this case study do not reflect the hardest hit communities within 
the Twin Cities but instead the center of activity within a segment of the metro area. 
RICHFIELD 
 The impact of the foreclosure crisis in Richfield serves as a microcosm of the 
communities studied across the Twin Cities. Throughout the six years following the housing 
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crash, overall foreclosure rates across Richfield fluctuated between 0.9 and 3.5 percent, and the 
three tracts in the suburb consistently saw rates above the submarket-wide rate. Similarly, 
homeowners in the inner-ring suburb saw relatively high foreclosure rates between one and two 
percent throughout the foreclosure crisis (Table 4a). Yet, while the Richfield tracts experienced 
above average foreclosure rates within Submarket B, these rates still paled in comparison to 
those seen in Minneapolis, and the Richfield tracts predominantly placed in the middle third of 
all studied tracts. Despite brief appearances by Tract 248.02 in the top ten foreclosed tracts and 
bottom third of studied tracts, these tracts largely reflected the state of the foreclosure crisis 
across the metro region.  
  With that being said, renters in Richfield experienced rather high rates of foreclosure at 
times between 2007 and 2013. In Tract 248.01, for example, two years of zero and 1.4 percent 
renter foreclosure rates were sandwiched between years that saw rates as high as 8.9 and 11.1 
percent. As in other tracts across Submarket B and the Twin Cities metro region, renter 
foreclosure rates in Richfield were consistently higher than homeowner rates and reflect 
divergent realities within the inner-ring suburb. In all, Richfield represents a middle-of-the-road 
foreclosure experience within Submarket B and the Twin Cities: the inner-ring suburb saw 
moderate foreclosure rates throughout the crisis yet most residents, with the exception of renters, 
escaped the worst of the foreclosure crisis.  
BLOOMINGTON 
 In the wake of the housing crash, the foreclosure crisis in Bloomington reflects an uneven 
geography within this post-war suburb. Foreclosure rates in Bloomington have fluctuated by year 
and census tract (Map 43). Yet, a distinct dichotomy in the overall and homesteaded foreclosure 
rates emerged between the first two and the last two tracts studied (Table 4a). For instance, 
Tracts 252.01 and 252.05 witnessed overall and homesteaded rates around 1 and 2 percent for 
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much of the foreclosure crisis, placing them above the submarket-wide average. Farther out in 
Bloomington, however, Tracts 253.01 and 253.02 consistently saw rates below 1 percent and 
escaped relatively unharmed for much of the study period. Non-homesteaded rates in 
Bloomington complicate this stark contrast, however, as renter foreclosure rates outpaced overall 
and homeowner rates across the suburb from 2007 to 2012. Nevertheless, it appears that the 
spatial impact of the foreclosure crisis in Bloomington was concentrated to particular parts of the 
suburb. 
When compared to tracts across the metro region, the four Bloomington tracts in 
Submarket B reflect a mixed bag. Tracts 252.05 and 253.02 placed in the middle third of all 
studied tracts for most of the foreclosure crisis. Tract 253.01, on the other hand, ranked in the 
bottom third almost the entirety of the study period. However, Bloomington’s innermost tract, 
Tract 252.01, witnessed the greatest fluctuation; the tract was among the middle third of all tracts 
for the first four years of the crisis, the top third in 2011, and then the bottom third in 2012. 
Much Richfield, the impact of the foreclosure crisis in Bloomington was roughly on par with 
communities across the Twin Cities. Yet, as previously mentioned, though the foreclosure rates 
in Bloomington were considerably lower than other parts of the submarket, foreclosures within 
the suburb were unevenly distributed and afflicted the innermost portions of the community. 
BURNSVILLE 
 While the suburb may not possess chart-topping overall foreclosure rates, certain portions 
of the Burnsville community were hit hard by the foreclosure crisis. For much of the foreclosure 
crisis, overall rates of foreclosure in this outer-ring suburb fell between 1 and 2 percent, and in 
the latter half of the study period, Burnsville tracts consistently saw rates above the submarket-
wide rate. Consequently, throughout the six-year study period, the seven Burnsville tracts ranked 
squarely in the middle third of all tracts studied. On the surface, these moderate foreclosure rates 
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appear to be steady but nothing too special. However, when foreclosure rates in Burnsville are 
split into homeowner vs. renter foreclosures, an entirely different story emerges. 
 Throughout the foreclosure crisis, renters in Burnsville felt a severely disproportionate 
impact to their homeowner counterparts. Although half of Burnsville tracts saw homeowner 
foreclosure rates that topped submarket-wide rates, homeowner foreclosure rates across the 
suburb did not top two percent for the entirety of the six-year study period. In fact, three tracts 
did not even see homeowner foreclosure rates surpass one percent. On the other hand, Burnsville 
experienced non-homesteaded foreclosure rates that far outpaced levels in Minneapolis and 
across the submarket. The three innermost tracts in Burnsville, in particular, felt sustained renter 
foreclosure rates well above the submarket-wide rate. Tract 607.48, which saw overall 
foreclosure rates between 0.6 and 1.8 and homeowner foreclosure rates between 0.3 and 0.9 
percent over the study period, experienced renter foreclosure rates between 12.8 and 14.5 percent 
for each of the five years following the housing crash. In fact, renter foreclosure rates in this tract 
did not fall below double digits until 2013. This pattern holds for the neighboring tract, Tract 
607.47, which saw the highest renter foreclosure rate recorded in Submarket B, 17.9 percent in 
2011. Foreclosures in Burnsville were disproportionately concentrated on non-homesteaded 
properties across the suburb (Table 4a). Even with the relatively low overall and homesteaded 
foreclosure rates in the outer-ring suburb, the remarkably high rates of foreclosure for renters 
hold significant impacts on neighborhood health across Burnsville. 
LAKEVILLE 
 Within Submarket B, Lakeville largely avoided the harshest realities of the foreclosure 
crisis. Overall and homesteaded foreclosure rates across the outer-ring suburb failed to eclipse 
two percent and hovered around one percent for most of the study period. Furthermore, unlike 
the four other Submarket B municipalities included in this study, Lakeville as a whole 
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consistently ranked below the submarket-wide rate. This trend extends to the metro region as 
well: for much of the crisis, the three Lakeville tracts fell into the bottom third of all studied 
tracts, with Tract 608.14 sporadically appearing in the middle third of all tracts. With that being 
said, renters in Lakeville had a significantly different experience during the foreclosure crisis. 
For much of the six-year study period, non-homesteaded foreclosure rates lingered above 2 
percent and at times surpassed five and six percent within a census tract. Though Lakeville was 
the least affected community within Submarket B, this title does not reflect the lived reality of a 
considerable segment of its residents.  
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Table 4a. 
Traverse B:  
Foreclosure Rates by Census Tract, 2007 to 2012 
 
Note: Boldfaced values represent foreclosure rates above submarket-wide rates. Foreclosure rates for each census 
tract along Traverse B were calculated using parcel shapefiles obtained from MetroGIS and foreclosure point 
shapefiles from Hennepin and Dakota Counties. Overall foreclosure rates (O) reflect number of foreclosure points 
per census tract divided by number of residential parcels in the census tract. Homesteaded foreclosure rates (H) 
reflect number of foreclosure points on homesteaded parcels per census tract divided by number of homesteaded 
residential parcels in the census tract. Non-homesteaded foreclosure rates (NH) reflect number of foreclosure points 
on non-homesteaded parcels per census tract divided by number of non-homesteaded residential parcels in the 
census tract. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Census Tract
O H NH O H NH O H NH O H NH O H NH O H NH
Minneapolis
1260 4.2 0.7 10.1 3.3 2.8 3.9 5.1 2.6 8.9 3.2 1.5 5.5 2.9 3.0 2.9 1.7 2.5 0.8
84 5.8 2.6 12.0 5.5 4.4 7.6 6.9 5.7 9.0 3.7 3.5 4.0 2.1 1.7 2.9 2.8 3.1 2.3
95 3.2 2.1 6.5 6.1 3.8 12.1 3.1 1.8 6.9 3.1 2.9 3.6 3.0 2.7 3.7 2.5 2.4 2.6
1109 3.1 2.1 9.0 2.5 1.9 5.3 2.3 1.9 4.7 2.6 2.3 4.3 1.9 1.5 3.6 1.7 1.4 2.7
1116 1.4 1.4 1.1 1.0 0.8 3.4 0.9 0.5 5.4 1.2 1.1 2.6 0.7 0.8 0.0 0.7 0.6 1.6
120.03 1.1 0.6 4.0 1.3 1.1 2.0 1.1 0.9 2.1 1.4 1.3 1.6 1.4 1.5 1.0 1.3 1.3 1.0
Richfield
247 1.0 1.0 1.8 2.4 2.2 6.0 1.2 1.2 1.6 2.1 2.0 4.3 1.9 1.8 2.5 1.4 1.2 3.6
248.01 1.2 0.6 8.9 2.0 1.1 11.1 1.7 1.8 0.0 2.2 1.8 6.3 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.0 2.8
248.02 1.6 1.5 2.0 3.5 3.5 3.6 0.9 0.8 1.8 2.3 2.1 3.3 0.9 0.8 1.7 1.4 1.0 4.5
Bloomington
252.01 1.5 1.5 2.0 2.3 2.6 1.6 2.5 1.9 7.0 2.9 2.6 5.2 3.0 3.2 1.6 0.9 0.8 1.5
252.05 1.6 1.4 3.9 2.0 1.6 6.8 1.3 1.2 2.2 1.4 1.3 3.1 1.6 1.5 3.7 1.7 1.5 3.9
253.01 0.3 0.1 3.1 1.0 1.0 1.5 0.7 0.7 1.4 0.8 0.8 1.3 0.7 0.8 0.0 1.0 1.1 0.0
253.02 0.6 0.5 1.9 1.2 0.8 4.3 1.4 1.1 3.4 1.1 1.1 0.9 1.4 1.4 0.9 1.1 1.1 0.8
Burnsville
607.48 1.2 0.4 12.8 1.6 0.6 14.0 1.6 0.7 13.8 1.5 0.5 14.5 1.8 0.9 13.3 0.6 0.3 4.0
607.47 0.6 0.2 6.1 1.0 0.4 10.3 1.3 0.8 8.8 2.2 1.0 17.9 1.8 0.6 15.9 1.7 0.7 11.3
607.14 1.6 1.0 11.7 1.6 1.0 10.2 1.6 1.2 9.4 2.4 1.6 17.0 1.8 1.6 4.8 1.5 1.4 2.8
607.37 0.8 0.3 2.5 1.4 0.5 5.4 1.3 0.4 5.3 2.2 0.8 8.8 1.8 0.8 6.3 1.1 0.4 4.4
607.13 1.5 1.1 7.7 1.1 0.8 6.6 1.2 1.2 1.5 1.9 1.5 7.9 1.7 1.8 1.1 1.3 1.4 0.0
607.41 1.3 1.0 4.5 2.2 1.3 10.8 1.7 1.1 7.4 1.3 1.0 4.2 1.9 1.3 6.6 1.5 1.3 3.0
607.42 1.1 0.9 4.3 1.1 0.8 6.1 1.6 1.4 5.7 1.6 1.4 4.6 1.1 1.0 2.9 0.9 0.9 0.0
Lakeville
608.14 1.1 1.0 3.4 1.3 1.0 5.8 0.9 0.9 0.7 1.6 1.3 4.7 1.3 1.3 1.9 1.8 1.9 0.9
608.15 0.6 0.5 1.6 1.0 0.8 2.2 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.0 2.8 1.3 1.2 2.3 0.7 0.6 1.3
608.16 0.8 0.6 4.3 1.4 1.1 6.1 0.7 0.4 4.1 1.1 1.0 3.3 1.1 1.0 2.0 0.7 0.6 2.3
Submarket B
Foreclosures Rates, 2007 to 2012
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
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DISCUSSION 
While impact of the housing crash was spread throughout Submarket B, low-income 
residents and people of color in South Minneapolis as well as renters throughout the submarket 
experienced the worst of the foreclosure crisis. Leading up to the housing crash, housing 
dynamics across Submarket B challenged the assumptions of the traditional submarket model 
developed by Adams et al. (2002). Instead of home values appreciating more rapidly farther 
along Traverse B, pre-crash housing appreciation was disproportionately concentrated in the 
South Minneapolis neighborhoods of Phillips and Powderhorn while the outer-ring suburbs of 
Burnsville and Lakeville witnessed relatively low appreciation rates (Figure 4k and Map 4b). 
Yet, not only did a housing bubble form in the heart of South Minneapolis leading up to 2006, 
but the tracts in the Phillips and Powderhorn neighborhoods also experienced plummeting home 
values from 2006 to 2013 (Map 4c). Moreover, during this time, the innermost tracts in 
Submarket B also saw the highest foreclosure rates across the submarket. While foreclosure rates 
in inner-ring suburbs like Richfield and Bloomington rivaled and even surpassed levels seen in 
Minneapolis, the impacts of the foreclosure crisis in the submarket were nonetheless heavily 
skewed toward the inner part of the middle-class submarket.  
However, within communities along Traverse B, renters experienced considerably higher 
rates of foreclosure than their homeowner counterparts in the submarket. Non-homesteaded 
foreclosure rates across Submarket B were well above homesteaded rates throughout the six year 
study period (Table 4a). Yet, this disproportionate impact was not limited solely to South 
Minneapolis. Instead, renters from the Phillips community to Burnsville consistently saw double 
digit foreclosure rates throughout the crisis. In fact, though overall and homeowner foreclosure 
rates across Burnsville lingered at or below two percent for much of the foreclosure crisis, renter 
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foreclosure rates in the outer-ring suburb regularly eclipsed 10 percent between 2007 and 2012. 
Though Submarket B as a whole did not witness as extreme foreclosure rates as those in other 
submarkets, renters across the submarket saw some of the highest foreclosure rates across the 
Twin Cities and were hit disproportionately harder than their homeowner counterparts. 
Furthermore, when overlaid with socioeconomic data, including race and income, these 
housing trends confirm that Submarket B communities with high concentrations of people of 
color and low-income residents were hit the hardest by the foreclosure crisis. Low-income 
residents and people of color within Submarket B are largely concentrated in the heart of South 
Minneapolis, while the median household income and proportion of white residents in each tract 
increase along Traverse B (Figure 4g-h). Between 2002 and 2013, the tracts in Submarket B 
which experienced 1) the highest pre-crash housing appreciation rates, 2) some of the largest 
post-crash declines in housing values, and 3) the highest annual foreclosure rates were also the 
only tracts in the submarket with 2011 median household incomes at or below $40,000 and non-
white majorities as of 2010. While correlation does not equal causation, the geographic 
connection between high depreciation and foreclosure rates and large concentrations of low-
income, people of color confirms an uneven geography within Submarket B that extends not 
only to housing dynamics, such as depreciation and foreclosure, but the socioeconomic impact of 
these dynamics as well. Though communities across Submarket B experienced the ill effects of 
the housing crash, from housing depreciation to rising foreclosure rates, these impacts were 
largely confined to study tracts with the highest concentrations of low-income residents, people 
of color, and renters. 
 
 CHAPTER V 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 SUBMARKET D:  
Near North Minneapolis to Maple Grove 
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BACKGROUND 
I. Geographic Definition 
Submarket D, a middle-class housing submarket within the Twin Cities metro region, 
encompasses most of Near North Minneapolis and its northwestern suburbs. The submarket 
begins just west of downtown Minneapolis (Map 5a). Following a network of highways, 
including Olson Memorial Highway and Interstates 94 and 694, the submarket then extends 
westward through suburban Hennepin County.  
Within Submarket D, I have selected a traverse that follows Upton and Oliver Avenues in 
Near North Minneapolis northward and then leapfrogs through western suburbs along routes 
such as Winnetka Avenue in New Hope and Brooklyn Park and Eagle Lake Road in Maple 
Grove. Originating just north of Olson Memorial Highway, where predominantly single-unit 
housing begins to emerge in Near North Minneapolis, Traverse D (Map 5a) runs through 
predominantly residential communities and avoids most commercial, institutional, or industrial 
activity. Older, less valuable, and smaller housing units are generally concentrated in 
Minneapolis and its inner-ring suburbs, with newer, more valuable houses on larger lots 
manifesting in second-ring suburbs like Brooklyn Park and Maple Grove (Figure 5a-d). 
Along its westward route, Traverse D runs through sixteen census tracts: three in 
Minneapolis’ Near North and Willard-Hey communities, one in Golden Valley, two in 
Robbinsdale, three in Crystal, two in New Hope, one in Brooklyn Park, and four in Maple 
Grove. These sixteen census tracts and the sample of 281 houses collected across Submarket D 
form the basis of analysis for this case study.   
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Map 5a. Submarket D Study Area 
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Figure 5a. Sample Houses along Traverse D: 11
th
 through 26
th
 Avenue N 
12
 
 
                                                          
12
 Sample houses pictured represent “typical” single-family units in each tract. Peak and low housing values are 
shaded. Data Source: Hennepin County Assessor’s Office. 
Current $ Constant $ Current $ Constant $
1995 42,000 62,017 1995 37,000 54,634
2000 46,500 58,332 2000 68,500 85,930
2005 142,500 154,693 2005 173,500 188,346
2006 145,000 157,669 2006 180,500 196,271
2010 93,000 95,001 2010 108,500 110,834
2012 88,500 88,500 2013 94,500 92,404
2013 93,000 90,937
Current $ Constant $ Current $ Constant $
1995 38,500 56,849 1996 72,000 102,232
2000 63,500 79,658 2000 86,800 108,886
2005 154,000 167,177 2005 173,000 187,803
2010 102,000 104,195 2006 193,000 209,863
2012 99,000 99,000 2010 178,000 181,830
2013 104,000 101,693 2013 120,000 117,338
Tract 1028
Tract 1020 Tract 217
11xx Oliver Ave 15xx Oliver Ave
22xx Upton Ave 25xx Parkview
Tract 33
Year Built: 1911 Year Built: 1914
Year Built: 1916 Year Built: 1946
Assessed Value Assessed Value
Assessed Value Assessed Value
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Figure 5b. Sample Houses along Traverse D: 34
th
 through 46
th
 Avenue N
13
 
 
                                                          
13
 Sample houses pictured represent “typical” single-family units in each tract. Peak and low housing values are 
shaded. Data Source: Hennepin County Assessor’s Office. 
Current $ Constant $ Current $ Constant $
1995 57,100 84,314 1995 71,900 106,168
2000 68,900 86,432 2000 89,400 112,148
2005 149,000 161,750 2005 179,000 194,317
2006 170,000 184,854 2006 195,000 212,038
2010 123,000 125,646 2010 146,000 149,141
2013 98,000 95,826 2013 123,000 120,272
Current $ Constant $ Current $ Constant $
1995 72,000 106,315 1995 93,500 138,062
2000 89,000 111,646 2000 113,000 141,753
2005 178,000 193,231 2005 216,000 234,483
2007 201,000 214,452 2006 232,000 252,271
2010 158,000 161,399 2010 186,000 190,002
2012 133,000 133,000 2012 153,000 153,000
2013 137,000 133,961 2013 166,000 162,318
Tract 214 Tract 213
Tract 209.03 Tract 215.03
34xx Grimes Ave 39xx Perry Ave
45xx Brunswick Ave N 46xx Oregon Ave N
Year Built: 1923 Year Built: 1938
Year Built: 1960 Year Built: 1969
Assessed Value Assessed Value
Assessed Value Assessed Value
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Figure 5c. Sample Houses along Traverse D: 48
th
 through 64
th
 Avenue N
14
 
 
                                                          
14
 Sample houses pictured represent “typical” single-family units in each tract. Peak and low housing values are 
shaded. Data Source: Hennepin County Assessor’s Office. 
Current $ Constant $ Current $ Constant $
1995 77,000 113,698 1995 66,000 97,456
2000 95,000 119,173 2000 78,000 97,847
2005 175,000 189,974 2005 154,000 167,177
2007 194,000 206,983 2007 167,000 178,176
2010 148,000 151,184 2010 122,000 124,625
2013 124,000 121,249 2013 98,000 95,826
Current $ Constant $ Current $ Constant $
1995 79,500 117,390 1995 74,100 109,416
2000 98,700 123,814 2000 90,700 113,779
2005 193,000 209,515 2005 185,600 201,481
2007 201,000 214,452 2006 194,300 211,277
2010 161,000 164,464 2010 152,300 155,577
2013 135,000 132,005 2013 128,300 125,454
Tract 208.04 Tract 208.01
Tract 215.01 Tract 268.07
48xx Nevada Ave N 76xx 59th Ave N
60xx Sumter Ave N 63xx Winnetka Ave N
Year Built: 1959 Year Built: 1951
Year Built: 1960 Year Built: 1958
Assessed Value Assessed Value
Assessed Value Assessed Value
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Figure 5d. Sample Houses along Traverse D: 73
rd
 through 81
st
 Avenue N
15
 
 
                                                          
15
 Sample houses pictured represent “typical” single-family units in each tract. Peak and low housing values are 
shaded. Data Source: Hennepin County Assessor’s Office. 
Current $ Constant $ Current $ Constant $
1995 167,800 247,774 1995 93,300 137,767
2000 197,300 247,503 2000 113,400 142,255
2005 328,300 356,392 2005 233,100 253,046
2007 366,600 391,135 2007 259,000 276,334
2010 303,800 310,336 2010 246,600 251,906
2013 277,300 271,149 2013 215,800 211,013
Current $ Constant $ Current $ Constant $
1995 98,400 145,298 1995 203,800 300,931
2000 126,600 158,813 2000 232,900 292,161
2005 218,200 236,871 2005 410,400 445,517
2007 235,200 250,941 2007 460,000 490,785
2010 211,300 215,846 2010 388,700 397,063
2012 201,300 201,300 2013 331,400 324,049
2013 212,400 207,689
Tract 267.13 Tract 267.12
Tract 267.11 Tract 267.16
109xx Eagle Lake Blvd N 65xx East Fish Lake Rd
74xx Berkshire Way N 153xx 80th Pl N
Year Built: 1993 Year Built: 1978
Year Built: 1978 Year Built: 1992
Assessed Value Assessed Value
Assessed Value Assessed Value
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II. Socioeconomic Context 
MEDIAN HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
With the notable exception of Golden Valley, median household income tends to 
gradually rise between North Minneapolis and Maple Grove, following a traditional middle-class 
submarket model. Median household income levels spike once Traverse D crosses the North 
Minneapolis-Golden Valley border, as income skyrockets from below $40,000 to over $80,000 
(Figure 5e). In fact, while the North Minneapolis tracts hold the lowest median household 
income levels in Submarket D, Tract 217 boasts the second highest income level across the 
submarket of $86,348. For reference, this income level was over $50,000 higher than the 
adjacent tract in North Minneapolis and over $25,000 higher than next tract in Robbinsdale.  
However, after removing Tract 217 from the sample, median household income levels 
tend to level out between $45,000 and $60,000 through other inner-ring suburbs like Crystal, 
New Hope, and Brooklyn Park. Situated in the middle of Submarket D, these suburban 
communities enjoy income levels double those in North Minneapolis yet sit well below the more 
affluent Maple Grove. Though Tract 267.16 at the outer reaches of Maple Grove had the highest 
median household income level in Submarket D by a margin of nearly $40,000, the other Maple 
Grove tracts had income levels between $73,000 and $82,000. While these figures may be 
relatively modest compared to other outer-ring suburbs, they nonetheless reflect an incremental 
progression from the inner part of the submarket to its outer reaches; noticeable outliers in 
Golden Valley and Robbinsdale aside, Figure 5e resembles a ladder in which residents in 
Submarket D move outward as their income levels rise.  
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Figure 5e. Submarket D Median Household Income by Census Tract, 2011 
 
Source: Esri Demographic Database, 2011 
DEMOGRAPHIC MAKEUP 
 Through the 2010 Census, Submarket D was heavily segregated, with North Minneapolis 
predominantly comprised of people of color and its western suburbs overwhelmingly white. The 
three North Minneapolis tracts are the only study tracts in the submarket without a white 
majority in 2000 or 2010 (Figure 5f). As of 2010, all three tracts were at least 48 percent black, 
with black residents constituting a 59 percent majority in the two innermost tracts. Moreover, 
people of color, not just blacks, make up an overwhelming majority in these tracts (Figure 5f). 
For instance, white residents comprised less than 10 percent of the total tract population in Tract 
33 in 2010, less than 15 percent in Tract 1028, and less than 30 percent in Tract 1020. Despite 
the predominance of people of color in North Minneapolis, the proportion of black residents in 
these three tracts actually dropped by 5.8 to 7.8 percent while the percentage of white residents 
grew by 1 to 1.5 percent over the 2000s. While the three North Minneapolis tracts are the only 
study tracts in Submarket D to experience this trend, this phenomenon can be explained by 
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population loss. Between 2000 and 2010, tracts in North Minneapolis witnessed between 5 and 
17 percent population loss. In fact, the number of white and black residents in each of the tracts 
fell over the course of the decade. Yet, as the white population declined by around 50 residents 
between 2000 and 2010, the black population in each tract lost 300 to 500 people during the 
same time period. Consequently, while North Minneapolis remains predominantly black, it 
appears that the black community has been hollowed out since 2000. 
Figure 5f. Demographic Makeup of Submarket D by Census Tract, 2000 and 2010 
 
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 and 2010 Decennial Census 
The thirteen suburban tracts included in this study, on the other hand, are significantly 
more homogeneous than North Minneapolis. Despite 3.9 to 14.4 percent drops in the proportion 
of white residents across all suburban tracts between 2000 and 2010, each tract was at least 68 
percent white as of the 2010 Census. In Maple Grove, for instance, the four study tracts were still 
over 80 percent white in 2010. The demographic transition from predominantly black North 
Minneapolis to its majority white suburbs is abrupt (Figure 5f). Whereas Tract1020 in North 
Minneapolis was roughly 28 percent white in 2000 and 2010, just across the Minneapolis-Golden 
Valley municipal boundary in Tract 217 white residents comprised 91.1 and 87.2 percent of the 
tract population in 2000 and 2010, respectively. That being said, majority white tracts in 
Submarket D, particularly in the inner-ring suburbs of Crystal, New Hope, and Robbinsdale, 
have become more diverse since 2000. Over the course of the 2000s, the percentage of black 
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residents in these areas has grown by as much eight and ten percent. Additionally, the proportion 
of Hispanic residents in New Hope and Crystal has risen by four to six percent and now 
comprise between seven and ten percent of the tract population in these suburbs. Overall, people 
of color are making inroads in the inner-ring suburbs of Submarket D, yet the spatial separation 
of people of color between North Minneapolis and its suburbs remains striking (Figure 5f). 
NEIGHBORHOOD HEALTH 
While owner-occupancy generally rises along Traverse D, there are great fluctuations on 
homeownership across Submarket D (Figure 5g). In 2000 and 2010, only the two innermost 
study tracts had owner-occupancy rates below 50 percent. Nevertheless, the fourteen remaining 
tracts had owner-occupancy rates that ranged from 52 to 99 percent. Moreover, owner-
occupancy rates were not geographically concentrated, but instead scattered across the submarket 
(Figure 5g). For example, three inner-ring suburban tracts (Tracts 213, 215.03, and 215.01) had 
rates below 60 in 2010, whereas another three inner-ring suburban tracts (Tracts 214, 209.03, and 
208.01) all enjoyed rates above 80 percent. One consistent trend across Submarket D, however, 
was declining owner-occupancy rates between 2000 and 2010. Though Tracts 215.03 and 215.01 
in New Hope enjoyed 0.8 and 1.5 percent increases in owner-occupancy, respectively, the 
overwhelmingly majority of study tracts in Submarket D saw their levels of owner-occupancy 
drop between 1 and 4 percent. The greatest declines in owner-occupancy occurred in North 
Minneapolis, with both Tracts 1028 and 1020 seeing decreases of 5.2 to 7.2 percent (Figure 5g). 
While levels of owner-occupancy fluctuate across Traverse D, owner-occupancy rates tend to 
grow with distance from the central city. 
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Figure 5g. Submarket D Owner-Occupancy Rate by Census Tract, 2000 and 2010 
 
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 and 2010 Decennial Census 
While vacancy rates are moderate across much of Submarket D, the concentration of 
vacant properties in North Minneapolis and Brooklyn Park is exceptionally high. As of 2010, the 
three North Minneapolis tracts and Tract 268.07 in Brooklyn Park all had vacancy rates above 10 
percent, with the Tracts 33 and 1028 experiencing residential vacancy levels above 14 percent. 
Tract 33, in which nearly one-fifth of residential properties were vacant in 2010, had not only the 
highest vacancy rate within Submarket D but also the second-highest rate across the 75 study 
tract sample. These four tracts also witnessed some of the largest increases in vacancies within 
the submarket (Figure 5h). In North Minneapolis, where vacancy rates were already above six 
percent in 2000, rates jumped by as much as 7.3 and 13.3 percent over the decade. In Tract 
268.07, however, the residential vacancy rate jumped from 1.3 percent in 2000 to 10.4 percent in 
2010, the second-largest increase in Submarket D. Whereas vacancy levels generally drop off 
farther out in housing submarkets, the dramatic rise in vacancies in not only Minneapolis but 
suburban areas like Brooklyn Park suggests dramatic changes in the housing dynamics within 
these communities.  
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Figure 5h. Submarket D Vacancy Rate by Census Tract, 2000 and 2010 
 
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 and 2010 Decennial Census 
HOUSING DYNAMICS, 2002 TO 2013 
In the years leading up to and following the housing crash, Submarket D, like its 
counterparts across the metro region, experienced uneven patterns of housing appreciation and 
depreciation. Levels of appreciation between 2002 and 2006 in Submarket D challenge the 
traditional submarket model in which houses farther away from the central city experience the 
most rapid rates of housing appreciation (Figure 5i). Instead, as the graph illustrates, tracts in 
North Minneapolis saw the greatest rates of pre-crash appreciation within the submarket, with 
rates in the innermost tracts doubling and even tripling levels seen in outer-ring suburban 
communities. However, despite the concentration of appreciation in Minneapolis before 2006, all 
but one tract in the submarket saw its pre-crash housing value gains erased in the years following 
the crash. In fact, substantial losses were spread fairly evenly across Minneapolis and its inner-
ring suburbs. While the red line in Figure 5i highlighting depreciation from 2006 to 2013 roughly 
mirrors its green counterpart, it should be noted that suburban communities like Robbinsdale, 
New Hope, and Crystal lost two to three times as much as they gained before 2006. More in-
Minneapolis 
G
o
ld
e
n
 V
a
ll
e
y
 
R
o
b
b
in
sd
a
le
 
N
e
w
 H
o
p
e
 
N
e
w
 H
o
p
e
 Crystal 
C
ry
st
a
l 
Maple Grove 
B
ro
o
k
ly
n
 P
a
rk
 
86 
depth analysis of intra-submarket housing trends will contrast pre-crash appreciation and post-
crash depreciation patterns to decipher the uneven housing dynamics across Submarket D.  
Maps 5b and c. 
Submarket D Housing Appreciation by Census Tract, 2002 to 2006; and 
Submarket D Housing Depreciation by Census Tract, 2006 to 2013 
 
Source: Hennepin County Assessor’s Office 
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Figure 5i. 
Traverse D: 
Pre-Crash Appreciation vs. Post-Crash Depreciation for Sample Houses, 2002 to 2013 
 
Sources: Hennepin County Assessor’s Office, MetroGIS 
MINNEAPOLIS 
2002 to 2006 
 Leading up to 2006, the highest appreciation rates in Submarket D were concentrated in 
North Minneapolis. The three North Minneapolis tracts enjoyed substantial growth in their 
sample median EMVs that far outpaced their suburban counterparts (Figure 5i). In fact, from 
2002 to 2006, the sample median EMVs in each of the three tracts grew by at least 32 percent, 
with innermost tracts, Tracts 33 and 1028 enjoying 39.7 percent and 45.1 percent appreciation, 
respectively. Median home values in Tract 1028, for instance, grew from $115,021 in 2002 to a 
peak of $166,912 in 2006. While not as dramatic as in other submarkets, the concentration of 
relatively high appreciation rates within North Minneapolis represents a moderate housing 
bubble within Submarket D. 
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Figure 5j. 
 
Sources: Hennepin County Assessor’s Office 
2006 to 2013 
 In the years following the housing crash, the three North Minneapolis tracts witnessed 
some of the highest depreciation rates in Submarket D. From 2006 to 2013, each of the three 
tracts saw their sample median EMVs decline by over 40 percent. Though the impact on housing 
values in North Minneapolis was not substantially different than in its inner-ring suburbs, 
depreciation rates in the innermost tracts were still among the highest across the submarket 
(Figure 5i). In Tract 1028, for example, the sample median EMV depreciated by over 46 percent 
from a 2006 peak of $164,737 to a 2013 low of $90,448. As of 2013, median home values in 
Tract 1028 and the other North Minneapolis tracts remained around $30,000 below their 2002 
values. Despite witnessing the highest pre-crash appreciation rates in Submarket D, the North 
Minneapolis study tracts lost considerably more in home values after 2006 than they gained 
before the crash. 
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GOLDEN VALLEY 
2002 to 2006 
 In the years leading up to the housing crash, Golden Valley enjoyed higher housing 
values than North Minneapolis yet experienced more modest levels of appreciation. From 2002 
to 2006, the lone Golden Valley study tract saw its sample median EMV appreciate by roughly 
22 percent, the fourth-highest rate of appreciation in Submarket D. For reference, the sample 
median EMV in Tract 217 rose from $192,091 in 2002 to a peak of $234,329 in 2006. In fact, 
despite relatively moderate rates of housing appreciation, the sample median EMV in Tract 217 
remained $40,000 to $60,000 higher than in adjacent study tracts in Submarket D. Leading up to 
the crash, Tract 217 in Golden Valley was in comparatively better condition than its 
contemporaries in the inner-ring suburbs. 
2006 to 2013 
 Despite its relative strength within Submarket D before 2006, Tract 217 experienced the 
greatest rate of depreciation across the entire submarket in the years that followed. The sample 
median EMV in Tract 217 plummeted between 2006 and 2013, losing roughly half its value over 
the seven year period (Figure 5k). In fact, Tract 217 saw its sample median EMV drop by over 
$100,000 from a 2006 height of $234,329 to a 2013 low of $117,338. Furthermore, Tract 217 
remained well below its 2002 value of $192,091, as of 2013. Although it stood prominently 
within Submarket D before the housing crash, Tract 217 in Golden Valley was hit hard by 
housing depreciation and saw all of its previous gains in home values disappear since the crash. 
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Figure 5k. 
 
Sources: Hennepin County Assessor’s Office 
ROBBINSDALE 
2002 to 2006 
Like neighbor Golden Valley, Robbinsdale experienced moderate levels of appreciation 
on par for the inner-ring suburbs of Submarket D. Housing appreciation in the two Robbinsdale 
study tracts was gradual, 15.3 in Tract 213 and 20.6 percent in Tract 214 (Figure 5l). However, 
the appreciation rate in Tract 214 was the highest between North Minneapolis and outer-ring 
suburb, Maple Grove (Figure 5i). Between 2002 and 2006, the sample median EMV in each tract 
grew by roughly $30,000 to 2006 peaks of $192,465 and $207,689, respectively. While its 
housing appreciation was less dramatic than North Minneapolis, Robbinsdale made gains in 
housing values in the years leading up to the housing crash, particularly in relation to its inner-
ring contemporaries.   
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Figure 5l. 
 
Sources: Hennepin County Assessor’s Office 
2006 to 2013 
 Though home values rose modestly in Robbinsdale pre-2006, they depreciated at levels 
that rivaled North Minneapolis in the years following the housing crash. As the downward 
sloping lines in Figure 5l indicate, the sample median EMVs in Tracts 214 and 213 nosedived 
after reaching their respective peaks in 2006. In fact, between 2006 and 2013, the two tracts saw 
depreciation rates of at least 43 percent, more than double their pre-crash appreciation rates and 
just shy of the rates of depreciation in the innermost tracts in North Minneapolis. During this 
time, the sample median EMVs in each tract dropped by nearly $90,000, and both Robbinsdale 
tracts remained roughly $60,000 below their 2002 values as of 2013 (Figure 5l). Overall, much 
like in North Minneapolis and Golden Valley, pre-crash gains in housing values in Robbinsdale 
were completely erased after the housing crash. 
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CRYSTAL 
2002 to 2006 
 Over the five years leading up to the housing crash, Crystal witnessed some of the lowest 
appreciation rates across Submarket D. Pre-crash appreciation rates in the three Crystal study 
tracts were well below their counterparts in the innermost and outermost portions of the 
submarket (Figure 5i). From 2002 to 2006, each of the Crystal study tracts saw levels of 
appreciation below 17 percent. Tract 208.04, for instance, had the second-lowest appreciation 
rate among the sixteen study tracts in Submarket D at 13.7 percent. In fact, the tract saw its 
sample median EMV climb from $164,066 in 2002 to just $186,485 by 2006. Much like their 
fellow inner-ring suburbs in the submarket, the Crystal tracts did not enjoy the same degree of 
housing appreciation as tracts in North Minneapolis and Maple Grove. 
Figure 5m. 
 
Sources: Hennepin County Assessor’s Office 
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2006 to 2013 
 Despite their relatively weak pre-crash gains in housing values, the three Crystal tracts 
were hit hard by the housing crash. Levels of housing post-crash depreciation in Crystal 
outpaced rates in New Hope and Maple Grove (Figure 5i). Between 2006 and 2013, the sample 
median EMV in each study tract in Crystal experienced at least 37 percent depreciation, with 
Tract 208.01 seeing its EMV drop by over 43 percent. In fact, the depreciation rate in Tract 
208.01 rivaled those seen in Robbinsdale, Golden Valley, and North Minneapolis. More 
importantly, however, post-crash depreciation rates across Crystal doubled and tripled pre-crash 
appreciation rates seen in the suburb. Tract 209.03, for instance, saw the highest pre-crash 
appreciation rate in Crystal, with sample median EMVs increasing by nearly 17 percent; 
however, despite gaining $30,000 between 2002 and 2006, the sample median EMV in the tract 
plummeted by almost 40 percent and $85,000 from 2006 to 2013. As of 2013, none of the 
sample median EMVs in the three tracts had returned to 2002 levels. Coupled with modest 
appreciation rates, the relatively high depreciation rates seen in Crystal after the housing crash 
hit the inner-ring suburb particularly hard.  
NEW HOPE 
2002 to 2006 
Between 2002 and 2006, New Hope experienced relatively minimal appreciation. Though 
comparable to appreciation rates in neighboring inner-ring suburbs, the appreciation rates in the 
two New Hope tracts were well below those found in North Minneapolis and Maple Grove. In 
fact, Tract 215.01 witnessed the lowest appreciation rate across Submarket D, seeing its sample 
median EMV grow by just 12.3 percent and roughly $23,000 between 2002 and 2006. Though 
both New Hope tracts enjoyed higher sample median EMVs than geographically adjacent tracts 
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in Submarket D, home values in Tract 215.03 and 215.01 grew gradually leading up to the crash 
and began to plateau as early as 2005.  
Figure 5n. 
 
Sources: Hennepin County Assessor’s Office 
2006 to 2013 
 Post-crash depreciation rates in New Hope were on par with those in other Submarket D 
inner-ring suburbs. Depreciation levels in Tracts 215.03 and 215.01 sat comfortably below 
submarket-high rates in North Minneapolis and Golden Valley yet were far outpaced by 
submarket-low rates in outer-ring Maple Grove (Figure 5i). That being said, while the New Hope 
study tracts witnessed post-crash depreciation rates of just 36 and 38 percent, these rates were 
double and triple the pre-crash appreciation rates in the tracts. After modest appreciation leading 
up to 2006, sample median EMVs in both New Hope tracts dropped steadily after 2006, as 
depicted in Figure 5n. In fact, pre-crash gains in home values in Tracts 215.03 and 215.01 had 
been entirely erased by 2009, and the respective median EMV of sampled houses in each tract 
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remained $50,000 below its 2002 value. While pre-crash appreciation levels were relatively low 
in New Hope, the suburban community experienced similar levels of post-crash depreciation to 
those seen in inner-ring neighbors like Crystal and Brooklyn Park. 
BROOKLYN PARK 
2002 to 2006 
 Much like Crystal and New Hope, Brooklyn Park saw relatively modest pre-crash 
appreciation. From 2002 to 2006, the lone Brooklyn Park study tract in Submarket D witnessed 
just over 16 percent appreciation in its sample median EMV. The pre-crash appreciation 
generally follows trends seen across the inner-ring suburbs between North Minneapolis and 
Maple Grove (Figure 5o). For reference, the sample median EMV in Tract 268.07 grew by 
roughly $30,000, from $183,158 in 2002 to a peak of $212,908 in 2006. While the median EMV 
of sampled housing in Brooklyn Park is slightly higher than in other inner-ring suburbs like 
Crystal and Robbinsdale, pre-crash appreciation trends in Tract 268.07 reflect those seen across 
much of Submarket D.  
2006 to 2013 
 Much like other inner-ring suburbs in Submarket D, Brooklyn Park saw moderate post-
crash depreciation rates that were well above outer-ring suburb, Maple Grove. Seeing 38 percent 
depreciation in its sample median EMV between 2006 and 2013, Tract 268.07 represents the last 
tract along Traverse D with a depreciation rate above 30 percent. In fact, rates of depreciation 
plummet once Traverse D crosses west into Maple Grove from Brooklyn Park (Figure 5i). 
Within Tract 268.07, the sample median EMV dropped by nearly $80,000 from its peak of 
$212,908 in 2006 to its 2013 low of $124,183. Moreover, as of 2013, the sample median EMV in 
Tract 286.07 was nearly $60,000 lower than its 2002 (Figure 5o). Situated in the middle of the 
pack in levels of pre-crash appreciation and post-crash depreciation, Tract 286.07 in Brooklyn 
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Park reflects a typical study tract in Submarket D, in which pre-crash gains in housing values 
were entirely erased by post-crash losses. 
Figure 5o. 
 
Sources: Hennepin County Assessor’s Office 
MAPLE GROVE 
2002 to 2006 
 Though nowhere near as high as appreciation levels in North Minneapolis, pre-crash 
appreciation rates in Maple Grove were higher than the preceding inner-ring suburb tracts along 
Traverse D (Figure 5i). From 2002 to 2006, home values in Maple Grove appreciated between 
18.8 and 20.6 percent. While pre-crash appreciation throughout the outer-ring suburb was 
modest, the impact on housing values was still considerable (Figure 5p). In Tract 267.16, for 
instance, the sample median EMV grew by 20 percent from $336,540 in 2002 to a peak of 
$403,851, a pre-crash gain of nearly $70,000. Tract 213 in Robbinsdale also enjoyed a roughly 
20 percent pre-crash appreciation rate, yet the sample median EMV in the tract grew by just 
$35,000. Therefore, when looking at not only the appreciation rate but the net increase in home 
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values as well, the pre-crash gains in Maple Grove far outpace those witnessed in other 
communities along Traverse D. 
Figure 5p. 
 
Sources: Hennepin County Assessor’s Office 
2006 to 2013 
 Between 2006 and 2013, Maple Grove saw the lowest depreciation rates across 
Submarket D. Maple Grove residents weathered the housing crash far better than their 
counterparts in North Minneapolis and the inner-ring suburbs of the submarket (Figure 5i and 
Map 5c). The four Maple Grove study tracts were the only tracts with depreciation rates below 
30 percent along Traverse D. In fact, the sample median EMV in Tract 267.11, which was the 
lowest among the sixteen study tracts, never dropped below its 2002 value (Figure 5p); after 
reaching $248,465 in 2006, the sample median EMV then depreciated by 15.9 percent down to a 
2013 low of $209,058. Moreover, though the sample median EMVs in the three other Maple 
Grove tracts along Traverse D were below their 2002 levels as of 2013, the Maple Grove tracts 
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saw the lowest net loss between 2002 and 2013. Whereas 2013 home values in tracts throughout 
Minneapolis and the inner-ring suburbs were over 20 and 30 percent lower than their 2002 
values, the Maple Grove tracts all saw less than 15 percent depreciation over the same time. 
Though home values in Maple Grove were impacted by the housing crash, the outer-ring suburb 
fared much better than other communities in Submarket D. 
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Map 5d. 
Submarket D Sample Median EMVs by Census Tract, Selected Years, in 2012 Dollars 
 
 
Source: Hennepin County Assessor’s Office 
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IMPACT OF THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS, 2007 TO 2012 
Throughout the height of the foreclosure crisis, foreclosures in Submarket D were 
disproportionately concentrated in North Minneapolis. Mirroring an overarching pattern 
witnessed across the metro region, the impact of the foreclosure crisis in the submarket was split 
unevenly between North Minneapolis and its western suburbs. Whereas foreclosures in 
Submarket B were spread throughout the submarket in central city and suburbs alike, North 
Minneapolis bore the brunt of the foreclosure crisis within Submarket D. In fact, though 
foreclosures in suburban communities in Submarket D were steady from 2007 to 2012, 
foreclosure rates never eclipsed 3.5 percent in any tract outside of Minneapolis. In North 
Minneapolis, however, foreclosure rates hit double digits in 2007 and 2008 and did not drop 
below three percent until 2011. Renters in North Minneapolis were hit particularly hard, 
experiencing foreclosure rates that reached double digits and consistently doubled and tripled 
their homeowner counterparts. While suburban renters faced a similar fate to their North 
Minneapolis counterparts, the negative correlation between foreclosure rates and distance from 
Minneapolis reveals a markedly uneven geography of foreclosure within Submarket D.  
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Map 5e.  
Submarket D Foreclosure Rates by Census Tract, 2007 to 2012 
 
Source: Hennepin County Sheriff’s Office 
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MINNEAPOLIS 
From 2007 to 2012, foreclosures in Submarket D have been disproportionately 
concentrated in North Minneapolis. While the three study tracts in North Minneapolis had 
foreclosure rates below 3 percent by 2012, the tracts had the highest foreclosures rates in 
Submarket D throughout the foreclosure crisis. In fact, all three tracts had foreclosure rates of at 
least 9.6 percent in 2007, over seven percent higher than the fourth-highest foreclosure rate in the 
submarket. Moreover, overall foreclosure rates in the three North Minneapolis census tracts 
consistently remained above the submarket-wide rates from 2007 through 2012 (Map 5e). 
Furthermore, the three North Minneapolis study tracts along Traverse D have been an epicenter 
of the foreclosure crisis within the Twin Cities metro region; each tract has sat firmly in the top 
third of all study tracts for foreclosure rates, and each tract has ranked in the top ten for at least 
three of the six year study period. While the foreclosure rates for homesteaded properties are 
slightly lower than overall rates (Table 5a), foreclosure rates for homeowners in North 
Minneapolis nonetheless dwarfed their suburban counterparts.  
Despite the staggering concentration of foreclosures in North Minneapolis, the uneven 
geography of the foreclosure crisis in Submarket D becomes even more remarkable when 
examining rates of foreclosure for North Minneapolis renters. Between 2007 and 2009, non-
homesteaded properties in North Minneapolis were decimated by foreclosures. All three North 
Minneapolis tracts along Traverse D had double digit non-homesteaded foreclosure rates (Table 
5a). In Tract 1020, for example, one in five non-homesteaded properties experienced foreclosure 
in 2007 and around one in six in 2008. More importantly, roughly two-thirds of all foreclosures 
in North Minneapolis through 2009 were on non-homesteaded property. Even as foreclosures in 
Submarket D were overwhelmingly concentrated in North Minneapolis, renters felt a much 
greater impact than their homeowner counterparts in the study tracts.  
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GOLDEN VALLEY AND ROBBINSDALE 
 Between Golden Valley and Robbinsdale, two divergent narratives emerge around the 
foreclosure crisis. Moving out along Traverse E from North Minneapolis, the border between 
Minneapolis and Golden Valley signals a stark change in landscape of foreclosure. Adjacent to 
census tracts with double digit foreclosure rates lays Tract 217, the sole study tract in Golden 
Valley, which did not reach a one percent foreclosure rate until 2011 (Map 5e). From 2007 to 
2012, the overall and homesteaded foreclosure rates in Tract 217 remained below submarket-
wide rates, and even non-homesteaded foreclosures, which were well above their homesteaded 
counterparts, failed to eclipse the submarket rate. In fact, Tract 217 had the most consistently low 
foreclosure rates during the foreclosure crisis of the sixteen tracts studied in Submarket D. 
Furthermore, when compared to the rest of the metro area, this tract ranked in the bottom third of 
all studied tracts for the entirety of the six-year study period. Remarkably, two distinct worlds 
have been conditioned by a single municipal border that has separated the largest concentration 
of foreclosures within Submarket D from the least harmed area in the submarket. 
However, as Tract 217 has been left largely untouched by the foreclosure crisis, the 
neighboring tracts in Robbinsdale have felt the impact of the foreclosure crisis. From 2007 to 
2012, Tracts 214 and 213 saw overall foreclosure rates between 1.6 and 2.7 percent and 
homesteaded foreclosure rates between 1.4 and 2.5 percent. For much of the foreclosure crisis, 
these tracts saw rates consistently above submarket-wide levels. In fact, by 2011 and 2012, the 
Robbinsdale tracts had reached foreclosure rates that rivaled and even surpassed those in North 
Minneapolis. For instance, Tract 213 ranked in the top third of all studied tracts in 2011, and the 
next year Tract 214 placed in the top ten foreclosed tracts across the entire metro region. With 
the exception of Tract 217 in Golden Valley, the effects of the foreclosure crisis afflicting North 
Minneapolis seeped into its neighboring inner-ring suburbs throughout the six-year study period.  
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CRYSTAL 
 Within Submarket D, Crystal was hit relatively hard by the foreclosure crisis. Throughout 
the six-year study period, the three Crystal tracts in Submarket D experienced overall and 
homesteaded foreclosure rates between one and three percent and consistently ranked above 
submarket-wide levels. Although their rates were well below those in North Minneapolis for 
much of the housing crisis, Crystal tracts still saw a steady flow of foreclosures into 2012. When 
compared to other studied census tracts across the metro region, the three Crystal tracts 
consistently rank in the middle third of all tracts. In Tract 208.01, however, foreclosure rates in 
2011 and 2012 landed the outermost tract in the top third of all studied tracts. Overall, the 
foreclosure crisis in Crystal has reflected the average impact across the Twin Cities with blips of 
relative severity.  
 Renters in Crystal, on the other hand, have seen disproportionately high foreclosure rates 
throughout the foreclosure crisis. Renter foreclosure rates in the three Crystal tracts were 
consistently higher than comparative homeowner rates over the course of the six-year study 
period (Table 5a). For much of the foreclosure crisis, Tract 209.03 and 208.01 saw rates well 
above submarket-wide levels. In 2008, Tract 208.01 saw a 21.4 percent renter foreclosure rate , 
the highest rate recorded across Submarket D and the third highest rate recorded among all 
studied census tracts. More importantly, however, this dramatically high rate was not a one-time 
occurrence; instead, renters across Crystal saw high foreclosure rates, i.e., 9.5 and 11.5 percent, 
sustained throughout the crisis. Although Crystal as a whole felt the bite of the foreclosure harder 
than other parts of Submarket D, this impact was amplified for renters in this inner-ring suburb. 
NEW HOPE 
 Within New Hope, the two study tracts experienced disparate impacts of the foreclosure 
crisis, with Tract 215.01 seeing higher concentrations of foreclosures between 2007 and 2012. 
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Throughout the study period, the two New Hope study tracts in Submarket D saw overall and 
homesteaded foreclosure rates between 0.5 and 2.6 percent. However, while Tract 215.03 
enjoyed rates consistently below two percent, foreclosure rates in Tract 215.01 lingered above 
two percent for much of the crisis and consistently ranked above the submarket-wide level. The 
uneven distribution of foreclosures within New Hope extends to non-homesteaded properties, as 
well. Though renters in Tract 215.03 failed to see annual foreclosure rates above six percent, 
their counterparts in Tract 215.01 saw three consecutive years of at least 7.5 percent foreclosure 
rates between 2008 and 2010. Moreover, this spatial disparity held when the tracts were 
compared to study tracts across the metro region. For example, Tract 215.03 spent two-thirds of 
the six year study among the bottom third of all study tracts and the other third within the middle 
third of tracts. Foreclosure rates in Tract 215.01, on the other hand, ranked in the middle third for 
the first five years of the foreclosure crisis before falling to the lowest third in 2012. Overall, 
from 2007 to 2012, New Hope witnessed divergent trends in foreclosures, with Tract 215.01 
feeling a much deeper impact from the crisis than its neighbor, Tract 215.03. 
BROOKLYN PARK 
 Although Tract 268.07 saw above average foreclosure rates throughout the foreclosure 
crisis, renters in the suburb were disproportionately impacted by foreclosures between 2007 and 
2012. During the six year study period, overall and homesteaded foreclosure rates in Tract 
268.07 in Brooklyn Park remained steady between one and three percent before dropping off in 
2012. For four of the six year study period overall foreclosure rates were above the submarket-
wide level. In fact, when compared to study tracts across the metro region, Tract 268.07 ranked 
in the middle third of all tracts for four years and even ranked in the top third in 2010. 
Nevertheless, non-homesteaded foreclosure rates in Tract 268.07 were double to triple the 
homesteaded rates throughout the entirety of the foreclosure crisis. From 2008 to 2010, renters in 
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the Brooklyn Park tract experienced over 7 percent foreclosure rates that rivaled and even 
surpassed those in North Minneapolis. On a whole, Tract 268.07 in Brooklyn Park was hit 
relatively hard within Submarket D, yet renters bore the brunt of this impact between 2007 and 
2012. 
MAPLE GROVE 
 Compared to its counterparts in Submarket D, Maple Grove has weathered the foreclosure 
with the least amount of damage. From 2007 to 2012, overall and homesteaded foreclosure rates 
across the four Maple Grove tracts largely fell below submarket-wide rates. In fact, overall and 
homesteaded foreclosure rates across Maple Grove did not eclipse 2.5 percent during the six-year 
study period, with rates hovering at or below one percent for most of the foreclosure crisis. 
Compared to other census tracts across the metro region, Maple Grove tracts predominantly rank 
within the lower third of all studied tracts. Tract 267.11, however, fell firmly in the middle third 
of all tracts for five of the six study years and even placed in the top third of tracts in 2012 with a 
foreclosure rate of 2.4 percent. Nevertheless, while the outer-ring suburb saw a steady influx of 
foreclosures between 2007 and 2012, homeowners and communities across Maple Grove have 
fared considerably better than their counterparts in North Minneapolis and inner suburbs like 
Crystal. 
 However, while Maple Grove as a whole appears to have escaped the foreclosure crisis 
relatively unscathed, renters in the suburban community have not been as fortunate. Non-
homesteaded foreclosure rates across Maple Grove were well above accompanying overall and 
homeowner foreclosure rates (Table 5a). Tract 267.11, for example, recorded two consecutive 
years of greater than 9 percent renter foreclosure rates and experienced rates of at least 2.9 
percent into 2012. Though other portions of Submarket D witnessed even higher renter 
foreclosure rates during this time, the disparity between homeowners and renters in Maple Grove 
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underscored the uneven geography of foreclosures across Submarket D and within this outer-ring 
submarket.    
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Table 5a. 
 
Traverse D:  
Foreclosure Rates by Census Tract, 2007 to 2012 
 
 
Note: Boldfaced values represent foreclosure rates above submarket-wide rates. Foreclosure rates for each census 
tract along Traverse D were calculated using parcel shapefiles obtained from MetroGIS and foreclosure point 
shapefiles from Hennepin County. Overall foreclosure rates (O) reflect number of foreclosure points per census tract 
divided by number of residential parcels in the census tract. Homesteaded foreclosure rates (H) reflect number of 
foreclosure points on homesteaded parcels per census tract divided by number of homesteaded residential parcels in 
the census tract. Non-homesteaded foreclosure rates (NH) reflect number of foreclosure points on non-homesteaded 
parcels per census tract divided by number of non-homesteaded residential parcels in the census tract. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Census Tract
O H NH O H NH O H NH O H NH O H NH O H NH
Minneapolis
33 9.6 5.5 14.9 8.8 6.4 11.7 5.9 3.2 9.3 3.6 4.7 2.2 2.9 2.1 3.9 2.4 2.6 2.1
1028 11.2 6.7 17.4 10.2 6.3 15.1 4.4 1.9 7.2 5.0 5.3 4.7 2.5 3.2 1.8 2.4 2.3 2.4
1020 10.0 4.7 20.5 8.3 4.2 16.0 4.6 1.9 9.7 4.9 4.5 5.7 2.5 1.9 3.6 2.9 2.2 4.1
Golden Valley
217 0.7 0.3 6.1 0.9 0.7 2.9 0.6 0.5 1.8 0.8 0.7 1.7 1.0 1.0 0.6 1.0 0.9 1.8
Robbinsdale
214 2.4 2.1 5.0 2.5 2.2 4.1 2.5 1.9 6.9 2.3 1.9 5.6 1.8 1.6 2.6 2.7 2.5 4.1
213 1.6 1.4 3.2 2.2 2.0 3.0 1.6 1.4 2.8 2.3 2.2 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.9 1.8 1.7 2.2
Crystal
209.03 1.7 1.5 4.5 2.4 1.9 9.5 2.5 2.1 6.3 2.2 2.1 2.9 1.4 1.2 3.0 1.8 1.6 4.8
New Hope
215.03 0.9 0.8 2.5 1.7 1.3 5.9 0.9 0.9 1.2 1.8 1.7 3.7 1.1 1.1 1.2 0.5 0.5 1.1
Crystal
208.04 1.8 1.5 6.1 3.2 2.9 6.1 1.4 1.4 1.4 2.4 2.3 3.8 1.9 1.8 2.4 1.4 1.2 3.6
208.01 2.3 2.2 2.4 3.4 2.0 21.4 2.9 2.4 7.8 2.2 1.4 11.5 2.5 2.6 1.6 2.2 2.0 4.2
New Hope
215.01 1.3 0.9 3.6 2.6 1.6 8.5 2.4 1.7 7.5 2.2 1.3 8.7 1.9 1.8 3.1 1.0 1.0 0.7
Brooklyn Park
268.07 2.1 2.0 4.4 2.3 1.8 7.5 2.1 1.7 7.3 3.0 2.6 8.1 2.3 2.1 4.3 0.8 0.6 2.8
Maple Grove
267.13 0.7 0.5 7.1 0.7 0.7 1.4 0.8 0.7 3.1 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.4 1.3 3.6 1.3 1.1 4.2
267.12 0.6 0.6 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.7 1.7 1.9 1.1 1.1 1.8 0.9 0.9 0.8
267.11 1.3 0.6 9.6 2.2 1.5 9.3 1.5 1.2 4.8 1.9 1.7 2.9 2.4 2.0 5.4 1.3 1.3 1.2
267.16 0.3 0.3 0.0 1.0 0.7 7.6 0.5 0.4 3.6 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.5 3.5 0.8 0.6 3.3
Submarket D
Foreclosures Rates, 2007 to 2012
20122007 2008 2009 2010 2011
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DISCUSSION 
Between 2002 and 2013, the housing crash and subsequent foreclosure crisis left an 
uneven mark on Submarket D, afflicting North Minneapolis residents and renters across the 
submarket more severely than suburban homeowners. Pre-crash housing dynamics, i.e., the 
concentration of high appreciation rates in the innermost tracts of the submarket, contradict the 
traditional submarket model developed by Adams et al. (2002). Though outer-ring tracts in 
Maple Grove enjoyed relatively high levels of pre-crash housing appreciation compared to their 
counterparts in inner-ring suburbs, the highest appreciation rates were disproportionately situated 
in North Minneapolis. Yet, not only did a housing bubble develop within North Minneapolis 
before 2006, but the tracts in the central city also witnessed the most substantial declines in home 
values following the crash. Similarly, as the series of maps in Map 5e illustrate, North 
Minneapolis tracts also saw far and away the highest concentration of foreclosures along 
Traverse D.  
Additionally, within communities along the traverse, renters have seen considerably 
higher rates of foreclosure than their homeowner counterparts. Non-homesteaded foreclosure 
rates across Submarket D were well above homesteaded rates throughout the six year study 
period. While non-homesteaded foreclosures were highest in North Minneapolis, large 
concentrations of renter foreclosures was not limited to the inner part of the submarket; instead, 
across suburban tracts with relatively low overall foreclosure rates, such Crystal’s Tract 208.01 
in 2008, renters saw double digits foreclosure rates that dwarfed homeowner foreclosure rates in 
the tracts. Even in tracts with relatively high owner-occupancy rates, renter foreclosure rates 
above 10 percent disproportionately affect less affluent residents and threaten neighborhood 
stability. 
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Moreover, when overlaid with socioeconomic data, including race and income, these 
housing trends confirm that Submarket D communities with high concentrations of people of 
color and low-income residents were hit the hardest by the foreclosure crisis. As previously 
discussed, low-income residents and people of color have historically been concentrated in North 
Minneapolis, with both inner-ring and outer-ring suburbs along Traverse D remained 
overwhelmingly white. The disconnect between the three North Minneapolis study tracts and the 
thirteen suburban tracts in Submarket D emerges most saliently along the Minneapolis-Golden 
Valley border. As Traverse D crosses from North Minneapolis into Golden Valley, not only do 
the median household income and proportion of white residents jump by $50,000 and 64 percent, 
respectively, but the foreclosure rates drop by nearly double digits. While an extreme situation, 
the juxtaposition of these geographically adjacent study tracts underscores the uneven impact of 
the foreclosure crisis within Submarket D. Though the submarket as a whole experienced the 
effects of the housing crash, including housing depreciation and a rise in foreclosures, these 
impacts were predominantly centered in tracts with the highest concentrations of low-income 
residents, people of color, and renters.  
 CHAPTER VI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 SUBMARKET E:  
North Minneapolis to Brooklyn Park 
 
 
 
 
112 
BACKGROUND 
I. Geographic Definition 
Submarket E, the only working-class submarket included in this study, extends out from 
the heart of North Minneapolis through Hennepin County’s northern suburbs. Submarket E 
originates in Near North Minneapolis, just north of Minneapolis’ North Loop along Plymouth 
Ave N (Map 6a). Hugging the western shore of the Mississippi River, the submarket then 
follows Interstate 94 north into Brooklyn Center and Brooklyn Park.  
Within this submarket, I have selected a traverse that follows Bryant, Colfax, and Dupont 
Avenues in Near North Minneapolis northward through the eastern edges of Brooklyn Center 
and Brooklyn Park. Originating just north of West Broadway Ave, as commercial development 
and multiple-unit housing give way to predominantly single-unit housing, Traverse E (Map 6a) 
courses through solidly residential development and bypasses commercial, institutional, or 
industrial activity and thoroughfare traffic. Differences in housing within Submarket E are 
embedded in the built environment; older, less valuable, and smaller housing units are generally 
concentrated in the Minneapolis portion of the traverse, whereas newer, more valuable houses on 
larger lots begin to emerge in the suburbs (Figures 6a-c). 
Along its route, the traverse intersects twelve census tracts: six in Minneapolis’ Near 
North and Camden communities and three in Brooklyn Center and Brooklyn Park, respectively. 
These twelve census tracts and the sample of 266 houses collected across Submarket E serve as 
the foundation of the analysis for this case study.   
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Map 6a. Submarket E Study Area 
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Figure 6a. Sample Houses along Traverse E:  24
th
 through 41
st
 Avenue N
16
 
 
                                                          
16
 Sample houses pictured represent “typical” single-family units in each tract. Peak and low housing values are 
shaded. Data Source: Hennepin County Assessor’s Office. 
Current $ Constant $ Current $ Constant $
1995 38,000 56,111 1995 41,500 61,279
2000 66,000 82,794 2000 57,500 72,131
2005 175,500 190,517 2004 153,000 169,472
2006 181,500 197,359 2005 153,000 166,092
2010 103,000 105,216 2010 70,000 71,506
2012 90,500 90,500 2011 70,000 70,877
2013 95,000 92,893 2013 72,500 70,892
Current $ Constant $ Current $ Constant $
1995 49,000 72,353 1995 45,500 67,185
2000 60,500 75,894 2000 65,500 82,166
2005 136,500 148,180 2005 137,000 148,723
2006 142,500 154,951 2006 137,000 148,970
2010 82,500 84,275 2010 103,000 105,216
2013 69,500 67,958 2013 75,000 73,336
24xx Dupont Ave 29xx Colfax Ave N
35xx Colfax Ave N 40xx Colfax Ave N
Year Built: 1923 Year Built: 1909
Year Built: 1915 Year Built: 1910
Tract 22 Tract 1016
Tract 1009 Tract 1004
Assessed Value Assessed Value
Assessed Value Assessed Value
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Figure 6b. Sample Houses along Traverse E: 42
nd
 through 63
rd
 Avenue N
17
 
 
                                                          
17
 Sample houses pictured represent “typical” single-family units in each tract. Peak and low housing values are 
shaded. Data Source: Hennepin County Assessor’s Office. 
Current $ Constant $ Current $ Constant $
1995 43,500 64,232 1995 60,000 88,596
2000 75,500 94,711 2000 90,000 112,900
2005 159,000 172,605 2005 178,500 193,774
2006 166,000 180,504 2006 178,500 194,096
2010 104,500 106,748 2010 116,500 119,007
2013 98,000 95,826 2013 95,000 92,893
Current $ Constant $ Current $ Constant $
1995 63,200 93,321 1995 67,000 98,932
2000 77,100 96,718 2000 82,100 102,990
2005 178,400 193,665 2005 155,300 168,589
2006 182,400 198,337 2007 181,600 193,754
2010 127,600 130,345 2010 123,200 125,851
2012 103,800 103,800 2013 97,500 95,337
2013 109,000 106,582
42xx Colfax Ave N 50xx Aldrich Ave
56xx Colfax Ave N 62xx Colfax Ave N
Year Built: 1883 Year Built: 1951
Year Built: 1949 Year Built: 1955
Tract 1002 Tract 1.02
Tract 205 Tract 206
Assessed Value Assessed Value
Assessed Value Assessed Value
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Figure 6c. Sample Houses along Traverse E: 72
nd
 through 99
th
 Avenue N
18
 
  
                                                          
18
 Sample houses pictured represent “typical” single-family units in each tract. Peak and low housing values are 
shaded. Data Source: Hennepin County Assessor’s Office. 
Current $ Constant $ Current $ Constant $
1995 76,700 113,255 1995 87,000 128,464
2000 95,500 119,800 2000 104,900 131,592
2005 181,900 197,465 2005 190,200 206,475
2007 190,100 202,822 2007 201,200 218,780
2010 142,300 145,362 2010 166,000 169,572
2013 116,100 113,525 2012 133,700 133,700
2013 137,000 133,961
Current $ Constant $ Current $ Constant $
1995 93,500 138,062 1995 No data No data
2000 113,200 142,004 2000 No data No data
2005 204,000 221,456 2005 318,500 345,753
2006 218,200 237,265 2006 340,100 369,816
2010 187,400 191,432 2010 289,100 295,320
2013 147,500 144,228 2013 269,400 263,424
11xx Woodbine Ln 76xx Fremont Ave
89xx Irving Ave 99xx Chestnut Ave
Year Built: 1965 Year Built: 1983
Year Built: 1975 Year Built: 2002
Tract 202 Tract 268.15
Tract 268.22 Tract 268.20
Assessed Value Assessed Value
Assessed Value Assessed Value
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II. Socioeconomic Context 
MEDIAN HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
As previously mentioned Submarket E represents the only working class submarket 
examined in this study and, consequently, has more consistent levels of income and 
concentrations of people of color throughout the submarket. In fact, Submarket E is the only 
submarket in which all study tracts had 2011 median household incomes below $100,000. That 
being said, as Figure 6d illustrates, the submarket retains clear socioeconomic boundaries; much 
like in the other four case studies, income levels across Submarket E tend to increase farther 
from the central city. As of 2011, median household incomes in the six Minneapolis tracts 
remained between $30,000 and $40,000, with Tract 1016 acting as an outlier with an annual 
median income of just $21,690 per household. Farther out in the submarket, however, income 
levels rise to around $50,000 across Brooklyn Center and between $70,000 and $95,000 in 
second-ring suburb, Brooklyn Park. Despite its working class classification, Submarket E 
remains segregated by class, with the lowest income residents concentrated in North 
Minneapolis.  
Figure 6d. Submarket E Median Household Income by Census Tract, 2011 
 
Source: Esri Demographic Database, 2011 
Minneapolis Brooklyn Center Brooklyn Park 
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DEMOGRAPHIC MAKEUP  
Though the spatial disparity in income extends to the demographic makeup of the 
submarket, Submarket E has become increasingly diverse since 2000, with historically large 
concentrations of people of color in North Minneapolis now spreading into suburban Brooklyn 
Center and Brooklyn Park. Between 2000 and 2010, the six study tracts in North Minneapolis 
saw dramatic population loss, predominantly among white residents. During the decade, five of 
the six census tracts in North Minneapolis saw their population drop, with four of these five 
seeing their population fall by at least 10 percent. The proportion of white residents in all six 
census tracts shrank, particularly in outer tracts with white majorities and pluralities like Tracts 
1002 and 1.02 (Figure 6e). On the other hand, the percentage of people of color has steadily 
grown since 2000. In fact, as of 2010, black residents comprised at least 30 percent of the tract 
population in all six study tracts and held a plurality or majority in four of the six tracts in North 
Minneapolis. Likewise, census tracts across North Minneapolis saw steady growth in the 
proportion of Hispanic residents during the 2000s. Overall, significant population loss in North 
Minneapolis has coincided with growing communities of color and steep drops in the proportion 
of white residents.  
Figure 6e. Demographic Makeup of Submarket E by Census Tract, 2000 and 2010
 
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 and 2010 Decennial Census 
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As of 2010, Brooklyn Center remains a predominantly white suburb, with whites making 
up a majority of two census tracts and a plurality in a third. However, like Minneapolis, 
Brooklyn Center has become increasingly nonwhite since 2000. While all three census tracts saw 
population growth between 2000 and 2010, the percentage of white residents in these tracts 
dropped precipitously across Brooklyn Center; Tract 202, in particular, saw a nearly 25 percent 
drop from 64.7 percent to 40 percent in just ten years. The proportion of people of color in 
Brooklyn Center, on the other hand, rose dramatically over the same time, particularly the 
percentage of black and Hispanic residents. The respective proportions of these two communities 
have risen by at least seven percent in each of the census tracts. Overall, while white residents 
remain the largest segment of the population in Brooklyn Center, this first-ring suburb has 
become an increasingly diverse location.    
Similarly, though still predominantly white, Brooklyn Park has also become more diverse 
since 2000. Between 2000 and 2010, the proportion of white residents in all three census tracts 
fell between 7 and 21 percent. Even Tract 268.20, which saw its population grow by 163.8 
percent over the decade, experienced a 15.9 percent drop in the percentage of white residents. 
Conversely, the proportion of people of color in Brooklyn Park, particularly black and Asian 
residents, grew over the same period. In Tracts 268.15 and 268.20, these respective communities 
saw 5 to 10 percent increases between 2000 and 2010. Even though white residents remain the 
majority in the three Brooklyn Park census tracts, black and Asian residents now make up at 
least 9 percent of the population in each tract.  
NEIGHBORHOOD HEALTH 
 In addition to income and race, indicators of neighborhood health, such as owner-
occupancy rate and vacancy rate, reflect socioeconomic disconnect between Minneapolis and its 
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northern suburbs. Levels of owner-occupancy generally rise the farther a tract is from the central 
city (Figure 6f). In fact, only three tracts had owner-occupancy rates below 50 percent in 2000 
and 2010, with two of these tracts in the heart of North Minneapolis. Tract 202 in Brooklyn 
Center, however, represents the notable exception to this pattern. In both 2000 and 2010, Tract 
202 had an owner-occupancy rate below 50 percent and more than 35 percent lower than its 
neighborhing tracts. Furthermore, nearly all tracts witnessed drops in owner-occupancy from 
2000 to 2010, with double digit drops occuring in Tracts 1009, 1.02, and 206. In fact, despite the 
general trend toward higher owner-occupancy in the suburbs, the only tract to see gains in 
owner-occupied homes was Tract 22 in the innermost portion of Submarket E. Yet, while owner-
occupancy took a hit in Submarket E during the 2000s, the suburban communities of Brooklyn 
Center and Brooklyn Park continue to outpace their urban counterpart in North Minneapolis.  
Figure 6f. Submarket E Owner-Occupancy Rate by Census Tract, 2000 and 2010 
 
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 and 2010 Decennial Census 
 
Minneapolis Brooklyn Center Brooklyn Park 
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 Moreover, the disconnect between inner city and suburban tracts is amplified by rates of 
housing vacancy across Submarket E. Patterns of vacancy in the submarket generally reflect the 
inverse of owner-occupancy rates within the submarket, with vacancy rates dropping instead of 
growing farther away from the central city. Vacancy rates across Submarket E rose between 
2000 and 2010 (Figure 6g). However, the rise in vacancy within the submarket was markedly 
uneven. Whereas suburban tracts in Brooklyn Park and Brooklyn Center saw relatively modest 
increases in housing vacancies, tracts in North Minneapolis saw vacancies grow by as much as 
10 percent over the decade. In fact, as of 2010, vacancy rates in the three innermost tracts in 
Minneapolis had eclipsed 16 percent. In Tract 22, nearly one in five homes were vacant, 
according to the 2010 Census. Much like owner-occupancy rate, the level of housing vacancy 
holds important implications for negihborhood health and investment. Coupled with owner-
occupancy patterns, divergent vacancy rates across Submarket E suggest greater neighborhood 
stability in Brooklyn Center and Brooklyn Park than Minneapolis.  
Figure 6g. Submarket E Vacancy Rate by Census Tract, 2000 and 2010 
 
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 and 2010 Decennial Census 
Minneapolis Brooklyn Center Brooklyn Park 
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HOUSING DYNAMICS, 2002 TO 2013 
From North Minneapolis to Brooklyn Park, the housing dynamics of Submarket E in the 
years leading up to and following the housing collapse demonstrate an uneven geography of 
appreciation and depreciation within the submarket that conditioned an uneven impact of the 
foreclosure crisis. The largest housing bubble in Submarket E emerged within North 
Minneapolis in the years leading up to the crash (Figure 6h). Bucking the traditional submarket 
model in which housing value appreciation and distance from central city are positively 
correlated, North Minneapolis tracts 22 and 1016 saw the greatest appreciation in median 
housing values from 2002 and 2006, with appreciation rates of 91 and 57 percent, respectively. 
Moreover, the same communities in Submarket E that experienced rapid appreciation leading up 
to the housing collapse suffered the highest levels of depreciation in its wake (Figure 6h). 
Though this case collected housing values over a 23 year period, analysis of the housing 
dynamics within Submarket E will pay primary attention to the years immediately preceding and 
succeeding the subprime mortgage crash to examine the uneven geography of appreciation 
leading up to the foreclosure crisis and depreciation throughout its height. 
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Maps 6b and c. 
Submarket E Housing Appreciation by Census Tract, 2002 to 2006; and 
Submarket E Housing Depreciation by Census Tract, 2006 to 2013 
 
Source: Hennepin County Assessor’s Office 
Figure 6h. 
Traverse E: 
Pre-Crash Appreciation vs. Post-Crash Depreciation for Sample Houses, 2002 to 2013 
 
Sources: Hennepin County Assessor’s Office 
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MINNEAPOLIS 
Figure 6i. 
 
Source: Hennepin County Assessor’s Office 
2002 to 2006 
 North Minneapolis leading up to the housing collapse embodies an exemplar housing 
bubble within the Twin Cities. Census tracts across North Minneapolis saw tremendous growth 
in median EMV from 2002 to 2006 (Figure 6i). While all of the North Minneapolis tracts 
experienced the mountain-like peak before the crash, the innermost tracts, Tracts 22 and 1016, 
felt astronomical appreciation during the first half of the 2000s. These two census tracts had the 
highest appreciation rates across Submarket E, with rates of 91 and 57 percent, respectively. 
Tract 22, for example, saw its 2002 median EMV of $105,096 from 2002 explode to 2006 
median of $201,164 just four years later. Moreover, as Figure 6d depicts, the levels of 
appreciation in these census tracts represent a striking departure from the traditional submarket 
model. Given the rapid, abnormal levels of appreciation in these areas and the large proportion of 
low-income people of color residing in these respective census tracts, this pattern not only 
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reveals a significant housing bubble in North Minneapolis but may also reflect the product of 
predatory lending within these communities. 
2007 to 2013 
 While the housing crash gradually affected suburban census tracts in Submarket E, urban 
census tracts in Minneapolis felt a precipitous drop in median EMV beginning in 2007. As 
Figure 6d illustrates, North Minneapolis neighborhoods saw greater levels of depreciation than 
their counterparts in Brooklyn Center and Brooklyn Park. All six census tracts in North 
Minneapolis had depreciation rates over 46 percent between 2006 and 2013. The three innermost 
tracts, in particular, saw the highest depreciation levels across Submarket E, with each tract 
losing over 53 percent of its 2006 median EMV by 2013. Despite the large housing bubble 
within North Minneapolis leading up to the crash, each of the North Minneapolis census tracts, 
with the exception of Tract 22, lost considerably more after 2006 than it gained in the first half of 
the decade. Census tracts that saw appreciation rates of 27 to 34 percent between 2002 and 2006 
experienced depreciation rates ranging from 46 to 53 percent over the years that followed. By 
2013, only Tract 22 remained above pre-2000 and -2002 median EMV levels. 
BROOKLYN CENTER 
2002 to 2006 
 Unlike the innermost neighborhoods of North Minneapolis, Brooklyn Center experienced 
more gradual appreciation leading up to the housing collapse. Between 2002 and 2006, sample 
median EMVs for each census tract in Brooklyn Center grew by roughly 25 percent. Following 
the traditional submarket model, outlying tracts like Tract 202 enjoy higher housing values and 
appreciation rates than tracts closer to central city neighborhoods in Minneapolis. Yet, despite 
growth in EMV across the suburb between 2002 and 2006, Brooklyn Center remained relatively 
126 
stagnant within Submarket E, especially considering a few census tracts in North Minneapolis 
caught up to suburban housing prices. Overall, Brooklyn Center was left behind during the years 
leading up to the crash, as Minneapolis and Brooklyn Park enjoyed higher levels of appreciation. 
Figure 6j. 
 
Source: Hennepin County Assessor’s Office 
2006 to 2013 
 Along with North Minneapolis, Brooklyn Center experienced some of the highest levels 
of depreciation following the housing collapse. When comparing the progression of sample 
medians in Figures 6i and 6j, the precipitous drop after 2007 looks all too familiar. All three 
Brooklyn Center census tracts saw 45 to 50 percent drops in their sample medians between 2006 
and 2013. Even tracts that saw relatively modest gain during the first half of the decade, such as 
Tracts 205 and 202, felt the heavy impact of the foreclosure crisis, losing twice as much in 
median EMV as they gained leading up to 2006.  Moreover, the impact in this first-ring suburb 
during this seven year period rivaled and eclipsed the level of depreciation witnessed in parts of 
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North Minneapolis, and as of 2013, the sample median EMVs for each of Brooklyn Center’s 
three census tracts were comparable to 2000 median EMV levels.  
BROOKLYN PARK 
Figure 6k. 
 
Source: Hennepin County Assessor’s Office 
2002 to 2006 
 Like Brooklyn Center, Brooklyn Park saw relatively modest appreciation rates leading up 
to 2006. The appreciation levels in Brooklyn Park between 2002 and 2006 appear diminutive 
when juxtaposed with the rapid ascent of housing values in North Minneapolis (Figure 6e). 
However, leading up to the crash, the second-ring suburb experienced slightly higher 
appreciation levels than its first-ring counterpart. The three Brooklyn Park census tracts saw 
increases in their median EMVs of 26 to 33 percent in the five years before the crash.  Yet, while 
nowhere near the rates documented in parts of North Minneapolis, the levels of appreciation in 
Brooklyn Park follow the traditional submarket model laid out by Adams et al.( 2002). The 
outermost tracts, Tracts 268.22 and 268.20, retain a distinct edge in median EMV over innermost 
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Brooklyn Park tract, Tract 268.15 (Figure 6k). This trend emerges, though admittedly to a lesser 
extent, within Figure 6h, as well; the green line marking pre-crash appreciation levels across 
Submarket E depicts a steady rise in housing values moving outward from Brooklyn Center to 
the edges of Brooklyn Park. Consequently, despite disruptions to the submarket model in North 
Minneapolis, the pre-crash housing dynamics in Brooklyn Park support previous findings and 
should not be surprising. 
2006 to 2013 
 Within Submarket E, Brooklyn Park weathered the recession with the least damage. 
Though there is a drop off in median EMVs after 2006, the slopes of depreciation in Brooklyn 
Park are much less steep than their counterparts in North Minneapolis and Brooklyn Center 
(Figure 6k). In fact, between 2006 and 2013, the three Brooklyn Park census tracts saw the 
lowest depreciation rates within the entire submarket, with rates ranging from 34 to 39 percent. 
While each of the tracts lost more post-crash than it gained pre-crash, the difference between 
these levels represents the smallest margins for any census tracts in Submarket E. Overall, when 
compared to Minneapolis and Brooklyn Center, Brooklyn Park has fared relatively well. 
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Map 6d. 
Submarket E Sample Median EMVs by Census Tract, Selected Years, in 2012 Dollars 
 
Source: Hennepin County Assessor’s Office 
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IMPACT OF THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS, 2007 TO 2012 
The state of Submarket E during the height of the foreclosure crisis follows two distinct 
but related stories: one intra-submarket, the other inter-submarket. On one hand, the geography 
of foreclosures in Submarket E remains strikingly uneven, with communities in North 
Minneapolis bearing the brunt of the impact and suburban communities in the Brooklyns 
experiencing generally lower foreclosure rates from 2007 through 2012. However, when 
compared to their suburban counterparts in other submarkets, Brooklyn Center and Brooklyn 
Park have seen consistently higher foreclosure rates. Therefore, though a clear dichotomy 
emerges within Submarket E between the urban core and surrounding suburbs, the across-the-
board concentration of foreclosures in this working class submarket clearly distinguish it from its 
middle class counterparts.  
Moreover, another facet of the uneven geography of the foreclosure crisis within 
Submarket E appears between homeowners and renters. Between 2007 and 2012, renters along 
Traverse E experienced a considerably higher rate of foreclosure than homeowners in the 
submarket. Aggregate foreclosure rates across the selected census tracts in Submarket E hovered 
between 2.4 percent and 4.8 percent, with the peak of foreclosure activity occurring in 2008 
dropping to the low in 2012 (Table 6a). Similarly, aggregate foreclosure rates for homesteaded 
properties across Submarket E ranged between a 2.3 percent low in 2012 and a 4.1 percent high 
in 2008. However, in non-homesteaded properties, which experienced aggregate foreclosure 
rates between 2.8 percent and 7.6 percent, the height of the foreclosure crisis hit in 2010 with 
rates dipping down to the low in 2012. This trend suggests disparity not only between across 
Submarket E neighborhoods but also within neighborhoods. 
MINNEAPOLIS 
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Throughout the height of the foreclosure crisis and well into its wake, foreclosures in 
Submarket E have been disproportionately concentrated in North Minneapolis. Although most 
North Minneapolis census tracts saw foreclosures rates drop to three percent by 2012 from 
double digit highs in the immediate aftermath of the crash, resident in the Near North and 
Camden communities, by an overwhelming margin, bore the brunt of the foreclosure crisis in 
Submarket E. Overall foreclosure rates in census tracts across North Minneapolis have 
consistently remained above the submarket-wide rates from 2007 through 2012 (Table 6a). 
What’s more, the six Minneapolis census tracts along Traverse E have been an epicenter of the 
foreclosure crisis within the Twin Cities metro region; each North Minneapolis tract has sat 
firmly in the top third of all study tracts for foreclosure rates, and until 2012, all four innermost 
tracts (Tracts 22 through 1004) were annual fixtures in the top ten foreclosed tracts. Tracts 1004 
and 1009, specifically, have seen top ten foreclosure rates over the entirety of the six year study 
period. While the foreclosure rates for homesteaded properties are more modest than overall 
rates, foreclosure rates for homeowners in North Minneapolis still far outpaced their suburban 
counterparts.  
However, the uneven geography of the foreclosure crisis in Submarket E becomes even 
more staggering when examining rates of foreclosure for North Minneapolis renters. In the three 
years following the housing crash, non-homesteaded properties in North Minneapolis were 
ravaged by foreclosures. All six North Minneapolis census tracts along Traverse E saw non-
homesteaded foreclosure rates above 12 percent, with half of these tracts experiencing rates over 
20 percent (Table 6a). More importantly, in the four innermost tracts, which saw as high as one 
in four renters foreclosed upon, non-homesteaded foreclosures constituted between 60 and 80 
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percent of all foreclosures between 2007 and 2009. While foreclosure rates for renters in North 
Minneapolis began to drop off after 2010, the damage had already been done. 
Map 6e.  
Submarket E Foreclosure Rates by Census Tract, 2007 to 2012 
 
Source: Hennepin County Sheriff’s Office 
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Map 6e. (cont’d) 
 
 
Source: Hennepin County Sheriff’s Office 
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BROOKLYN CENTER 
Although Minneapolis saw the greatest concentration of foreclosures within Submarket E 
between 2007 and 2012, a less extreme yet steady wave of foreclosures have afflicted first-ring 
suburb, Brooklyn Center, for much of the foreclosure crisis. Throughout the six year study 
period, overall and homesteaded foreclosure rates in Brooklyn Center remained fairly stable. 
Though Brooklyn Center did not experience as dramatically high of foreclosure rates as North 
Minneapolis communities, the inner-ring suburb nonetheless experienced a persistent effect from 
foreclosures between 2007 and 2012, with rates still hovering around three percent five years 
after the 2007 crash. In fact, during 2011 and 2012, the rates in Tracts 205 and 206 rivaled those 
in some of the hardest hit neighborhoods in Minneapolis. Moreover, when compared to other 
census tracts across the five study submarkets, census tracts in Brooklyn Center rank among the 
greatest impacted in the Twin Cities metro region. Foreclosure rates in the three Brooklyn Center 
census tracts were among the top third of all census tracts for each of the six study years, and 
2011 and 2012 rates in Tracts 205 and 206 placed these suburban census tracts in the top ten 
hardest hit census tracts during their respective years.  
 While homeowners in Brooklyn Center have seen moderate albeit steady foreclosure 
rates, renters in this first-ring suburb have experienced more dramatic foreclosure rates since 
2007. Non-homesteaded properties across Brooklyn Center consistently faced foreclosure rates 
above the submarket-wide rate and comparable to rates in North Minneapolis for the first stages 
of the foreclosure crisis. Tract 206, in particular, witnessed non-homesteaded foreclosure rates 
over 5 percent throughout the six year study period, with nearly one in six renters experiencing 
foreclosure in 2008. Although overall foreclosure rates across Brooklyn Center were relatively 
stable, the lasting disparity between homesteaded and non-homesteaded properties implies 
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disproportionate impact for Brooklyn Center residents dependent upon tenure status. Even as 
Brooklyn Center emerged as a hot spot for foreclosures after 2007, renters in this inner-ring 
suburb felt this reality to a greater extent than homeowners.   
BROOKLYN PARK 
Compared to their counterparts in North Minneapolis and Brooklyn Center, the census 
tracts along Traverse E in Brooklyn Park have weathered the foreclosure crisis relatively well. 
From 2007 to 2012, overall and homesteaded foreclosure rates across Brooklyn Park have 
largely remained below aggregated submarket rates. In fact, the only time a Brooklyn Park 
census tract experienced an overall foreclosure rate above the submarket rate was Census Tract 
268.15 in 2009 with a rate of 3.3 percent. This holds for homesteaded properties, as census tracts 
in Brooklyn Park have, with only two exceptions, fared better than their counterparts in 
Minneapolis and Brooklyn Center over the six year study period. While the second-ring suburb 
has not been immune to foreclosures, the concentration of foreclosures in Brooklyn Park does 
not rival the swath of foreclosed properties in the inner portions of Submarket E.      
Nevertheless, despite its comparative advantage within Submarket E, it should be noted 
that Brooklyn Park residents, particularly renters, have not weathered the foreclosure crisis 
unscathed. As Table 6a illustrates, when examining non-homesteaded properties, Brooklyn Park 
has witnessed foreclosure rates that rival and eclipse those found in Minneapolis. Census Tract 
268.20, for instance, recorded the second-highest non-homesteaded foreclosure rate (22.1 percent 
in 2007) over the six-year study period not only within Submarket E but across all five 
submarket case studies. Furthermore, renters in Census Tract 268.15 have consistently seen 
foreclosure rates above 4 percent from 2007 and 2012, with rates getting as high as 17.9 percent 
in 2008. This pattern suggest two divergent trends in foreclosures within Brooklyn Park; while 
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most residents in Brooklyn Park, namely homeowners, have seen modest rates of foreclosure 
during the foreclosure crisis, renters in the suburban community have been hit exceptionally 
hard. 
Furthermore, the relatively low foreclosure rates in Brooklyn Park also obscure an 
important inter-submarket trend. With the exception of Census Tract 268.22, overall foreclosure 
rates have hovered over two percent across Brooklyn Park for much of the foreclosure crisis. 
When compared to rates in North Minneapolis these values appear insignificant, yet when 
evaluated alongside other second-ring suburbs, a starker picture begins to develop. For much of 
the six year study period, all three census tracts in Brooklyn Park experienced foreclosure rates 
among the middle third of all studied census tracts. Tract 268.15, in fact, sat comfortably in the 
top third of all 75 census tracts studied for much of the foreclosure crisis. Foreclosure rates in 
Brooklyn Park between 2007 and 2012 not only eclipsed second-ring suburban counterparts like 
Shoreview, Woodbury, and Lakeville but also rival those in areas of Minneapolis and Saint Paul. 
Though foreclosure rates above three and four percent fail to surpass aggregated intra-submarket 
rates in Submarket E, these rates would appear high in each of the other four case study 
submarkets and suggest something distinctive about the foreclosure crisis in Submarket E. As 
evidenced in not only North Minneapolis but throughout Brooklyn Center and Brooklyn Park, 
the foreclosure crisis has clearly had a disproportionately greater impact on Submarket E, the 
only working class submarket included in this study, than the four other case study submarkets.  
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Table 6a. 
Traverse E:  
Foreclosure Rates by Census Tract, 2007 to 2012 
 
 
 
Note: Boldfaced values represent foreclosure rates above submarket-wide rates. Foreclosure rates for each census tract along Traverse E were calculated using 
parcel shapefiles obtained from MetroGIS and foreclosure point shapefiles from Hennepin County. Overall foreclosure rates (O) reflect number of foreclosure 
points per census tract divided by number of residential parcels in the census tract. Homesteaded foreclosure rates (H) reflect number of foreclosure points on 
homesteaded parcels per census tract divided by number of homesteaded residential parcels in the census tract. Non-homesteaded foreclosure rates (NH) reflect 
number of foreclosure points on non-homesteaded parcels per census tract divided by number of non-homesteaded residential parcels in the census tract. 
Census Tract
O H NH O H NH O H NH O H NH O H NH O H NH
Minneapolis
22 12.8 6.8 20.0 8.4 5.9 10.9 6.3 3.0 9.3 7.8 3.4 12.4 4.4 4.0 4.8 2.4 4.0 0.6
1016 16.2 7.6 24.2 11.0 8.8 12.9 5.7 4.8 6.5 4.4 4.4 4.3 3.4 4.4 2.7 2.3 2.7 2.1
1009 10.3 6.2 17.1 10.1 5.6 17.1 6.3 3.6 9.8 5.1 4.0 6.4 3.4 3.9 2.8 3.8 3.4 4.4
1004 9.5 4.4 21.1 7.5 4.6 13.3 5.1 2.9 9.7 5.6 4.4 7.7 4.3 5.0 2.9 3.2 3.6 2.7
1002 4.8 2.6 15.1 4.9 3.3 11.2 3.0 2.5 5.3 4.0 3.6 5.2 2.7 2.6 3.1 2.5 2.4 2.5
1.02 5.9 4.4 12.7 6.3 4.6 12.9 4.6 4.0 6.9 7.2 4.0 17.0 3.0 3.4 1.8 2.8 2.6 3.2
Brooklyn Center
205 3.1 3.1 4.1 4.5 3.5 12.6 3.7 3.3 6.8 3.1 3.1 3.0 3.5 3.1 5.8 2.7 2.9 1.6
206 4.3 3.9 8.2 6.1 5.0 16.2 4.4 3.0 14.3 3.1 2.8 5.1 3.3 2.8 6.5 3.7 3.5 5.4
202 3.8 3.2 7.8 6.3 5.4 9.6 3.4 3.3 4.4 3.7 3.6 4.3 2.3 2.1 3.3 2.3 2.7 0.4
Brooklyn Park
268.15 1.3 1.1 4.7 4.5 3.4 17.9 3.3 3.0 7.2 3.6 3.2 8.5 2.6 2.5 5.2 2.2 2.1 4.4
268.22 1.0 0.8 3.6 1.9 1.7 5.6 1.8 1.5 7.9 1.4 1.1 7.7 0.9 1.0 0.0 1.1 1.1 1.0
268.20 2.8 1.7 22.1 3.8 2.8 15.5 2.3 1.8 8.4 2.8 2.6 5.9 2.2 2.2 2.6 1.7 1.6 2.5
2007 2008 2009 2010
Submarket E
Foreclosures Rates, 2007 to 2012
2011 2012
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DISCUSSION 
As substantial losses in home values and lingering foreclosure rates suggest, Submarket E 
was hit particularly hard by the foreclosure crisis. However, the impact of the housing crash has 
been markedly uneven within the submarket, and when housing dynamics and foreclosure 
patterns are overlaid with socioeconomic data, communities with concentrations of low-income 
residents, people of color, and renters disproportionately bore the brunt. Leading up to the 
financial crash, housing dynamics within Submarket E bucked the traditional submarket model 
developed by Adams et al. (2002), with the highest levels of appreciation occurring within the 
central city instead of the outer reaches of the suburbs. However, not only did a sizable housing 
bubble emerge in North Minneapolis in the years leading up to the crash, but these communities 
also saw the largest drops in home values and highest concentrations of foreclosures in the wake 
of the crash. When comparing Minneapolis to its suburban counterparts, a clear dichotomy 
emerges within Submarket E between the urban core and surrounding suburbs.  
More importantly, however, this dichotomy reveals an uneven impact of the foreclosure 
crisis on neighborhoods with relatively low-income residents, people of color, and renters. While 
this study does not gauge the impact of the foreclosure on individual households, the existence of 
housing bubbles and concentration of foreclosures in particular census tracts holds community-
wide ramifications. As the socioeconomic context section details, the same tracts with large 
fluctuations in appreciation and depreciation and high levels of foreclosure also have relatively 
low median household incomes and large concentrations of people of color. Moreover, as 
foreclosure analysis has revealed, renters have seen dramatically higher rates of foreclosure than 
their homeowner counterparts. Renters in Submarket E reside predominantly in the North 
Minneapolis neighborhoods and portions of Brooklyn Center (Table 6a). Overall, Submarket E 
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may have seen the greatest impact from the foreclosure crisis among the five case studies, yet as 
in other submarkets, communities with high concentrations of low-income residents, people of 
color, and renters disproportionately experienced the effects of the crisis within the submarket.  
 CHAPTER VII 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
SUBMARKET H: 
Frogtown to Shoreview 
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BACKGROUND 
I. Geographic Definition 
Submarket H, a middle-class submarket in Ramsey County, stretches from the Frogtown 
neighborhood in Saint Paul northward to Shoreview. As shown in Map 7a, Submarket H 
originates north of University Avenue in Saint Paul. The submarket then follows a network of 
highways, including Interstate 35W and Minnesota State Highway 280, north into the suburban 
communities of Roseville, Arden Hills, and Shoreview.  
Within Submarket H, I have selected a traverse that travels along the eastern half of the 
submarket, running along Western and Grotto Avenues in Saint Paul northward into Roseville 
and then Shoreview. Originating just north of University Avenue, Traverse H (Map 7a) runs 
through residential neighborhoods and avoids most commercial, institutional, and industrial 
activity as well as thoroughfare traffic on its route. As Figures 7a through 7c illustrate, newer and 
more expensive homes on larger lots are generally situated in the suburban stretches of Traverse 
H, with older, cheaper, and smaller housing units concentrated closer to core. 
From its genesis in Saint Paul to its terminal in Shoreview, Traverse H runs through 
twelve census tracts: four in the Frogtown, North End, and Como neighborhoods of Saint Paul, 
three in Roseville, and five in Shoreview. These twelve census tracts and the sample of 201 
houses collected serve as the basis of analysis for this case study. 
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Map 7a. Submarket H Study Area 
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Figure 7a. Sample Houses along Traverse H: University to Ivy Avenue
19
  
                                                          
19
 Sample houses pictured represent “typical” single-family units in each tract. Peak and low housing values are 
shaded. Data Source: Ramsey County Assessor’s Office. 
Current $ Constant $ Current $ Constant $
1995 22,400 33,076 1995 36,200 53,453
2000 49,700 62,346 2000 67,500 84,675
2005 103,500 112,356 2005 212,800 231,009
2007 107,300 114,481 2007 226,200 241,338
2010 58,300 59,554 2010 156,800 160,174
2013 20,000 19,556 2012 70,500 70,500
2013 114,200 111,667
Current $ Constant $ Current $ Constant $
1995 53,400 78,851 1995 81,400 120,195
2000 79,400 99,603 2000 101,700 127,578
2005 160,200 173,908 2005 255,300 277,145
2008 178,100 183,543 2007 268,400 286,363
2010 153,300 156,598 2010 235,400 240,465
2013 115,000 112,449 2011 200,100 202,607
2013 215,500 210,720
Tract 303
13xx Grotto St
Year Built: 1946
Assessed Value
Tract 326 Tract 327
5xx Western Ave 7xx Western Ave
Year Built: 1875 Year Built: 1904
Assessed Value Assessed Value
Tract 312
10xx Avon St
Year Built: 1916
Assessed Value
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Figure 7b. Sample Houses along Traverse H: Maryland Avenue to County Rd E
20
 
                                                          
20
 Sample houses pictured represent “typical” single-family units in each tract. Peak and low housing values are 
shaded. Data Source: Ramsey County Assessor’s Office. 
Current $ Constant $ Current $ Constant $
1995 90,100 133,042 1995 101,000 149,137
2000 123,100 154,423 2000 138,000 173,114
2005 231,400 251,200 2005 252,100 273,672
2007 260,100 277,507 2006 252,100 274,127
2010 249,800 255,174 2010 218,300 222,997
2013 190,900 186,666 2013 191,500 187,252
Current $ Constant $ Current $ Constant $
1995 133,300 196,831 1995 100,400 148,251
2000 180,900 226,930 2000 136,100 170,731
2005 296,700 322,088 2005 245,900 266,941
2006 296,700 322,624 2007 262,000 279,534
2010 249,600 254,970 2010 255,600 261,099
2012 228,600 228,600 2013 204,800 200,257
2013 237,500 232,232
Tract 416.02
Assessed Value Assessed Value
Tract 416.01
Tract 415 Tract 407.04
20xx Western Ave 23xx Western Ave
30xx Chatsworth St 8xx Harriet Ave
Year Built: 1959 Year Built: 1970
Year Built: 1965 Year Built: 1971
Assessed Value Assessed Value
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Figure 7c. Sample Houses along Traverse H: County Rd F to J
21
  
                                                          
21
 Sample houses pictured represent “typical” single-family units in each tract. Peak and low housing values are 
shaded. Data Source: Ramsey County Assessor’s Office. 
Current $ Constant $ Current $ Constant $
1995 102,700 151,647 1995 116,000 171,286
2000 138,300 173,490 2000 155,200 194,691
2005 284,100 308,410 2005 281,300 305,370
2007 295,800 315,596 2008 319,200 328,956
2010 262,400 268,046 2010 235,000 240,056
2012 221,300 221,300 2013 189,300 185,101
2013 231,500 226,365
Current $ Constant $ Current $ Constant $
1995 244,900 361,620 1995 305,800 451,545
2000 324,200 406,693 2000 400,700 502,658
2005 527,000 572,094 2005 621,000 674,138
2007 573,600 611,988 2007 663,900 708,331
2010 516,200 527,306 2010 525,500 536,806
2012 458,303 458,303 2012 453,400 453,400
2013 468,700 458,303 2013 475,300 464,757
Assessed Value Assessed Value
Tract 407.03 Tract 407.07
Tract 407.06 Tract 407.05
42xx Victoria St 47xx Chandler Rd
59xx Royal Oaks Dr 12xx West Royal Oaks Dr
Year Built: 1977 Year Built: 1979
Year Built: 1983 Year Built: 1989
Assessed Value Assessed Value
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II. Socioeconomic Context 
MEDIAN HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
Despite the middle-class classification of Submarket H, income levels across the 
submarket resemble those in Submarket E more than the other middle-class submarkets in this 
study. In fact, if the 2011 median household income in Tract 407.07 in Shoreview was $64 
lower, Submarket H would join Submarket E as the only submarkets in which all study tract 
incomes were below $100,000. As seen in other submarkets, median household income tends to 
grow farther away from the central city, with the lowest income levels concentrated in Saint Paul 
and the highest located at the farthest reaches of Traverse H (Figure 7d). However, a few outliers 
appear among the study tracts in Submarket H. The 2011 median household income in Tract 303, 
Saint Paul’s outermost tract, was nearly double the levels seen in all other Saint Paul tracts 
(Figure 7d). Conversely, Tract 407.05, the outermost tract in Submarket H, had a median 
household income nearly $40,000 lower than the preceding tract in Shoreview. In the case of 
Tract 303, relatively higher income residents likely live in this tract because of its proximity to 
amenity-rich Lake Como, as seen in Map 7a. On the other hand, Tract 407.05, unlike its 
neighbors in Shoreview, does not contain or border any lakes or natural amenities. While these 
outliers deviate from the upward trend line, the prevailing pattern of income across Submarket H 
suggests the spatial separation of low-income and more affluent residents, with low-income 
residents concentrated in the core of Saint Paul and their wealthy counterparts in outer-ring 
suburbs.  
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Figure 7d. Submarket H Median Household Income by Census Tract, 2011 
 
Source: Esri Demographic Database, 2011 
DEMOGRAPHIC MAKEUP 
 Within Submarket H, people of color are disproportionately concentrated in the inner part 
of Saint Paul, with a clear divide existing between the Frogtown neighborhood and the suburban 
communities to its north. Tracts 326 and 327 in the heart of Frogtown are the only study tracts in 
Submarket H without a white majority in 2000 or 2010 (Figure 7e). As of 2010, both tracts were 
predominantly Asian and black, with each of these communities making up between 25 and 40 
percent of the respective tract populations. In fact, the proportion of black residents in each of 
these tracts grew by over 8 percent between 2000 and 2010, while the percentage of white 
residents dropped by four percent. Yet, despite the growth in the proportion of people of color, 
however, Tracts 326 and 327 each witnessed over 13 percent population loss between 2000 and 
2010. Therefore, while the demographic makeup of the innermost tracts in Saint Paul becomes 
increasingly mixed, the overall population in these areas has simultaneously become depleted. 
 
 
  
 
Saint Paul Roseville 
 
Shoreview 
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Figure 7e. Demographic Makeup of Submarket H by Census Tract, 2000 and 2010 
 
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 and 2010 Decennial Census 
Conversely, the ten study tracts north of Frogtown, including Tracts 312 and 303 in Saint 
Paul, remain predominantly white. As of 2010, eight of these ten tracts were at least 80 percent 
white, with the two exceptions, Tracts 327 and 416.02, roughly two-thirds white. The transition 
to predominantly white communities is far from gradual, however; in 2000 and 2010, the 
proportion of white residents in Tract 312 was over 50 percent higher than its geographic 
neighbor, Tract 327. Figure 7e illustrates the abrupt transition from Frogtown to the Como 
neighborhood particularly well and highlights spatial separation of these two communities. That 
being said, the majority white tracts in Submarket H have become more diverse since 2000. In 
fact, over the course of the 2000s, each of the ten tracts saw the proportion of white residents fall 
by at least four percent. Tract 416.02 in Roseville, for instance, saw a 17.4 percent decline in the 
proportion of white residents coupled with 8.1 percent and 7.3 percent increases in the proportion 
of Asian and Hispanic residents, respectively. Still, while these tracts may have seen the 
proportion of people of color increase between 2000 and 2010, these gains were modest, and 
much of Submarket H remains homogeneous with people of color concentrated in the two 
innermost study tracts (Figure 7e).   
NEIGHBORHOOD HEALTH 
Like income and race, neighborhood health indicators such as owner-occupancy and 
vacancy rates in Submarket H vary across the submarket. Levels of owner-occupancy tend to rise 
149 
farther along Traverse, with considerable blips along the trend line in the more affluent Tract 303 
in Saint Paul and in the innermost tracts of Roseville and Shoreview, respectively (Figure 7f). 
While tracts in Shoreview enjoy owner-occupancy rates as high as 96 and 98 percent, the lowest 
owner-occupancy rates in both 2000 and 2010 are concentrated in Saint Paul and inner-ring 
suburb, Roseville. The noteable exception is Tract 303, which had owner-occupancy rates 
between 30 and 40 percent higher than geographically adjacent tracts in 2000 and 2010. Between 
2000 and 2010, however, owner-occupancy rates across Submarket H were fairly stable. While 
owner-occupancy dropped in all but two census tracts, (Tracts 416.01 and 415), the decline in 
owner-occupancy in the submarket was modest, with only three study tracts (Tracts 326, 327, 
and 407.07) witnessing slides of greater than five percent. Overall, Submarket H fared relatively 
better than its counterparts in regards to change owner-occupancy levels; nevertheless, a striking 
disparity exists between Saint Paul and its suburbs, particularly Shoreview (Figure 7f).   
Figure 7f. Submarket H Owner-Occupancy by Census Tract, 2000 and 2010
 
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 and 2010 Decennial Census 
 
 
Saint Paul Roseville 
 
Shoreview 
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Figure 7g. Submarket B Vacancy Rate by Census Tract, 2000 and 2010 
 
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 and 2010 Decennial Census 
As in other submarkets, residential vacancy rate trends in Submarket H correlate with 
owner-occupancy levels in the submarket. Whereas owner-ocupancy tends to increase with the 
amount of distance from the central city, vacancy rates do the inverse, gradually falling farther 
and farther away from the core. In Submarket H, the highest residential vacancy rates were 
concentrated in Saint Paul, with the two innermost tracts, Tracts 326 and 327, seeing vacancy 
rates over 13 percent in 2010. Conversely, study tracts in Shoreview and Roseville experienced 
much more modest vacancy levels below 5 percent in both 2000 and 2010. More importantly, the 
disparity in residential vacancies between the inner city and suburban communities extends to 
the change in rates over time, as well. Communities with already high vacancy rates in 2000 saw 
the greatest growth in residential vacancies over the next ten years (Figure 7g). Yet, it should be 
noted that these dynamics are not strictly central city vs. suburbs; in fact, between 2000 and 
2010, the tracts that saw the smallest and greatest changes in vacancy rates within Submarket H 
were both located in Saint Paul. Over the decade, Tract 327 saw an 8.1 percent increase in 
vacancy from 4.9 to 13 percent, while just two miles farther north, Tract 303 experienced a 0.9 
rise from 2.2 to 3.1 percent. When coupled with owner-occupancy data, the trends in residential 
Saint Paul Roseville 
 
Shoreview 
151 
vacancies in Submarket H suggest that Tract 303 in Saint Paul and its outer-ring counterparts in 
Shoreview are the most stable communities in the submarket at the neighborhood level.  
HOUSING DYNAMICS, 2002 TO 2013 
While communities across Submarket H enjoyed gains in housing values leading up to 
the financial crash and experienced sizable losses in its wake, the most significant levels of 
appreciation and depreciation occurred in the innermost part of the submarket. Pre-crash 
appreciation rates were fairly consistent across the submarket and generally mirrored their post-
crash depreciation counterparts (Figure 7h). In fact, all but two of the study tracts saw 
appreciation rates above 20 percent between 2002 and 2007, and all twelve tracts witnessed 
depreciation rates over 20 percent between 2007 and 2013. However, as the chart also indicates, 
Saint Paul census tracts, particularly Tracts 326 and 327, held a clear comparative advantage in 
levels of appreciation leading up to the crash. More importantly, unlike their suburban 
counterparts, these tracts then experienced depreciation rates that not only dwarfed the decline in 
housing values in surrounding tracts but also outpaced previous gains by 10 to 25 percent. 
Though Submarket H did not see as big of a housing bubble as other submarkets, its innermost 
portions felt some of the most severe drops in housing values in the metro region after its bubble 
burst. The following analysis of the Submarket H housing dynamics will focus on the six years 
preceding and succeeding the subprime mortgage crash to chart the spatial inequities in 
appreciation and depreciation within the submarket. 
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Maps 7b and c. 
Submarket H Housing Appreciation by Census Tract, 2002 to 2007; and 
Submarket H Housing Depreciation by Census Tract, 2007 to 2013 
 
Source: Ramsey County Assessor’s Office 
Figure 7h. 
Traverse H: 
Pre-Crash Appreciation vs. Post-Crash Depreciation for Sample Houses, 2002 to 2013 
 
Source: Ramsey County Assessor’s Office 
Saint Paul Roseville 
 
Shoreview 
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SAINT PAUL 
Figure 7i. 
 
Source: Ramsey County Assessor’s Office 
2002 to 2007 
 In the years leading up to the housing crash, the Saint Paul communities in Submarket H 
experienced a considerable housing bubble. All four census tracts in Saint Paul saw their sample 
median EMVs increase within the first half of the 2000s (Figure 7i). The three innermost tracts, 
in particular, witnessed the greatest levels of growth. Tracts 326, 327, and 312 attained the 
highest levels of appreciation between 2002 and 2007 across the entire submarket, with rates 
ranging from 40 to 50 percent over this time. In Tract 327, the sample median EMV appreciated 
by 49.37 percent, rising from $113,211 in 2002 to a peak of $169, 108 in 2007 (Figure 7i). While 
the appreciation levels in the innermost part of the submarket dwarf those in suburban Submarket 
H, the remarkable growth in the central city becomes even more striking after looking further 
back to 2000: sitting at a sample median EMV of $86,557 in 2000, home values across Tract 327 
nearly doubled over the next seven years and the tract experienced over 95 percent appreciation. 
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While EMVs in these communities, particularly those in the Frogtown neighborhood, never 
reached levels farther out in the submarket, the rapid rates of appreciation across the innermost 
census tracts not only challenges the assumptions of Adams et al.’s (2002) traditional submarket 
theory but also suggests important implications for neighborhood stability in these areas. 
Reflecting the tell tales signs of a housing bubble, the escalating rates of appreciation in this 
traditionally soft part of Submarket H left many of its residents underwater and the community 
exposed to rising rates of foreclosure. 
2007 to 2013 
 Despite seeing the highest rates of appreciation leading up to the housing crash, census 
tracts in Saint Paul felt their bubble burst in its aftermath. Although suburban census tracts in 
Submarket H gradually felt the sting of the housing crash, tracts in Saint Paul saw their median 
EMVs plummet after 2007. With Tract 303 serving as a slight exception, Saint Paul tracts had 
the highest depreciation levels between 2007 and 2013 across the entire submarket. Depreciation 
in the central city far outpaced suburban levels, and median home values in these urban areas 
dropped by as much as 60 and 70 percent by 2013 (Figure 7h). The impact in Tract 326, the 
innermost census tract studied in Submarket H, was particularly staggering. From 2007 to 2013, 
the sample median EMV in Tract 326 fell by 70.36 percent; after reaching a height of $168,734 
in 2007, the median EMV in the tract had fallen to $50,005 by 2013. Figure 7h portrays this 
unsettling trend and contextualizes it with the other tracts in Saint Paul, depicting the 
mountainous ascent of the home values in this tract as well as their immediate regression to pre-
2000 levels. In fact, after reaching its apex in 2007, it took the sample median EMV in Tract 326 
just two years to drop below its 2002 level. Across the city, none of the four Saint Paul census 
tracts in Submarket H had yet recovered to 2002 home values, as of 2013. While parts of Saint 
Paul indeed experienced above average levels of appreciation in the first half of the decade, the 
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subsequent depreciation of home values following the housing crash completely erased any gains 
these communities saw before 2007. 
ROSEVILLE 
Figure 7j. 
 
Source: Ramsey County Assessor’s Office 
2002 to 2007 
Communities in Roseville enjoyed significant appreciation leading up to 2007, yet the 
growth in this inner-ring suburb was slightly less dramatic than in Saint Paul (Figure 7j). 
Between 2002 and 2007, census tracts in Roseville saw appreciation rates ranging from 16 to 39 
percent. Much like Saint Paul, the levels of appreciation in Roseville drop as distance from the 
central city increases (Figure 7g). Nestled in the innermost portion of Roseville, homes in Tract 
416.02 appreciated at rates that rivaled and eclipsed those in Saint Paul. In fact, it had the fourth-
highest appreciation rate from 2002 to 2007, 38.89 percent, and the third-highest rate from 2000 
to 2007, 89.51 percent, across the entire submarket. Yet, while Tracts 416.02 and 416.01 felt 
rapid appreciation leading up to the housing collapse, home values in these tracts never caught 
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up to the more stable and affluent Tract 415. Overall, though Roseville saw housing appreciation 
leading up to 2007, the rise in home values in this inner-ring suburb were not nearly as dramatic 
as in Saint Paul. 
2007 to 2013 
 While not as severe as the fallout in Saint Paul, the housing collapse chipped away at the 
gains made by Roseville tracts leading up to the crash. The depreciation in home values in 
Roseville resulting from the housing crash roughly mirrored patterns of appreciation between 
2002 and 2007 (Figure 7j). That is, the tracts that witnessed the greatest rates of appreciation 
subsequently experienced the highest levels of depreciation. Overall, the inner-ring suburb saw 
depreciation rates between 20 and 31 percent between 2007 and 2013, and the drop in home 
values in Roseville was more gradual than in Saint Paul (Figure 7j). Yet, despite this much less 
dramatic decline, none of the sample median EMVs in the three Roseville tracts had returned to 
their 2002 levels. Communities in Roseville may not have had as severe depreciation as their 
urban counterparts, yet after modest gains in home prices leading up to the crash, these areas saw 
this progress dissipate in the aftermath of the housing crash. 
SHOREVIEW  
2002 to 2007 
 Shoreview residents experienced relatively modest appreciation in home values leading 
up to the crash. Continuing a trend seen in Saint Paul and Roseville, the highest rates of 
appreciation in Shoreview occurred in the tracts closest to the central city, with levels plateauing 
farther out in the submarket (Figure 7h).  That being said, the second-ring suburb still managed 
appreciation rates ranging from 14 to 32 percent. Furthermore, an important caveat to the fairly 
modest appreciation in some tracts is that these communities had relatively high home values to 
start with. Tract 407.05, for example, had the lowest appreciation rate between 2002 and 2007 in 
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the entire submarket at 13.96 percent; however, the sample median EMV in 2002 was $447,124 
and grew to a peak of $509,563 by 2007 (Figure 7k). While this may be an extreme case, every 
study tract in Shoreview had a sample median EMV over $200,000 in 2002 and ended 2007 with 
an EMV near or above $300,000. Even though the rates of appreciation were more gradual in 
Shoreview than other parts of Submarket H, this second-ring suburb still enjoyed considerable 
growth in home values leading up to 2007. 
Figure 7k. 
 
Source: Ramsey County Assessor’s Office 
2007 to 2013 
 Much like in Saint Paul and Roseville, the pattern of depreciation following the housing 
crash in Shoreview generally mirrored the levels of appreciation felt before the collapse. Across 
Shoreview, census tracts experienced depreciation rates from 24 to 31 percent between 2007 and 
2013. However, depreciation was more rapid in certain segments of the second-ring suburb than 
others. Whereas the three inner tracts with nearly identical sample median EMVs saw a more 
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gradual decline after 2007, the two outer tracts, Tracts 407.06 and 407.05, appear to have much 
more precipitous drops. These tracts, which have boasted the highest median EMVs across 
Submarket H, each lost over $120,000 from their median EMVs from 2007 to 2013. Their rapid 
descent after 2007, however, suggests that home values in these areas farthest away from the 
central city were overinflated and unsustainable. As of 2013, these tracts as well as the other 
three Shoreview tracts had not yet recovered to 2002 median EMV levels. However, three of the 
five tracts saw positive growth in their sample median EMVs from 2012 to 2013, suggesting a 
turn toward recovery (Figure 7k). Overall, Shoreview residents experienced the bite of the 
housing crash along with, and at times more than, their Saint Paul and Roseville counterparts, yet 
while this second-ring suburb saw greater losses, it began with more to lose. 
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Map 7d. 
Submarket H Sample Median EMVs by Census Tract, Selected Years, in 2012 Dollars 
 
Source: Ramsey County Assessor’s Office 
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IMPACT OF THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS, 2007 TO 2012 
Within Submarket H, Saint Paul, particularly the Frogtown neighborhood, experienced 
the lion share of foreclosures between 2007 and 2012. Much like the other case studies, 
Submarket H witnessed dramatic disparity in foreclosure rates between central city and suburban 
tracts. However, unlike their counterparts in Submarkets B, D, and E, suburban tracts within 
Submarket H were largely immune to the impact of the foreclosure crisis. Whereas suburban 
tracts in suburbs like Brooklyn Center and Burnsville saw foreclosure levels that rivaled inner-
city rates, only two of the eight suburban tracts in Submarket H saw foreclosure rates top 1 
percent over the six year study period, and these were simply one-time occurrences for these two 
tracts. This striking drop off begins in Tract 303, the outermost tract in Saint Paul, and continues 
throughout tracts in Roseville and Shoreview (Map 7e). Admittedly, overall foreclosure rates, as 
well as homesteaded and non-homesteaded rates, in Saint Paul have decline over time, yet these 
urban tracts have sustained rates two, three, and even four times higher than their suburban 
counterparts. Ultimately, Submarket H reflects the uneven pattern of concentrated foreclosures in 
inner-city neighborhoods experienced across the Twin Cities.  
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Map 7e.  
Submarket H Foreclosure Rates by Census Tract, 2007 to 2012 
 
 
Source: Ramsey County Assessor’s Office 
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Map 7e. (cont’d) 
 
Source: Ramsey County Assessor’s Office 
SAINT PAUL 
Throughout the duration of the foreclosure crisis, the vast majority of foreclosures in 
Submarket H concentrated in Saint Paul. Tracts in Saint Paul consistently outpaced the 
submarket average over the six-year study period. More strikingly, the three innermost tracts in 
Saint Paul, Tracts 326 through 312, were the only tracts in the entire submarket to regularly 
attain foreclosure rates above 1 percent. Saint Paul residents, homeowners and renters alike, 
experienced a disproportionate impact of the foreclosure crisis (Table 7a). These rates were not 
only high compared to the rest of Submarket, however; Tracts 326 and 327 ranked in the top 
third of all studied tracts for all but one study year and were a constant fixture in the top ten 
foreclosed tracts from 2007 to 2012. Consequently, the innermost census tracts in northern Saint 
Paul represent an epicenter of the foreclosure crisis within the Twin Cities metro region. 
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Yet, while intra- and inter-submarket trends reveal the relative impact of the foreclosure 
crisis in Saint Paul, breaking down the intra-city patterns exposes the uneven geography of the 
crisis within the city. Though foreclosure rates across Saint Paul were the highest in Submarket 
H, these rankings can be deceiving. Although central city tracts like Tract 312 were above the 
submarket average, the overall, homesteaded, and non-homesteaded foreclosure rates in these 
tracts were two and three times lower than those in the innermost tracts each year. In fact, the 
landscape of foreclosure shifts dramatically after Tract 327 (Map 7e). Though Saint Paul as a 
whole fared worse than its suburban counterparts, a noticeable drop in foreclosures occurs 
directly north of the Frogtown neighborhood, and the innermost tracts, Tracts 326 and 327, 
suffered a much greater affliction from 2007 to 2012 than tracts farther north in the city and 
submarket. Ultimately, Saint Paul stands apart from its suburban counterparts in Roseville and 
Shoreview, yet the Frogtown neighborhood embodies the true epicenter of the foreclosure crisis 
in Submarket H.  
ROSEVILLE 
 Lying mere miles north of Frogtown and other Saint Paul neighborhoods hit hard by the 
foreclosure crisis, Roseville weathered the crisis remarkably well. None of the study tracts in 
Roseville saw foreclosure rates higher than one percent and not until 2012 did a census tract have 
an above submarket average rate (Map 7e). This trend extends to homeowners as well; Roseville 
experienced consistently low homesteaded foreclosure rates from 2007 to 2012. Moreover, this 
first-ring suburb not only fared relatively well within Submarket H but within the Twin Cities 
metro region as a whole; all three Roseville tracts ranked in the bottom third of all studied tracts 
for foreclosure rates. Overall, the inner-ring suburb has maintained considerably low foreclosure 
rates and dodged much of the impact afflicting Saint Paul. 
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That being said, renters in Roseville experienced a slightly more bleak reality during the 
six-year study period. Non-homestead foreclosure rates in Roseville tended to double or triple 
the homesteaded rates throughout the foreclosure crisis, with tracts at times reaching annual rates 
of two to three percent (Table 7a). When compared to renter foreclosure rates in Saint Paul, these 
figures appear insignificant. Nevertheless, a three percent foreclosure rate, regardless of 
homeowner or renter status, threatens neighborhood stability and should not be taken lightly. 
Moreover, the juxtaposition between homeowner and renter foreclosure rates suggests that, 
despite the low overall foreclosure rate in Roseville, households in this suburb have felt an 
uneven impact of the foreclosure crisis based on their tenure status. 
SHOREVIEW 
Much like Roseville, Shoreview witnessed relatively negligible foreclosure rates 
throughout the foreclosure crisis. Although census tracts in Shoreview outpaced the submarket 
average a combined four times over the six-year study period, overall tract foreclosure levels 
eclipsed one percent only twice: first, Tract 407.06 in 2009 with a rate of one percent, and then, 
Tract 407.05 in 2010 with a rate of 1.2 percent. While these rates are relatively high compared to 
surrounding tracts and other years, many communities across the Twin Cities would envy these 
outliers in Shoreview. As in Roseville, the five Shoreview tracts in Submarket H ranked in the 
lower third of all studied tracts across the metro area. Furthermore, though homeowners in 
Shoreview saw foreclosure rates higher than the submarket average a number of times, 
homesteaded foreclosure rates across Shoreview failed to reach the one percent threshold 
between 2007 and 2012. Non-homesteaded foreclosure rates in Shoreview, on the other hand, 
were considerably higher than levels for homesteaded properties. However, despite this disparity, 
the foreclosure rates for Shoreview renters remained well below those for Saint Paul renters 
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throughout the study period. Certainly, like its inner-ring counterpart, this second-ring suburb 
avoided much of the calamity that befell Saint Paul.  
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Table 7a. 
Traverse H:  
Foreclosure Rates by Census Tract, 2007 to 2012 
 
Note: Boldfaced values represent foreclosure rates above submarket-wide rates. Foreclosure rates for each census tract along Traverse H were calculated using 
parcel shapefiles obtained from MetroGIS and foreclosure data from Ramsey County. Overall foreclosure rates (O) reflect number of foreclosure points per 
census tract divided by number of residential parcels in the census tract. Homesteaded foreclosure rates (H) reflect number of foreclosure points on homesteaded 
parcels per census tract divided by number of homesteaded residential parcels in the census tract. Non-homesteaded foreclosure rates (NH) reflect number of 
foreclosure points on non-homesteaded parcels per census tract divided by number of non-homesteaded residential parcels in the census tract. 
Census Tract
O H NH O H NH O H NH O H NH O H NH O H NH
St. Paul
326 9.8 5.2 17.0 6.7 3.4 11.5 3.6 - - 3.9 1.6 6.3 3.2 3.3 3.1 2.7 1.5 4.4
327 6.7 3.8 11.4 8.7 3.9 16.0 4.7 - - 3.9 3.4 4.2 1.4 0.8 2.3 2.1 0.4 4.3
312 2.1 0.9 7.7 1.8 1.5 3.0 2.1 - - 2.2 1.6 3.9 1.5 0.9 4.2 0.9 0.8 1.0
303 0.4 0.3 1.5 0.5 0.2 4.4 0.3 - - 0.6 0.5 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.2 0.6 0.4 2.5
Roseville
416.02 0.4 0.3 1.7 0.6 0.3 2.3 0.3 - - 0.8 0.4 2.1 0.8 0.9 0.0 0.6 0.4 1.8
416.01 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.7 0.5 2.9 0.5 - - 0.9 0.8 1.7 0.6 0.7 0.0 0.7 0.5 3.3
415 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.5 - - 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.5 0.4 2.2 0.2 0.1 1.2
Shoreview
407.04 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.3 2.6 0.7 - - 0.8 0.7 1.5 0.6 0.5 1.6 0.5 0.1 2.7
407.03 0.6 0.6 1.5 0.7 0.5 3.3 0.9 - - 0.9 0.8 1.6 0.8 0.6 2.3 0.7 0.4 3.6
407.07 0.6 0.3 4.2 0.4 0.2 3.5 0.7 - - 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.7 1.0 0.7 0.5 2.9
407.06 0.7 0.5 3.9 0.4 0.4 0.0 1.0 - - 0.7 0.5 1.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.6 0.5 2.1
407.05 0.5 0.3 2.8 0.8 0.4 6.2 0.7 - - 1.2 0.9 2.9 0.7 0.5 3.0 0.4 0.3 2.0
Submarket H
Foreclosures Rates, 2007 to 2012
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
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DISCUSSION 
Within Submarket H, the impact of the housing crash and foreclosure crisis were 
concentrated in the Frogtown neighborhood of Saint Paul. Much like the other case study 
submarkets, Submarket H did not follow the traditional pattern of housing appreciation leading 
up to the subprime mortgage crisis; instead of home values appreciating more rapidly at the 
outermost edges of Traverse H, the highest pre-crash appreciation rates were located in the 
innermost parts of the submarket. While communities across Submarket H enjoyed pre-crash 
gains in housing values and experienced substantial post-crash losses, these housing dynamics 
were magnified in the Frogtown neighborhood, and post-crash depreciation rates in the 
predominantly Asian and black community dwarfed the decline in home values seen in 
surrounding tracts (Maps 7b-c). Moreover, though Submarket H did not see as large of a housing 
bubble as other submarkets in the Twin Cities, the innermost tracts in the submarket felt some of 
the most precipitous drops in housing values across the metro region after the bubble burst.  
Furthermore, the same tracts that experienced the highest depreciation rates in Submarket 
H also saw the lion share of foreclosures between 2007 and 2012. Unlike their counterparts in 
Submarkets B, D, and E, the suburban tracts, as well as the outermost tracts in Saint Paul, 
escaped the foreclosure crisis largely unscathed. In fact, foreclosure rates in suburban Submarket 
H eclipsed one percent just twice in the six year study period. Conversely, Frogtown residents, 
renters and homeowners alike, saw the foreclosure rates that doubled, tripled, and even 
quadrupled those in the suburbs. 
When compared alongside socioeconomic data, including race and income, these housing 
trends show that within Submarket H the foreclosure crisis impacted communities with high 
concentrations of people of color and low-income residents disproportionately more affluent, 
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predominantly white areas. As discussed in the socioeconomic context section, low-income 
residents and people of color in Submarket H are overwhelmingly concentrated in the Frogtown 
neighborhood of Saint Paul, whereas both inner-ring and outer-ring suburbs along Traverse H 
remained overwhelmingly white. The spatial disparity between Frogtown and the rest of 
Submarket H is most striking at the Frogtown-Como neighborhood boundary. As Traverse H 
moves from Frogtown northward into Como, not only do the median household income double 
and proportion of white residents spike by over 50 percent, but the foreclosure rates plummet to 
less than two and one percent. The stark contrast between these geographically adjacent study 
tracts emphasizes the uneven impact of the foreclosure crisis within Submarket H. Though the 
housing crash and subsequent foreclosure crisis affected the entire submarket, the effects were 
concentrated in the Frogtown neighborhood and the only tracts with the high concentrations of 
low-income residents and people of color. 
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BACKGROUND 
I. Geographic Definition 
Submarket K, the fourth middle class submarket included in the study, extends eastward 
from the East Side of Saint Paul out to Woodbury. Submarket K originates in Dayton’s Bluff, 
just east of downtown Saint Paul (Map 8a). The submarket then follows Interstate 94 east into 
Maplewood and the Washington County suburbs of Oakdale, and Woodbury.  
Within Submarket K, I have selected a traverse that flows through the heart of the 
submarket, following 6
th
 and Margaret Streets in Dayton’s Bluff eastward into the southern 
regions of Maplewood and Oakdale and the northern reaches of Woodbury. Originating just east 
of Mounds Boulevard, Traverse K (Map 8a) runs through solidly residential neighborhoods and 
circumvents commercial, institutional, and industrial activity as well as thoroughfare traffic. 
Older, cheaper, and smaller housing units are generally located in the Saint Paul stretches of the 
traverse, with newer, more expensive, and larger homes concentrated in the eastern suburbs 
(Figures 8a-c).  
Along its route, the traverse intersects 12 census tracts: six in the Dayton’s Bluff and 
Greater East Side neighborhoods of Saint Paul, one in Maplewood, one in Oakdale, and four in 
Woodbury. These 12 census tracts and the sample of 216 houses collected are the source of 
analysis for this case study.  
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Map 8a. Submarket K Study Area 
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Figure 8a. Sample Houses along Traverse K: Mounds Boulevard to Johnson Parkway
22
 
 
                                                          
22
 Sample houses pictured represent “typical” single-family units in each tract. Peak and low housing values are 
shaded. Data Source: Ramsey County Assessor’s Office. 
Current $ Constant $ Current $ Constant $
1995 54,000 79,736 1995 42,300 62,460
2000 69,000 86,557 2000 117,600 147,523
2005 148,400 161,098 2005 128,800 139,821
2008 199,800 205,906 2007 139,700 149,049
2010 100,100 102,254 2010 97,200 99,291
2013 65,700 64,243 2013 49,300 48,206
Current $ Constant $ Current $ Constant $
1995 64,100 94,650 1995 52,400 77,374
2000 134,600 168,849 2000 32,900 41,271
2005 160,500 174,234 2005 137,800 149,591
2007 181,400 193,540 2007 166,600 177,750
2010 146,300 149,448 2010 102,600 104,807
2013 84,900 83,017 2013 73,500 71,870
Year Built: 1930Year Built: 1934
11xx 6th
Assessed Value
Tract 346.02
13xx Margaret
Assessed Value
Tract 346.01
Tract 344
Assessed Value
Year Built: 1909
3xx Hope
Tract 345
Assessed Value
Year Built: 1878
6xx 5th
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Figure 8b. Sample Houses along Traverse K: White Bear to Hadley Avenue
23
 
 
                                                          
23
 Sample houses pictured represent “typical” single-family units in each tract. Peak and low housing values are 
shaded. Data Source: Ramsey County Assessor’s Office and Washington County Assessor’s Office. 
Current $ Constant $ Current $ Constant $
1995 52,100 76,931 1995 73,000 107,792
2002 106,600 124,480 2000 81,800 102,614
2005 149,600 162,401 2005 177,300 192,471
2007 180,600 192,687 2007 192,000 204,850
2010 130,900 133,716 2010 164,600 168,141
2013 91,400 89,373 2013 113,400 110,885
Current $ Constant $ Current $ Constant $
1995 82,300 121,524 1996 84,600 120,123
2000 101,000 126,699 2000 101,700 127,578
2005 201,900 219,176 2005 179,600 194,968
2007 210,000 224,054 2006 195,400 212,473
2010 184,100 188,061 2010 168,300 171,921
2013 135,400 132,397 2013 140,100 136,992
Tract 347.01
17xx Margaret
Year Built: 1921
Assessed Value
Tract 347.02
19xx Margaret
Year Built: 1958
Assessed Value
*No data for 2000.
66xx 7th St
Year Built: 1959
Assessed Value
Tract 425.01
26xx 5th
Year Built: 1970
Assessed Value
Tract 709.10
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Figure 8c. Sample Houses along Traverse K: Bielenberg Drive to Settlers Ridge Parkway
24
 
  
                                                          
24
 Sample houses pictured represent “typical” single-family units in each tract. Peak and low housing values are 
shaded. Data Source: Washington County Assessor’s Office. 
Current $ Constant $ Current $ Constant $
1996 227,700 323,309 1996 157,700 223,917
2000 247,200 310,100 2000 192,900 241,983
2005 375,300 407,414 2005 276,200 299,834
2006 393,400 427,773 2006 285,700 310,663
2010 301,200 307,680 2010 263,200 268,863
2012 283,400 283,400 2012 238,100 238,100
2013 299,300 292,661 2013 258,100 252,375
Current $ Constant $ Current $ Constant $
1996 163,200 231,726 1996 No data No data
2000 195,200 244,869 2000 No data No data
2005 299,500 325,128 2005 No data No data
2006 303,800 330,345 2008 461,600 475,708
2010 260,500 266,105 2010 355,200 362,842
2013 238,500 233,210 2013 349,100 341,356
81xx Somerset
Year Built: 1987
Assessed Value
Tract 710.06 Tract 710.10
91xx Pinehurst
Year Built: 1990
Assessed Value
Tract 710.11
17xx Jewel
Year Built: 1995
Assessed Value
Tract 710.18
11xxx Dogwood
Year Built: 2006
Assessed Value
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II. Socioeconomic Context 
MEDIAN HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
While income levels tend to grow farther along Traverse K, wealth in Submarket K 
remains overwhelmingly concentrated in Woodbury. 2011 median household income levels were 
fairly even across the first two-thirds of the submarket (Figure 8d). Within Saint Paul, for 
example, all six study tracts had median household incomes between $37,000 and $45,000. In 
fact, when the Maplewood and Oakdale tracts are included, median household incomes across 
Saint Paul and its inner-ring suburbs remain within a $20,000 window. Woodbury, however, 
boasts median household income levels significantly higher than other communities in 
Submarket K. As of 2011, income levels across the four Woodbury tracts were all above 
$95,000, with the two outermost tracts enjoying eclipsing the $100,000 threshold. For reference, 
the highest median household income in 2011, located in Woodbury’s Tract 710.18, was over 
$80,000 higher than the lowest median household income, found in Tract 344 in Dayton’s Bluff. 
Moreover, when compared to the income level in the neighboring Oakdale study tract, the 2011 
median household income in the innermost Woodbury tract, Tract 710.06, was still over $40,000 
higher. Consequently, it not appears that wealth in Submarket K is largely concentrated in the 
outer-ring of the submarket but also that the inner-ring suburbs of Maplewood and Oakdale 
resemble Saint Paul far more than their more affluent counterparts in Woodbury.   
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Figure 8d. Submarket K Median Household Income by Census Tract, 2011 
 
Source: Esri Demographic Database, 2011 
DEMOGRAPHIC MAKEUP 
Though the study tracts in Submarket K remain predominantly white, the submarket has 
experienced rising demographic diversity since 2000. As of 2010, white residents made up a 
majority or plurality of the total population in all twelve study tracts. Throughout the suburban 
tracts, the proportion of white residents sat between 74 and 87 percent, with the highest 
concentrations in Woodbury. In Saint Paul, on the other hand, the proportion of white residents 
in the study tracts has plummeted since 2000; five of the six tracts became at least nine percent 
less white, with the proportion of white residents in the three outermost tracts (Tracts 346.02, 
347.01, and 347.02) dropping by 18 to 22 percent over the course of the decade. In fact, the Saint 
Paul study tract with the largest concentration of white residents, Tract 347.02, was only 55.6 
percent white, as of 2010. Overall, as Figure 8e illustrates, once majority white tracts in Saint 
Paul have become increasingly less homogenous since 2000.  
Conversely, communities of color have made considerable inroads over the course of the 
last decade. Since 2000, the proportion of black, Asian, and Hispanic residents has increased in 
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all but two study tracts. The Saint Paul study tracts have experienced significant growth in the 
Asian and Hispanic communities (Figure 8e). In Tract 346.02, the proportion of Hispanic 
residents grew by 12.3 percent, with the community constituting over 21 percent of the tract 
population in 2010. Likewise, in neighboring Tract 347.01, after the proportion of Asian 
residents increased by 11.9 percent over the decade, the demographic group now comprises just 
over 24 percent of the tract population. Though much of the growth in communities of color has 
occurred in Saint Paul, suburban tracts across Submarket K have seen substantial rises in the 
proportion of people of color, as well. Tract 710.06 in Woodbury, for instance, saw the 
proportion of Asian residents in the tract climb by 7.8 percent from 5.7 to 13.5 percent. Similar 
progress has been made in Maplewood and Oakdale, as well. While white residents continue to 
comprise a majority or plurality of tract populations across Submarket K, the submarket has 
become increasingly diverse in not only urban Saint Paul tracts but suburban Woodbury tracts as 
well. 
Figure 8e. Demographic Makeup of Submarket K by Census Tract, 2000 and 2010 
 
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 and 2010 Decennial Census 
NEIGHBORHOOD HEALTH 
Across Submarket K, neighborhood health indicators, such as owner-occupancy and 
vacancy rates, tend to improve along Traverse K, with a few notable exceptions. Owner-
occupancy generally increases along Traverse K away from Saint Paul (Figure 8f). Much like 
income, the highest owner-occupancy rates are concentrated in outer-ring tracts in Oakdale and 
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Woodbury. The lowest rates in Submarket K, on the other hand, are located exclusively in Saint 
Paul. While no tracts in Submarket K dipped below 45 percent as of 2010, only one of the six 
study tracts eclipsed 60 percent owner-occupancy. That being said, between 2000 and 2010, 
every tract in Submarket K, with the exception of Tract 710.18 in Woodbury, experienced 
declining rates of owner-occupancy. Yet, even the changes in owner-occupancy rate were 
unevenly distributed across the submarket. For example, while drops in owner-occupancy were 
modest across the submarket, Tract 346.01 in Saint Paul and Tract 710.06 in Woodbury each saw 
over 16 percent declines in owner-occupancy (Figure 8f). Nevertheless, trends in owner-
occupancy within the submarket generally follow the traditional submarket model, with rates 
rising farther along Traverse K.  
Figure 8f. Submarket K Owner-Occupancy Rate by Census Tract, 2000 and 2010 
 
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 and 2010 Decennial Census 
Vacancy rates in Submarket K tend to drop dramatically from the inner core to the outer 
reaches of the submarket (Figure 8g). With the exception of the Woodbury tracts, patterns of 
residential vacancy in Submarket K follow the traditional submarket model, with higher levels of 
vacancy concentrated in the central city followed by lower rates farther and farther away from 
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the core of the submarket. As of 2010, all six study tracts in Saint Paul experienced vacancy rates 
above 5 percent, with the innermost tracts, Tracts 344 and 345, reaching heights of 19.2 and 13.8 
percent, respectively. Furthemore, the Saint Paul tracts saw the greatest increases in vacancies 
between 2000 and 2010; the vacancy rates in each Saint Paul tract grew by at least four percent 
and some experienced spikes of nine and 13 percent over the decade. As in other submarkets, 
these rapidly decline as Traverse K travels farther out into the submarket, eventually leveling off 
in the outer-ring suburbs.  
An entirely different story emerged in Woodbury, however. Tracts 710.06 and 710.18 in 
Woodbury actually saw their vacancy rates decline between 2000 and 2010, with drops of 6.4 
and 9.3 percent, respectively (Figure 8g). These tracts were not only outliers in Submarket K, 
however, but the only two study tracts out of the 75 tract sample across the metro region to 
experience declining vacancy rates over the decade. This trend can likely be explained by the 
dynamics of a relatively new housing market in Woodbury. In 2000, Tracts 710.06 and 710.18 
had the two highest vacancy rates across the 75 tract sample (16 and 13 percent, respectively). 
More importantly, however, the population and housing stock in these tracts were considerably 
lower than in 2010; over the 2000s, Tract 710.06 saw 31.9 percent population growth and 23.9 
percent growth in its number of total housing units, while the popluation of Tract 710.18 boomed 
by 185.3 percent followed by 165.8 percent growth in housing units. For context, the other two 
study tracts in Woodbury each added less than 10 housing units during this time and lost at least 
four percent of their residents. Based upon the dramatic influx of people and housing units  over 
the course of the decade, these tracts likely saw their vacancy rates plummet in large part 
because of the sheer amount of human and physical capital moving to Woodbury. 
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Figure 8g. Submarket K Vacancy Rate by Census Tract, 2000 and 2010 
 
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 and 2010 Decennial Census 
HOUSING DYNAMICS, 2002 TO 2013 
Leading up to and following the housing crash, study tracts along Traverse K experienced 
uneven patterns of housing appreciation and depreciation. Between 2002 and 2007, appreciation 
rates across Traverse K contradict the traditional submarket model in which housing values 
appreciate more rapidly farther away from the central city. Instead, pre-crash appreciation rates 
in Submarket K decline along Traverse K, with the highest rates concentrated in the Dayton’s 
Bluff neighborhood of Saint Paul (Figure 8h). After the housing crash, however, the submarket 
returns to the traditional submarket model, as post-crash housing depreciation rates steadily 
decline from the core eastward to the outer-ring suburbs. The same communities that 
experienced dramatic pre-crash appreciation rates were then afflicted by the highest post-crash 
depreciation rates in the submarket (Figure 8h). Moreover, all but one of the twelve study tracts 
experienced net losses in sample median EMVs from 2002 to 2013, yet home values in the four 
Woodbury tracts in Woodbury weathered the housing collapse with the lowest net deprecation 
rates in Submarket K. The following analysis of the Submarket K housing dynamics will parse 
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the six years preceding and succeeding the subprime mortgage crash to reveal the uneven 
geography of appreciation and depreciation within the submarket. 
Figure 8h. 
Traverse K: 
Pre-Crash Appreciation vs. Post-Crash Depreciation for Sample Houses, 2002 to 2013 
 
Source: Ramsey County Assessor’s Office, Washington County Assessor’s Office 
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Maps 8b and c. 
Submarket K Housing Appreciation by Census Tract, 2002 to 2007; and 
Submarket K Housing Depreciation by Census Tract, 2007 to 2013 
 
Sources: Ramsey County Assessor’s Office, Washington County Assessor’s Office 
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SAINT PAUL 
Figure 8i. 
 
Source: Ramsey County Assessor’s Office 
2002 to 2007 
 In the years leading up to the housing crash, the innermost Saint Paul tract experienced 
one of the largest housing bubbles in the metro region. Between 2002 and 2007, most Saint Paul 
tracts saw their median EMVs appreciation by 30 to 40 percent, well above rates farther out in 
Maplewood, Oakdale, and Woodbury. However, Tract 344 in the heart of Dayton’s Bluff 
witnessed astronomic levels of appreciation (Figure 8h). In fact, the median EMV of sample 
properties in Tract 344 skyrocketed by nearly 135 percent in the six years leading up to the crash. 
Unlike their counterparts in other Saint Paul tracts, housing values in Tract 344 grew quiet 
dramatically in the years immediately preceding 2007 (Figure 8i). Considering the relatively 
limited sample size of six properties collected for Tract 344, the derived figure may overstate the 
actual level of appreciation in the census tract. Despite these limitations, the sample data should 
still reflect trends occurring within the two blocks along Traverse K given the sampling method 
184 
of this research. Moreover, the dramatic nature of the pre-crash appreciation rate in Tract 344 
suggests that a housing bubble formed in the Dayton’s Bluff neighborhood in the first half of the 
2000s, regardless if the actual level of appreciation was less than, greater than, or equal to 135 
percent. More importantly, Saint Paul as a whole experienced more rapid appreciation in the 
years leading up to the financial crash than its suburban counterparts. 
2007 to 2013 
 As seen in other submarkets, the census tracts in Submarket K with the highest pre-crash 
appreciation rates, found predominantly in Saint Paul, also had the greatest post-crash 
depreciation levels. From 2007 to 2013, median EMVs in each Saint Paul tract depreciated by at 
least 49 percent. However, the impact in Tract 344, the innermost tract studied in Submarket K, 
was striking. After reaching a peak of $238,084 in 2007, the sample median EMV in Tract 344 
precipitously dropped by 92.58 percent in the six years following the crash (Figure 8i). By 2013, 
the sample median in Tract 344 had fallen to $86,879, setting it back to pre-2002 levels. Tract 
344 is not alone, however; as Figure 8i illustrates, median EMVs for all six Saint Paul study 
tracts in Submarket K had yet to return to their 2002 levels, as of 2013. Despite the above 
average levels of appreciation experienced in Saint Paul in the first half of the decade, the 
subsequent depreciation of home values following the housing crash erased any gains these 
communities saw before 2007. 
MAPLEWOOD 
2002 to 2007 
 Unlike Saint Paul, Maplewood experienced relatively modest appreciation leading up to 
the housing crash. From 2002 to 2007, the one study tract in Maplewood saw roughly 23 percent 
appreciation, putting it on par with other suburban tracts in Submarket K. While sample median 
EMVs in Saint Paul tracts ballooned before the crash, Tract 425.01 in Maplewood saw its 
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median EMV grow from $182,516 in 2002 to a peak of just $224,054 in 2007. Overall, within 
Submarket K, Maplewood was middle-of-the-road leading up to the crash, enjoying modest 
gains between 2002 and 2007. 
Figure 8j. 
 
Source: Ramsey County Assessor’s Office 
2007 to 2013 
 Despite its modest gains between 2002 and 2007, Maplewood was not immune to the 
impact of the housing crash. Though not as dramatic as the levels of depreciation in Saint Paul, 
the sample median EMV of the study tract in Maplewood experienced nearly 42 percent 
depreciation in the six years following the economic downturn. More importantly, the post-crash 
depreciation rate in Tract 425.01 was roughly double its pre-crash appreciation rate. Modest pre-
crash gains were followed by steady losses through 2013 (Figure 7j). In fact, after peaking at 
$224,054 in 2007, the sample median EMV in Tract 425.01 dropped to $132,397 by 2013, over 
$50,000 lower than its 2002 level. While their decline may not be as extreme as their Saint Paul 
186 
counterparts, housing values in Maplewood nonetheless took a considerable hit following the 
2007 crash. 
OAKDALE 
Figure 8k. 
 
Source: Washington County Assessor’s Office 
2002 to 2007 
 Much like Maplewood, Oakdale saw relatively modest appreciation leading up to the 
housing crash. In the first part of the decade, the lone Oakdale study tract witnessed just over 25 
percent appreciation. The pre-crash appreciation in this inner-ring suburb generally reflects 
trends seen in the adjacent tracts in Maplewood and Woodbury (Figure 8h). For reference, the 
sample median EMV in Tract 709.10 rose from $166,985 in 2002 to a peak of $210,244 in 2006 
before beginning to level off in 2007. Like Maplewood, Oakdale is situated around the middle of 
the pack in the years leading up to the crash, seeing only relatively moderate gains between 2002 
and 2007. 
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2007 to 2013 
 Though its appreciation rate mirrored Tract 425.01 in Maplewood leading up the crash, 
Tract 709.10 experienced less dramatic depreciation of home values after 2007. With 34.6 
percent depreciation in its sample median EMV between 2007 and 2013, Tract 709.10 is the first 
tract along Traverse K with a depreciation rate below 40 percent. Nevertheless, modest gains 
leading up to 2007 were followed by consistent losses into 2013 (Figure 8k). After hitting a high 
of $210,244 in 2006, the sample median EMV in Tract 709.10 then tumbled to a low of 
$136,650 in 2013. Like the other tracts in Submarket K, Tract 709.10 had yet to recover to its 
2002 value of $166,985. Despite the relatively modest depreciation rate in Tract 709.10, the 
housing crash still set the inner-ring suburban tract back over a decade.  
WOODBURY 
2002 to 2007 
 With the exception of Tract 710.18, the Woodbury study tracts experienced modest levels 
of appreciation similar to those in Maplewood and Oakdale. As Figure 8l illustrates, the four 
Woodbury study tracts, unlike the rest of Submarket K, hit their peak sample median EMVs in 
2006 instead of 2007. Nevertheless, most of the outer-ring suburb experienced relatively low 
pre-crash appreciation rates. The levels of housing appreciation in Tracts 710.06 and 710.10, for 
instance, mirrored the rates in Maplewood and Oakdale. Moreover, Tract 710.11 enjoyed the 
pre-crash appreciation in Submarket K with its sample median EMV growing by roughly 19.5 
percent between 2002 and 2007. At the outer reaches of Traverse K, however, Tract 710.18 saw 
the second-highest appreciation rate in the submarket. As depicted in Figure 8h, the sample 
median EMV in Tract 710.18 appreciated by 50.8 percent from $280,956 in 2002 to $423,783 in 
2007. Considering the sample median year of construction in Tract 710.18 was 1998, the 
dramatic pre-crash appreciation in this tract likely resulted from the proliferation of new housing 
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at the edges of Woodbury.
25
 Yet, aside from the relatively new Tract 710.18, Woodbury tracts 
with housing from the 1980s and early 1990s observed relatively modest pre-crash appreciation 
compared to their counterparts in Dayton’s Bluff. 
Figure 8l. 
 
Source: Washington County Assessor’s Office 
2007 to 2013 
 After the housing crash, Woodbury saw the lowest depreciation rates across Submarket 
K. Woodbury fared much better than Saint Paul and inner-ring suburbs, Maplewood and Oakdale 
(Map 8c). In fact, none of the sample median EMVs in the four Woodbury study tracts 
depreciated by more than 25 percent between 2007 and 2013. In fact, the sample median EMV in 
Tract 710.18 never dropped below its 2002 level of $280, 956 (Figure 8l). Instead, the tract hit its 
lowest post-crash EMV of $312,950 in 2012 and even began to regain some of its losses in 2013. 
Moreover, though 2013 sample median EMVs in three of the four Woodbury tracts were below 
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 In fact, the sample house from Tract 710.18 included in Figure 8c was constructed in 2006, and 17 of the 38 
sample houses collected in the tract were built after 2000. 
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their 2002 values, each of the four Woodbury tracts experienced housing appreciation between 
2012 and 2013. It should be noted, however, that despite its relatively low deprecation rates 
Woodbury saw some of the largest raw losses in housing prices; for example, although Tract 
710.18 saw just 24.8 percent depreciation between 2007 and 2013, the sample median EMV 
dropped over $105,000 from $423,783 in 2007 to $318,280 in 2013. Home values in Woodbury 
were two to three times as high as those in the rest of Submarket K throughout the study period, 
yet because the outer-ring suburb had relatively high home values to begin with, modest 
depreciation rates mask substantial losses in sample median EMVs. 
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Map 8d. 
Submarket D Sample Median EMVs by Census Tract, Selected Years, in 2012 Dollars 
 
Sources: Ramsey County Assessor’s Office, Washington County Assessor’s Office 
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IMPACT OF THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS, 2007 TO 2012 
From 2007 to 2012, the impacts of the foreclosure crisis in Submarket K were 
disproportionately concentrated within the innermost portions of the submarket. Reflecting a 
trend witnessed in each of the previously examined submarkets, Submarket K saw a sharp divide 
between Saint Paul census tracts and tracts in the eastern suburbs of Maplewood, Oakdale, and 
Woodbury. While unsurprising, this trend departs from patterns seen in Submarkets B and E, in 
which suburban communities shared some of the brunt of the foreclosure crisis with their central 
city counterparts. Instead, though suburban communities in Submarket K saw fairly steady 
foreclosure rates, these figures rarely eclipsed two percent for much of the foreclosure crisis. 
Much like in Submarket H, the negative correlation between foreclosure rates and distance from 
the central city signals a considerably uneven geography of foreclosure within this housing 
submarket.  
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Map 8e.  
Submarket K Foreclosure Rates by Census Tract, 2007 to 2012 
 
Sources: Ramsey County Sheriff’s Office, Washington County Sheriff’s Office 
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SAINT PAUL 
Saint Paul has been the epicenter of the foreclosure crisis within Submarket K (Map 8e). 
Though their foreclosure rates pale in comparison to those experienced in parts of North 
Minneapolis, census tracts on Saint Paul’s East Side have seen some of the highest rates in the 
metro region. Throughout the foreclosure crisis, the six Saint Paul census tracts not only dwarfed 
their suburban counterparts in Submarket K but consistently ranked in the top third of all studied 
census tracts, with Tracts 345 through 347.01 regularly appearing in the top ten foreclosed tracts 
studied between 2007 and 2012. These census tracts have seen their foreclosure rates begin to 
drop off toward 2012, yet over the course of the study period, the rates in each tract have 
stubbornly remained over two and three percent. The foreclosure rates for homesteaded 
properties have been slightly more modest, particularly in 2008 (Table 8a); however, much like 
the overall rates, homesteaded foreclosure rates in Saint Paul suggest a steady onslaught on the 
Dayton’s Bluff and Battle Creek communities.  
Whereas homeowners saw relatively lower rates of foreclosure than overall tract levels, 
renters in Saint Paul have been disproportionately impacted by the foreclosure crisis within the 
city and across the submarket. Within Submarket K, most non-homesteaded foreclosures were 
concentrated in Saint Paul, with central city tracts experiencing annual foreclosure rates well 
above the submarket average. More importantly, when compared to accompanying foreclosure 
rates among homesteaded properties, the high non-homesteaded foreclosure rates across Saint 
Paul indicate a distinct stratification among homeowners and renters. Census tracts in Saint Paul 
saw non-homesteaded foreclosure rates during 2007 and 2008 that not only reached double digits 
but also tripled and quadrupled their homesteaded counterparts (Table 8a). Even with 2009 data 
missing from analysis, the disproportionate and lingering impact of the foreclosure crisis on 
renters in Saint Paul emerges.  
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MAPLEWOOD 
 Though Tract 425.01 cannot represent the entire community of Maplewood, the impact of 
the foreclosure crisis in this tract suggest that the concentration of foreclosures in this inner-ring 
suburb was on par for the metro region. During the crisis, Maplewood saw foreclosure rates 
osculate between one and two percent over the six-year study period, placing it below the 
submarket average for most years. This trend extends to homesteaded foreclosure rates and even 
non-homesteaded levels, which despite being considerably higher than homesteaded rates are 
still dwarfed by figures in Saint Paul. Furthermore, from 2007 to 2012, Tract 425.01 consistently 
ranked in the middle third of all studied tracts. A middle-of-the-road ranking, Maplewood neither 
felt the greatest impact from the foreclosure crisis nor avoided the damage altogether. 
Ultimately, notwithstanding the disparity between homeowners and renters in this inner-ring 
suburb, Maplewood experienced a rather average impact from the foreclosure crisis within 
Submarket K and the Twin Cities metro. 
OAKDALE 
 Much like Maplewood, Oakdale experienced a noticeable impact from the foreclosure 
crisis yet was left largely untouched. Tract 709.10, the only census tract sampled in Oakdale, 
offers insight into the state of this suburb during the foreclosure crisis. Over the course of the six-
year study period, overall and homesteaded foreclosure rates largely remained below two percent 
and did not eclipse the submarket-wide rate until 2012. Tract 709.10, like Tract 425.01 in 
Maplewood, spent the majority of this time in the middle third of all studied tracts. Oakdale 
renters, on the other hand, witnessed considerably higher foreclosure rates, with levels shifting 
between three and seven percent throughout the crisis. In 2010, for instance, Tract 709.10 had 
the third-highest non-homesteaded foreclosure rate in Submarket K with 7.2 percent of renters 
facing foreclosure during the year. Consequently, while the tract as a whole faced relatively low 
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foreclosure rates, renters experienced an unequal impact throughout the foreclosure crisis. 
Ultimately, despite their fairly average status, Tracts 425.01 and 709.10 in Maplewood and 
Oakdale, respectively, reflect the uneven geography of the foreclosure crisis in Submarket K and 
serve as the middle ground between the highs of Dayton’s Bluff to the lows of Woodbury. 
WOODBURY 
Over the course of the foreclosure crisis, Woodbury fared relatively well within 
Submarket K. Though foreclosure rates in Woodbury tracts like Tracts 710.06 and 710.18 
regularly eclipsed one and even topped two percent in 2009, the steady low rates distinguish this 
outer-ring suburb from its fellow Submarket K communities. For much of the study period, 
overall and homesteaded foreclosure rates across Woodbury remained below one percent, and 
like their counterparts in Maplewood and Oakdale, Woodbury census tracts experienced rates of 
foreclosure well below the submarket-wide rate throughout the foreclosure crisis. Furthermore, 
while the foreclosure rates in Woodbury were not as low as other suburban communities like 
Roseville or Shoreview, the outer-ring suburb consistently ranked in the bottom third of all 
studied tracts, and its foreclosure rates resemble those in comparable suburbs like Burnsville and 
Lakeville.  Despite its rapid growth over the past few decades, Woodbury escaped the 
foreclosure crisis relatively unscathed as others in Submarket K felt the bite of the housing crash. 
 However, while Woodbury weathered this storm relatively well as a whole, renters in this 
outer-ring suburb were not as fortunate. As previously mentioned, renters across Submarket K 
felt a disproportionate impact compared to their homeowner counterparts. Yet, unlike renters in 
Maplewood or Oakdale, Woodbury renters saw rates of foreclosure that rivaled those in Saint 
Paul. For much of the crisis, non-homesteaded foreclosure rates in Woodbury, as depicted in 
Figure 8o, were all over the map and exhibited no clear pattern. Nevertheless, with rates 
periodically topping seven and eight percent, tracts in Woodbury, particularly Tracts 710.06 and 
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710.18, felt greater renter impacts than their Saint Paul counterparts. In fact, Tract 710.06 held 
the second-highest renter foreclosure rate in 2007 with a rate of 10.9 percent, and Tract 710.18 
outpaced all tracts in 2010 with a rate of 8.2. Furthermore, while a lack of homestead data from 
Ramsey County prevents comparison across Submarket K, the 18.1 percent renter foreclosure 
rate reached by Tract 710.06 in 2009 not only stands as the highest rate within Submarket K 
during the six-year study period but also the sixth highest non-homesteaded foreclosure rate 
across all . While inconsistent across space and time, renter foreclosure rates in Woodbury 
during the foreclosure crisis at times matched those found in more typical epicenters of 
foreclosure like North Minneapolis. Overall foreclosure rates in Woodbury may signal a 
community left largely unscathed by the foreclosure crisis, yet abnormally high non-
homesteaded foreclosure rates suggest an alternate reality within this outer-ring suburb.  
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Table 8a. 
Traverse K:  
Foreclosure Rates by Census Tract, 2007 to 2012 
 
Note: Boldfaced values represent foreclosure rates above submarket-wide rates. Foreclosure rates for each census tract along Traverse K were calculated using 
parcel shapefiles obtained from MetroGIS and foreclosure point shapefiles from Ramsey and Washington Counties. Overall foreclosure rates (O) reflect number 
of foreclosure points per census tract divided by number of residential parcels in the census tract. Homesteaded foreclosure rates (H) reflect number of 
foreclosure points on homesteaded parcels per census tract divided by number of homesteaded residential parcels in the census tract. Non-homesteaded 
foreclosure rates (NH) reflect number of foreclosure points on non-homesteaded parcels per census tract divided by number of non-homesteaded residential 
parcels in the census tract. 
Census Tract
O H NH O H NH O H NH O H NH O H NH O H NH
St. Paul
344 4.2 1.9 9.0 3.6 0.02 7.4 3.5 - - 3.8 3.5 4.3 1.7 2.0 1.1 2.3 2.1 2.6
345 5.6 3.6 10.6 5.4 0.03 10.1 4.7 - - 5.4 3.8 7.5 3.8 3.6 4.2 2.8 2.3 3.8
346.01 5.3 3.5 13.7 4.2 0.04 6.3 6.0 - - 4.1 3.7 5.2 3.2 2.9 4.1 2.7 2.4 3.8
346.02 3.1 3.0 3.8 4.6 0.04 10.3 5.1 - - 3.0 2.5 4.3 3.2 3.2 3.0 2.4 1.6 6.0
347.01 2.5 1.7 7.2 5.2 0.03 15.2 3.9 - - 4.1 3.6 5.5 3.7 3.7 4.2 2.6 1.4 7.1
347.02 1.6 1.1 5.6 4.9 0.04 11.8 2.7 - - 3.6 2.9 6.2 2.4 1.7 7.1 2.1 1.4 6.0
Maplewood
425.01 0.9 0.6 4.1 1.5 0.01 3.1 1.3 - - 1.6 1.3 3.1 1.8 1.7 2.6 1.4 0.8 5.9
Oakdale
709.10 1.0 0.6 4.6 1.0 0.01 3.6 2.1 1.6 5.9 1.6 1.1 7.2 1.2 1.0 2.8 1.5 1.3 3.2
Woodbury
710.06 1.3 0.5 10.9 1.4 0.01 5.4 3.1 1.6 18.1 1.3 1.0 4.0 1.2 1.0 3.6 1.4 1.2 3.4
710.10 0.6 0.5 1.0 0.9 0.01 1.2 0.8 0.4 2.4 1.5 1.3 2.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 1.0 1.0 0.6
710.11 0.7 0.4 8.1 0.7 0.00 5.7 0.8 0.8 0.0 0.5 0.4 2.3 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.5 0.4 2.2
710.18 0.9 0.5 1.9 1.6 0.01 3.9 2.5 0.9 7.8 1.7 0.9 8.2 0.8 0.6 2.4 0.8 0.7 1.9
20122007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Submarket K
Foreclosures Rates, 2007 to 2012
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DISCUSSION 
Along Traverse K, the effects of the subprime mortgage crisis, including declining home 
values and a rising number of foreclosures, predominantly impacted the East Side of Saint Paul. 
As in each of the other four case studies, pre-crash appreciation rates in Submarket K contradict 
the traditional submarket model. Though home values appreciated rapidly in the outer edges of 
Woodbury, they pale in comparison to the levels of appreciation seen in the Dayton’s Bluff 
neighborhood of Saint Paul; in fact, between 2002 and 2007, sample median home values in the 
heart of Dayton’s Bluff jumped by as much 135 percent. Moreover, after the substantial housing 
bubble that formed in Dayton’s Bluff collapsed, the same community that experienced dramatic 
pre-crash appreciation rates were then afflicted by the highest post-crash depreciation rates in the 
submarket. In fact, Dayton’s Bluff not only experienced the largest housing bubble within the 
Twin Cities metro region but also the highest depreciation rate at nearly 93 percent. At the edge 
of Submarket K, however, home values declined much less precipitously and sample median 
EMVs in a few Woodbury tracts even began to rebound by 2013. Consequently, of the five case 
studies, Submarket K best exemplifies the uneven geography of pre-crash housing appreciation 
and post-crash housing depreciation within the Twin Cities. 
Additionally, the disproportionate concentration of foreclosures in Dayton’s Bluff 
between 2007 and 2012 amplified the dramatic spatial disparities in pre-crash appreciation and 
post-crash depreciation. Mirroring a trend witnessed across each of the four other case studies, 
the geography of foreclosure in Submarket K was sharply divided between Saint Paul and its 
eastern suburbs. Unlike in Submarkets B and E, suburban tracts in Submarket K escaped the 
foreclosure crisis relatively unharmed; despite experiencing steady waves of foreclosures, 
suburban tracts in the submarket rarely saw their foreclosure rates top two percent throughout the 
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crisis. Instead, as in Submarket H, the same tracts in the innermost part of the submarket that 
experienced high depreciation rates absorbed most of the impact from the foreclosure crisis. 
Though less clear cut than in the other studied submarkets, the spatially uneven housing 
dynamics in Submarket K had a disproportionate impact on communities with high 
concentrations of low-income residents and people of color. Unlike the other case studies, people 
of color make up a smaller proportion of the population in tracts across Traverse K; in fact, white 
residents constitute a majority or plurality in all twelve of the study tracts in the submarket. 
Nonetheless, each of the four innermost tracts in Submarket K not only experienced housing 
depreciation rates over 50 percent between 2007 and 2013 but also had 2011 median household 
incomes below $44,000 and a nearly 50-50 split between white and non-white residents in 2010. 
Moreover, Tract 344 in Dayton’s Bluff, which experienced the largest housing bubble in the 
Twin Cities, lost over 15 percent of its population 2000 and 2010 and saw its vacancy rate 
increase by 13.1 percent up to 19.2 percent. Although the concentration of people of color in the 
Saint Paul study tracts along Traverse K do not rival those seen in the innermost portions of 
other submarkets, the positive correlation between proportion of people of color and foreclosure 
rate remains undeniable. While correlation does not equate to causation, the study tracts in 
Submarket K that witnessed the most dramatic swings in pre-crash and post-crash housing values 
and rise in foreclosures also contained the largest proportions of low-income residents and 
people of color in the submarket.   
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CONCLUSIONS 
Between 2002 and 2013, my analysis confirms the anecdotes and observations of the 
uneven geography of the foreclosure crisis: low-income residents, people of color, and renters 
were disproportionately hit by the housing crash and subsequent foreclosure crisis. Leading up to 
the crash, the highest appreciation rates and biggest housing bubbles within the Twin Cities 
developed in the innermost tracts of each submarket. Following the crash, however, tracts in 
North Minneapolis, South Minneapolis, Frogtown, and Dayton’s Bluff experienced the largest 
levels of depreciation in home values and the highest foreclosure rates within their respective 
submarkets and across the metro region. Though correlation does not equal causation, the 
geographic connection between high depreciation and foreclosure rates and large concentrations 
of low-income, people of color underscores the uneven geography across the Twin Cities that 
extends not only to housing dynamics, such as depreciation and foreclosure, but the 
socioeconomic impact of these dynamics as well. Though communities throughout the metro 
region experienced the negative effects of the housing crash, including housing depreciation and 
rising foreclosure rates, these impacts were largely confined to areas with the highest 
concentrations of low-income residents, people of color, and renters. 
Another common thread that emerged from my analysis was the disproportionate impact 
of the foreclosure crisis on renters in the Twin Cities. In each of the five case studies, non-
homesteaded foreclosure rates were well above their homesteaded counterparts throughout the 
six year study period. Renter foreclosures were highest in inner tracts in North Minneapolis, 
South Minneapolis, and Frogtown, yet even inner- and outer-ring suburbs like Crystal and 
Burnsville witnessed double digit foreclosure rates that dwarfed homeowner foreclosure rates in 
these communities. While suburban areas tend to have fewer renters than central city 
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neighborhoods, renter foreclosure rates that are significantly higher than homeowner rates 
disproportionately affect less affluent residents and threaten neighborhood stability. Though 
much of the narrative around the foreclosure crisis surrounds homeowners, the startling disparity 
between homeowners and renters across all five case studies suggests a need to shift the way 
researchers and policymakers view foreclosures to include considerations of the impact on not 
just homeowners but renters as well.  
Yet, given existing socioeconomic inequality and the inequity inherent to the housing 
submarket model, is the uneven geography of the foreclosure crisis something that should have 
been expected? Although the assumptions of housing submarkets privilege predominantly white, 
affluent suburbanites, this assumption only applied to the Twin Cities after the housing crash. In 
fact, across all five case studies, the housing trends leading up to the housing crash contradict the 
assumptions of traditional housing submarket theory: though the extent varied between 
submarkets, the highest appreciation rates and biggest housing bubbles within the Twin Cities 
developed in the innermost tracts of each submarket. However, since 2007, post-crash 
depreciation rates and later housing recovery trends appear to support the underlying 
assumptions of submarket theory, with the highest levels of depreciation concentrated in the 
inner parts of each submarket and gradual appreciation occurring at the edges of suburban 
development. Therefore, it appears that the theory holds up to 2000 and after 2007. Considering 
the model did not fit any of the case studies between 2002 and 2007, was this pre-crash period a 
watershed moment signaling a shift in the submarket model, or simply an anomaly? Given the 
uneven impact of the foreclosure crisis in the Twin Cities, the answer to this question holds 
profound implications for residents, particularly low-income, people of color, hoping to achieve 
the “American Dream” within these middle-class submarkets. 
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LIMITATIONS 
Despite the evidence confirming an uneven geography to the foreclosure crisis within the 
Twin Cities, this research holds a few key limitations. As mentioned in Chapter III, the analysis 
relies upon a sample of over 1,400 houses that were collected in the field. Because “typical” 
homes were selected, the sampling is inherently subjective; for instance, two separate researchers 
could select two completely different samples of 1,400 houses and yield different results. 
Furthermore, although the average study tract has a sample size of 18 homes, the number of 
sample houses per study tract ranged from three to nearly 60. The number of sample houses per 
study tract has a direct effect on aggregated tract-level values, such as the sample median EMV, 
which means that the calculated median values for census tracts with smaller sample sizes may 
not be representative of the median value for the entire tract (Adams et al. 2002, p. 33). 
Additionally, because the sample of houses draws from a single traverse within each submarket, 
they reflect only a slice of the housing trends occurring within that submarket.  
Moreover, this research can neither convey qualitative aspects of the foreclosure crisis 
nor speak to the experiences of individual homeowners in the Twin Cities. Though this research 
may offer a database full of appreciation levels and foreclosure rates, quantitative analysis alone 
fails to offer insight into the effects of these dramatic housing dynamics and foreclosure rates 
within the hardest hit communities. For example, without qualitative analysis, this study cannot 
properly describe how the character of foreclosure-ridden neighborhoods has changed or what 
neighborhoods with over 10 percent annual foreclosure rates look like pre- and post-foreclosure 
crisis. Furthermore, because the research analyzes housing trends and foreclosure data at the 
census tract level, it does not reveal any information or conclusions regarding individual 
homeowners. For instance, though study tracts with large concentrations of low-income residents 
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and people of color were disproportionately impacted by the foreclosure crisis, the findings 
cannot conclude whether or not residents of color within high foreclosure tracts experienced the 
majority of these foreclosures. However, from the existing research on the community impact of 
foreclosures, this research does confirm that communities with concentrations of low-income 
residents and people of color also saw the highest foreclosure rates and these socioeconomic 
groups were more likely to experience the effects of foreclosure in their communities. 
NEXT STEPS 
Moving forward, future research should address the applicability of submarket theory to 
explain housing trends in the Twin Cities and examine the role of policy in conditioning the 
uneven geography of the foreclosure crisis documented in this paper. Although the assumptions 
of submarket theory hold prior to 2000, the housing dynamics in the Twin Cities leading up to 
the housing crash, particularly the concentration of the highest appreciation rates in the 
innermost parts of the housing market, contradict submarket theory. Following the crash, 
however, submarket theory applies to the Twin Cities region; inner-city tracts felt the highest 
levels of housing depreciation, while their suburban counterparts witnessed relatively low 
depreciation rates. Moreover, as of 2013, trends in the housing recovery appear to follow 
submarket theory as well. From Woodbury to Burnsville and Lakeville to Shoreview, suburban 
tracts at the edges of their respective submarkets have begun to see sample median home values 
climb since 2012 by as much six and seven percent. Therefore, do the abnormal housing 
dynamics prior to 2006 reflect a watershed moment for submarket theory or simply an anomaly? 
Are the uneven pre-crash appreciation levels indicative of a significant boom-and-bust period or 
changing housing tastes and preferences? 
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While this research cannot begin to answer these questions, it lays the foundation for 
future research into the ongoing applicability of the traditional assumptions of submarket theory 
in the Twin Cities. Though this study builds a compelling narrative of the uneven geography of 
the foreclosure crisis in the Twin Cities, further research is needed to make conclusions on the 
present and future state of submarket theory. Given more time and resources, I would like to 
examine how the housing dynamics in the five case studies evolve over the coming decade. 
Although the twelve year study period of this research emphasizes the years immediately 
preceding and succeeding the housing crash, it cannot predict how the housing submarkets will 
change moving forward. Instead, adopting a long-term approach to studying the housing 
dynamics in the Twin Cities should reveal whether pre-crash appreciation rates were a product of 
policies and practices or a sign of shifting housing trends.   
To address this question, future research would benefit from related policy analysis and 
qualitative methods. At the early stages of this research, I sought to not only examine the uneven 
geography of the foreclosure crisis but also discover the ways in which policies and practices 
conditioned this disparity. While this paper was unable to cover this subject matter, previous 
research has explicitly connected subprime and predatory lending practices, particularly in 
communities of color, to the disproportionate accumulation of risky mortgages and foreclosures 
in racially segregated neighborhoods (Rugh and Massey 2010, p. 630). Applying this research 
and approach to the Twin Cities could expose the ways in which local, state, and even federal 
policies and practices impacted the uneven housing dynamics in the Twin Cities and subverted 
the traditional submarket model leading up to the crash. Moreover, qualitative analysis, including 
interviews with community members living in the hardest hit parts of the Twin Cities and 
foreclosed renters from around the metro region, would add the human component to this story. 
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Though this research currently provides convincing evidence of the disproportionate impact of 
the foreclosure crisis on communities of color and low-income residents, it cannot show the real 
impact of this spatial disparity. As such, I would recommend further research to learn how those 
living in places like North Minneapolis, Frogtown, and Burnsville have experienced the effects 
of the foreclosure crisis documented in this project.  
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